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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION  
CRISIS LEADERSHIP:  
THE ROLES UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS AND CRISIS MANAGERS PLAY IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION – A CASE STUDY OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 
OF FLORIDA 
by   
Brenezza DaParre Garcia 
Florida International University, 2015   
Miami, Florida   
Professor Benjamin Baez, Major Professor 
Universities have had a tumultuous history in terms of crises. Though crises have 
always existed, its definition and emphasis in the landscape of higher education has 
dramatically changed in the last 50 years. For this reason, the study and implementation 
of crisis management systems have become a growing phenomenon on campuses around 
the nation. However, as the types of crises institutions face diversifies, communities’ 
emphasis on leadership accountability has also become more magnified. The role of the 
president, thus, has become increasingly relevant and critical to the conversation 
concerning campus security and safety.  
The purpose of this study was to better understand the phenomenon of crisis 
leadership in higher education. A case study of the State University System of Florida 
was chosen, interviewing all available university presidents and crisis managers. Its 
diversity in population, infrastructure and mission is the reason it was selected as an 
appropriate case. This study sought insight on how SUS presidents and crisis managers 
  
ix 
 
understood the concepts of crisis, crisis leadership and crisis management; what they 
perceived their roles and responsibilities to be throughout the crisis management cycle; 
and how these definitions and roles created and sustained a culture of safety, security and 
preparedness.  
The 16 study participants (6 presidents and 10 crisis managers) offered a great 
deal of insight on how they defined crisis leadership and its respective roles pre-, during 
and post-crises. Participants believed that the differing definitions of crisis; the 
university’s culture towards crisis management; the roles played by the university, 
presidents and crisis managers; resources (established and lacking); as well as the 
inevitable variability of crises, all played a critical role in leadership.  
The study’s findings supported Muffet-Willett’s position that crisis leadership is 
fundamentally connected to the relationship between presidents and crisis managers. 
Both must offer support, tangibly and intangibly, to one another so that others across the 
university see the importance being placed on crisis management. Findings of this study 
supported the assumption made in the literature by student affairs authors that presidents 
are critical to crisis management.  In addition, I concluded that crisis managers are also 
critical to crisis leadership. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Universities have had a tumultuous history in terms of crises. Though crises have 
always existed, its definition and emphasis in the landscape of higher education has 
dramatically changed in the last 50 years. For this reason, the study and implementation 
of crisis management systems have become a growing phenomenon on campuses around 
the nation. However, as the types of crises institutions face diversifies, the university 
communities’ search for accountability measures also becomes more magnified. The role 
of the president, thus, has become increasingly relevant and critical to the conversation of 
campus security and safety. This study was undertaken to contribute to the growing 
literature on crisis leadership in higher education, specifically by addressing how 
university presidents and crisis managers defined crisis and their roles in times of crisis; 
and, therefore, how they affected crisis management systems on their campuses as well as 
their institutions’ culture of safety and preparedness.  
Statement of the Problem 
Since the establishment of modern crisis management in the 1980s, the field has 
garnered more attention (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). This is especially true for higher 
education in the last decade with tragic incidents like the 9-11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, 
the Virginia Tech shootings, and the Sandusky scandal. Mitroff (2005) offered a 7-point 
argument on this issue, which illustrated that with the rapidly increasing number of major 
incidents, we have become a “crisis-prone society” (p. 3). “Crises are no longer an 
aberrant, rare, random, or peripheral feature of today’s society. They are built into the 
very fabric of modern societies” (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001, p. 5). Thus, crisis 
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management has become a phenomenon impacting how all academic administrators view 
the safety and security of their campuses.  
The study of crisis has been a growing field since the 1960s, specifically with the 
work done by Hermann (1963, 1972) who is considered to be the founding researcher in 
crisis management. His seminal book titled International Crises has become the 
foundation for many subsequent authors in the field. However, he noted that the problem 
with crisis research at that time was the lack of relevance. In his second book, Hermann 
(1972) offered three limits to the study of crises: analysis has been restricted to single 
case studies; the common belief that each crisis is unique and therefore must be 
researched as such; and, the blurred meanings of the word crisis. “These inhibitions in the 
study of crises must be overcome if we are to develop any knowledge about crises as a 
class of events” (p. 4). 
Sadly, with all of the horrific incidents affecting campuses across the nation, 
Hermann’s original problem in crisis research - lack of relevance - is no longer an issue. 
His other limits to the research, though, still stand true today. In the field of higher 
education, major incidents are often studied as stand-alone, distinctive events with 
lessons pulled for specific purposes. “Most of the student affairs and higher education 
literature on crisis management are anecdotal in nature, and relates the author’s 
experience in dealing with a particular crisis” (Zdziarski, 2001, 6). Though nonetheless 
important and relevant to the field, the available literature contains more subjective 
incident reports rather than empirical research on the topic (i.e., anecdotal lessons learned 
versus rigorous analyses). 
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Zdziarski (2001, 2006); Harper, Paterson, and Zdziarski (2006); Zdziarski, 
Dunkel, and Rollo (2007); and Hemphill and LaBanc (2010) have all produced 
significant work for student affairs professionals seeking insight into crisis management. 
Their research offered a unique perspective on how universities can better plan for, 
respond to and recover from major campus incidents. They also all alluded to the 
importance of the university president and how integral his/her support is for crisis 
management plans and teams. However, none of them analyzed the relationship 
dynamics of the crisis leader and crisis manager on their respective campuses. Similarly, 
none discussed how those role perceptions and interactions transcended into the campus’ 
overall endorsement (i.e., institutional buy-in) to inculcate a culture of safety, or 
explained why their involvement was in fact significant.  
Though research is vast in this field, it is all highly observational, idiosyncratic 
and situational. There are no research-oriented, specifically related to higher education, 
that helps answer why leaders (i.e., university presidents) are so critical to the study of 
crisis. This study sought to answer that question by better defining what a crisis leader is, 
and what roles these leaders play (both individually and with crisis managers) in crises.  
Purpose of the Study 
In Zdziarski’s (2001) influential dissertation on crisis management, he stated that 
one of the possible directions for further research of his study “should be approached 
from other perspectives within the institution (i.e., academic affairs, administration, 
finance, etc.)” (p. 114). Since his work was published, numerous incidents dealing with 
poor decision-making and slow response/action (e.g., Virginia Tech shooting) have 
supported the need to have additional research done within the field of crisis 
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management. Zdziarski’s recommendations, tied to the new trend of increased leader 
accountability, brought me to study crisis leadership.  
For the purpose of this study, Zdziarski et al.’s (2007) definition of crisis was 
used as the basis to formulate the research questions. As will be described in more detail 
in the literature review, their well-summarized description took the commonalities of 
corporate and government typologies, while bringing the uniqueness of higher education 
into the fold. The study sought to validate whether Zdziarski et al.’s position could be 
expounded past student affairs professionals into the realm of university presidents and 
crisis managers. Along these lines were the differing definitions and roles of crisis 
management and crisis leadership.  
Mitroff (2004) defined the differences between crisis management and crisis 
leadership as the former being “reactive” and the latter “proactive” (p. 10). In other 
words, crisis management can be called “crash management – what to do when 
everything falls apart” (Pauchant, 1992, p.10), while crisis leadership takes a more 
holistic, strategic approach. Given the different meanings of crisis by different authors 
and management cultures, many can agree that a crisis leader is also not necessarily a 
crisis manager (Daniels & Daniels, 2007). If a leader offers direction, vision, and 
inspiration, “a manager, then, is a technician who helps people, processes, and systems 
function together efficiently” (p. 35).  
It is through this perspective that I separated a crisis manager from a crisis leader 
throughout the rest of this study. In this study, a crisis manager is defined as a middle-
management incident coordinator, while a crisis leader represents the interests of the 
institution as a whole and all the constituents involved in the crisis (specifically for this 
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study, a university president). Though many commonalities exist between crisis managers 
and crisis leaders, there are fundamental differences that one must understand, which will 
be discussed in more detail later in the literature review. 
Since Zdziarski’s (2001) dissertation, which was the foundation of this study, 
three other academic works have been published that discuss crisis leadership in higher 
education, similar to the way it is defined in this study: a dissertation by Stacy M. Burrell 
(2009), a dissertation by Stacy L. Muffet-Willett (2010), and a recently published book 
by former Tulane University president, Scott Cowan (2014).  
Burrell grounded her research of crisis management systems on Christian-based 
institutions. This perspective carried with it various ethical and religious variables not 
normally found in secular universities across the nation. It is a very specific viewpoint 
that could be difficult to consider and properly analyze in my data, especially since this 
was a case study of public universities. Muffet-Willett (2010), on the other hand, did 
focus on crisis leadership as defined in this study. Her dissertation helped me gather 
strong comparing and contrasting crisis management and crisis leadership literature, 
which allowed me to hone in on my research questions. Muffet-Willett took one of 
Zdziarski’s research direction proposals and focused her research on crisis management 
from the administration perspective, which is similar to my impetus. However, she 
interviewed two leaders from private universities (of which I did not), and she did not 
interview a single university president (which is the focus of my research) or crisis 
manager (as was defined in this study). 
Cowan’s (2014) new book, The Inevitable City: The Resurgence of New Orleans 
and the Future of Urban America, discussed the challenges faced by and opportunities 
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presented to Tulane University in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Throughout the 
book, he illustrated principles of crisis leadership through a recounting of his 
experiences; some of which are discussed in the forthcoming literature review to help 
support this study’s findings. However, the book is just that - an autobiography of life 
lessons taken from what is notably one of the greatest examples of higher education 
leadership in the face of adversity.  
As noted earlier, Zdziarski (2001, 2006); Harper et al. (2006); Zdziarski et al. 
(2007); and Hemphill and LaBanc (2010) have all mentioned the importance of the 
university president and how integral his/her support is for crisis management plans and 
teams. However, each of these sources only had one or two sentences on the matter. None 
of these publications detailed why or how presidents played such a vital role.  
As such, I have yet to find any comprehensive, empirically-based work on higher 
education crisis leadership that also focuses on the university president. This is what 
makes this study unique. Similarly, with the ever-growing responsibility placed on 
university administrators to keep their institutions safe at all costs and also the increased 
liability for the actions of their employees (recent examples being Florida A&M, Penn 
State and Rutgers), this dissertation is of timely relevance for universities looking at 
implementing crisis management systems or reviewing their current practices. 
The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, was to better understand the 
phenomenon of crisis leadership in higher education. Specifically, I chose to conduct a 
case study of the State University System (SUS) of Florida, interviewing all available 
university presidents and crisis managers. Through the study, I found commonalities and 
analyzed key differences amongst the presidents and crisis managers related to their 
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definitions of and roles in crisis leadership, and how those definitions and perspectives 
enhanced, supported and/or hindered institutional crisis management systems. The 
findings have hopefully contributed to higher education literature by both strengthening 
and opposing former hypotheses on the importance of leadership in crises.  
Research Questions 
Due to the definitional morass related to the terms crisis and crisis leadership, 
three research questions formed the basis of this study: 
1. In the State University System of Florida, how does each president and crisis 
manager define “crisis”, “crisis management” and “crisis leadership” on their 
campuses? 
2. Per those definitions, (a) What roles do crisis managers and crisis leaders see 
themselves playing in crisis management and crisis leadership, respectively?, (b) 
What roles do the crisis managers see the presidents playing in crisis 
management, if any?, and (c) What roles do the presidents see crisis managers 
playing in crisis leadership, if any?  
3. How do those definitions and perceptions create a culture of preparedness towards 
and support of crisis management systems at their universities? 
Definition of Terms 
The following are terms used throughout the paper that may be unfamiliar or have 
multiple meanings to the reader: 
• Crisis: An intentional, unintentional, expected, unexpected, environmental, 
facility and/or human event that causes disruption to the operations of the 
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university. This definition was adapted from Zdziarski et al.’s (2007) Crisis 
Matrix. Other definitions of crisis are described within the literature review. 
• Crisis Leader: A proactive, high-ranking official who has ultimate decision-
making authority, and serves as the face of a major campus crisis. Specifically for 
this study, a university president. 
• Crisis Manager: A reactive, middle-management official who manages all tasks 
related to a campus crisis. This individual also serves as the lead official for more 
minor incidents at their university.  
• Founded: The year each institution was established. In this study, this referred to 
when the legislature approved the university’s creation, not the year each opened 
its doors or joined the SUS. 
• President: The top-ranking leader of a college or university. Called by different 
names depending on the institution (e.g., president, chancellor, CEO, etc.), 
“president” is the commonly used term within the sample studied, and hence used 
throughout the paper for consistency. 
• SUS: State University System. In this case, it is being used to refer to the 12-
institution public university system in the State of Florida. 
• Tabletop: An exercise to simulate crises scenarios with a goal to teach 
participants the proper way of responding and also to learn what, if any, gaps in 
the university exist (in terms of communication, resources, etc.).  
• University: An institution of higher learning offering advanced degrees. Though 
the U.S. has multiple higher education institutions (i.e., universities, colleges, 
community colleges, technical institutes, etc.), “university” is the commonly used 
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term within the sample studied. Specifically, New College is the only institution 
that does not have the word “university” in their name. Therefore, university was 
used throughout the paper for consistency to refer to all of the institutions in the 
sample.  
Summary 
Crisis management is a field that has been studied since the 1960s, and more in-
depth starting in the 1980s. Crisis leadership, on the other hand, is an area of study that 
has been highly subjective in nature. Part of this is due to the innumerable definitions of 
the term and how it affected the management of crises on university campuses. 
University presidents play a critical role in helping explain both their definition of and 
role in crises. Thus far, subjective anecdotes of crisis leadership have filled the majority 
of the literature (such as former Tulane president, Scott Cowen, who wrote heavily on his 
accounts from Hurricane Katrina). Though exceptions exist, there was a lack of empirical 
research in this field. Hence, there was a need to interview presidents, along with crisis 
managers, in order to gain a first-hand, candid perspective on the definitions of and roles 
in crisis leadership, as well as the relationship between them. The forthcoming literature 
review offered a foundational and historical basis that helped answer the study’s research 
questions. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Definitional Morass 
Etymologically, crisis comes from the Greek word krisis, meaning turning point 
in a disease, and from krinein, meaning to judge or decide (etymonline.com; Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). Today, crisis is an overused term in our everyday vernacular to 
describe a serious problem (Fearn-Banks, 2011). I felt no quote better described the 
difficulty in defining what a crisis was than the one John Gerring (2004) used to describe 
a case study: “the many academic attempts to clarify what ‘case study’ means has 
resulted in a definitional morass, and each time someone attempts to clear up the mess of 
definitions, it just gets worse” (p. 342, as cited in Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 302).  
Similarly, crisis management is now a term used by “a variety of disciplines, 
including business, education, public administration, communications, political science, 
and psychology” (Zdziarski, 2006, p. 4). How one defines these terms is highly 
dependent on which field he/she comes from. Simply put, “there is no single, universally 
accepted, definition of a crisis” (Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 1996, p. 7). This is 
supported by the third of Hermann’s (1972) limits to the study of crises, which relates to 
the blurred meanings of the word crisis. 
The multiple definitions cause what Coombs (1999) described as a fragmentation 
of the literature. In my review of the available literature on crisis management and crisis 
leadership, three key areas appeared: (a) how crisis is defined in the corporate world, 
which is from where the study of crisis management originated, (b) how governmental 
agencies define crisis, specifically related to disaster management, and (c) academia’s 
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definition of crisis and crisis management, which is the capstone of crisis leadership in 
higher education as defined in this study.  
Due to this definitional morass, three research questions formed the root of this 
study. The first asked how each president and crisis manager defined “crisis”, “crisis 
management” and “crisis leadership” on their campuses. Per those definitions, the second 
question sought to answer how crisis managers and crisis leaders saw themselves 
involved in crisis management and crisis leadership, respectively; how crisis managers 
saw presidents playing a role in crisis management, if any; and how presidents saw crisis 
managers playing a role in crisis leadership, if any. Furthermore, it sought to understand 
how those definitions and role perceptions contributed to the chosen, or missing, crisis 
management systems at their respective universities. It is through this muddled lens and 
perspective that the study first illustrated the several definitions of crisis and crisis 
management in order to create a contextual foundation for the creation of my first 
research question, and then showcase how these definitions influenced and supported the 
second and third research questions. 
Corporate Definitions and Typologies 
The field of modern crisis management is credited to have begun with the Tylenol 
poisonings of 1982 (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). After seven people were killed in the 
Chicago area, close to 31 million bottles with a retail value of over $100 million were 
pulled from the shelves by Johnson & Johnson after it was learned that only three batches 
were poisoned with cyanide (Rehak, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). When Johnson & 
Johnson took responsibility for the incident, though no direct fault was tied to them, it 
changed the dynamics of how organizations handled crises.  
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Though Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) considered themselves the founders of this 
field, there is a great amount of literature that can be divided into innumerable sub-topics 
(e.g., disaster management, risk management, issues management, etc.). For the purpose 
of this literature review, I have focused on the top authors credited with contributing to 
the way universities understand crisis management today. These authors were chosen 
according to Coombs (1999) rationale: “by the number of people citing the approach as 
an influence in the development of their crisis models” (p. 10).  
The study of crisis has been a growing field since the 1960s, specifically with the 
work done by Hermann (1963, 1972) who is considered to be the founding researcher in 
crisis management. His pivotal book, International Crises, has become the foundation for 
many subsequent authors in the field. However, he noted that the problem with crisis 
research at that time was the lack of relevance. In his second book in 1972, Hermann 
offered three limits to the study of crisis management: analysis has been restricted to 
single case studies, the common belief that each crisis is unique and therefore must be 
researched as such, and the blurred meanings of the word crisis. “These inhibitions in the 
study of crises must be overcome if we are to develop any knowledge about crises as a 
class of events” (p. 4). Though the lack of relevance is no longer a factor, Hermann’s 
stance did lead to an expanded field of literature. 
A crisis, defined by Webster as a turning point, does not need to have a negative 
connotation. “It is merely characterized by a certain degree of risk and uncertainty” 
(Fink, 1986, p. 15). Along those lines, crisis management should be described as “the art 
of removing the risk and uncertainty to allow you to achieve more control over your own 
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destiny” (p. 15). In other words, any pre-planning for those potential turning points can 
be considered crisis management (e.g., tabletop exercises).  
 Fink’s typology for crisis consisted of up to four phases. The prodromal crisis 
stage is considered the early warning, or pre-crisis stage (pp. 21-22). In this stage, crisis 
managers are aware of impending dangers and risks and take necessary steps to prepare. 
The acute crisis stage is “the point of no return” (p. 22). Some damage has already 
occurred, and it is the leadership’s responsibility to take control of the situation before the 
incident escalates. The third stage, chronic crisis, is a time of “recovery,” “self-analysis,” 
and “healing” (pp. 23-24). Last is the crisis resolution stage where the incident has been 
resolved. The goal of any crisis manager should be to get to the last stage immediately 
after the first stage, but, as we know from history, that is not always possible.  
Fearn-Banks (2011) slightly disagreed with Fink’s stance on the negative 
undertones of crisis. She described a crisis as “a major occurrence with a potentially 
negative outcome affecting the organization, company, or industry, as well as its public, 
products, services, or good name” (p. 2). Similar to other authors discussed in this 
review, Fearn-Banks noted that there are different types and stages of crisis. For her, it 
was more about the scale, or degree, of crisis. There are minor crises (incidents limited to 
a specific area and/or can quickly be controlled) and major crises (incidents involving 
significant injury or loss of life/property and an extended disruption to operations) (p. 
321). The stages include detection, prevention/preparation, containment, recovery and 
learning (pp. 4-5). As such, she described crisis management as “a strategic planning 
process, one that the organization can prepare for, with a high emphasis on 
communications” (p. 2).  
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create an effective crisis management program, a “systematic framework” of the most 
critical variables of crisis must be analyzed: types, phases, systems and stakeholders of 
crises (p. 14).  These variables take into account the scope, time progression, response 
modes, causes, resources, and people. This integrated system would help any crisis 
manager better assess the organization’s risks and opportunities.  
Building on their previous work, Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) jointly offered a 
“guiding definition” of crisis: “an event that affects or has the potential to affect the 
whole organization” (p. 34). To them, crisis management (CM) differed from emergency 
and risk management. They believed that CM dealt with “man-made or human-caused 
crises” and are “not inevitable” (p. 6). They noted that “for the first time, human-caused 
crises now rival natural disasters in scope and magnitude” (p. 23) and should hence be 
given more weight. For these reasons, companies must think beyond public relations and 
understand that new skills are needed in today’s world in order to better manage crises 
(Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001).  
 By the time of their 2001 publication, not only had accountability measures 
become a recommended standard operating procedure in their writings, but an unlearned 
lesson came to fruition: “the failure of success” (Mitroff & Anagnos, p. 20). Management 
consultant, Peter Drucker, has noted that companies run into problems more often 
because they have grown accustomed to their success and become complacent, and less 
so because of frequent problems that arise. It is similar to the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix 
it” mentality. The companies therefore repeat their actions, simply because that is the 
way they have always been done, until the day that is no longer good enough and crisis 
ensues. 
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Society first understood crises in terms of natural disasters, things out of our 
control. Currently, we see crises as unplanned, critical incidents. Mitroff (2005) 
differentiated between these “normal” and “abnormal” events (pp. 9-10) as follows: 
“Normal accidents represent the unintentional breakdown of complex technical and 
organizational systems” (e.g., fires, floods, manufacturing mistakes, etc.). “In contrast, 
abnormal accidents represent the intentional breakup of complex technical, organization, 
and social systems” (e.g., bombings, cyberattacks, shootings, etc.) (p. 10). As noted 
earlier, Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) strongly believed that these incidents are made and 
caused by humans. In other words, there are in fact events that are unavoidable for 
organizations.   
Coombs (1999) partially agreed with Mitroff and defined crisis as “unpredictable 
but not unexpected” (p. 2). He posited that crisis managers can most effectively respond 
to crisis by classifying it into the following categories: natural disasters, malevolence, 
technical breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, megadamage, organizational 
misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors. Once categorized, they can be properly 
managed in order “to ward off or reduce the threats by providing guidelines for properly 
handling crisis” (p. 3). Coombs also suggested that “issues management, risk assessment, 
and stakeholder relations all serve to scan information that could be relevant to crisis 
management” (p. 18). Lerbinger (2012) later took these types of crises and classified 
them into three groupings: “crises of the physical world, crises of the human climate, and 
crises of the management failure” (p. 18).  
Lerbinger (2012), though, offered a slightly different definition of crisis, 
suggesting that an organization’s reputation must also be at risk: “a crisis is an event that 
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brings, or has the potential for bringing, an organization into disrepute and imperils its 
future profitability, growth, and possibly, its very survival” (p. 9). Though the definition 
differs from the aforementioned authors, Lerbinger’s characteristics of a crisis 
(suddenness, uncertainty, and time compression) are in line with those described in other 
literature. 
 Seymour and Moore (2000) conjectured that crisis “‘happens’ in two ways: first, 
by actually catching a company unprepared; second, by exploiting surprise and 
weaknesses in the company’s culture to dig itself in” (p. 10). They advised that 
companies are vulnerable to crisis if they: (a) “get too comfortable about risks,” (b) “start 
with the wrong perspective,” (c) “fail to respect the emotions of our audiences,” (d) “try 
to ‘lose’ the problem,” (e) “individuals or teams try going it alone,” and (f) “ignore the 
warning signs” (pp. 17-23). How companies respond to and recover from these crises, 
therefore, are the crux of their success.  
 Corporate literature is very careful, though, to separate crisis management from 
risk communication and issues management. Seymour and Moore (2000) defined risks as 
“personal fears” and issues as “social concerns” (pp. 161-162). Individual fears can 
spread and cause national concern, hence risks can easily turn into issues, and issues into 
crises. For example, a small community’s fear of sanitation issues can quickly turn into a 
state-wide or nation-wide concern. Companies, then, must foresee the fine transition 
when a problem will soon become public enough that they have to move from issues 
management into crisis management (Seymour & Moore).  
Skinner and Mersham (2002) took crisis management and offered a multi-
dimensional approach, breaking it down into issues, disasters, and crises. They defined 
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an “issue” differently than Seymour and Moore; they saw it as an “unresolved or 
ambiguous social or policy matter of public concern” (p. 12). They saw a “disaster” as a 
“rapid disruption of routine operations causing serious damage to property and/or injury 
to people, and a ‘crisis’ as an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs whose outcome 
will make a decisive difference…for an organization” (p. 12). Ultimately, Skinner and 
Mersham (2002) believed it is disasters, or unresolved issues, that lead to and cause 
crises. 
 In sum, Skinner and Mersham (2002) defined crises as “unplanned events that 
directly or potentially threaten a company’s reputation; the environment; the health, 
safety or welfare of employees; and the health, safety or welfare of citizens in 
communities…” (p. 23). They saw crisis management as a process with five stages: 
detection, prevention, containment, recovery and learning (p. 24) - similar to the Crisis 
Management Cycle - and described the overlap of issues and crisis management through 
the work of Bland (1998): 
A crisis is an issue in a hurry. You could also say that an issue is an infant 
crisis. Both present some kind of threat – to your reputation, your bottom 
line, your license to operate and so on – but usually over a different period 
of time. Crisis management therefore requires more in terms of advance 
planning, team building, training, simulations and prepared plans. You 
have to be able to ‘press a button’ and preplanned operations rapidly fall 
into place. (p. 172, as cited in Skinner and Mersham, p. 18) 
 
Therefore, issues management is considered “an ‘early warning’ process” that allows the 
organization’s top leadership to better plan and communicate and is important in the 
success of crisis management. 
Seeger et al. (2003) researched organizational crisis and defined it as “a specific, 
unexpected and non-routine organizationally based event or series of events which 
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creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high 
priority goals” (p. 7, cited from Seeger et al., 1998, p. 233). They used Hermann’s (1963) 
model, which is considered the first and most widely used model of crisis, to come to that 
definition. Hermann posited that a crisis is based on three conditions: “(1) threatens high 
priority values of the organization goals, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which 
a decision can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization” (p. 
64). Seeger et al. (2003) felt that though not all of these conditions have to be present for 
a crisis to exist, “the perception of a serious and credible threat is a requisite feature of all 
crisis events” (p. 8).  
 Similar to Seymour and Moore (2000) and Skinner and Mersham (2002), Seeger 
et al. (2003) also believed that there is a noted difference between risk communication 
and issue management. Per their research, this is supported by Crable and Vibert’s (1985) 
work: “issues are unresolved questions or perceived problems that arise in the public 
domain with the potential to affect an organization” (p. 11). Therefore, “issues 
management is the strategic process of ‘issues identification, monitoring, and analysis’ 
seeking to influence their resolution in a manner mutually beneficial to the organization 
and its stakeholders” (Heath, 1997, as cited in Seeger et al., 2003, p. 11).  
 Overall, corporate definitions and typologies of crisis are no doubt affected by 
definitional morass. Their views on crisis, risk and issues management all differ while 
coinciding at the same time. Regardless of stage, level, or type, all of the aforementioned 
authors would agree, though, that crisis entails a certain “suddenness” to it. No matter 
how much you prepare, there comes a point where there is minimal control and the 
incident becomes more about mitigating and recovering. This common definition is 
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something that I looked for from the study participants. It was important to understand if 
and why their definitions were in line with or rejected this shared notion.  
Governmental Definitions and Typologies 
From the numerous lessons learned from private organizations, federal, state and 
local governments have also had their fair share of management issues to address. 
Though all agencies have dealt with their own types of crises, the governmental 
organization most relevant to this paper’s definition of crisis is the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). They were tasked with supporting the nation not just in 
recovery from, but also in preparation for natural disasters. Though natural disasters are 
only one part of the definition of crisis as used in this study, FEMA’s implementation 
strategies are nonetheless important to the subsequent discussion of crisis management 
and crisis leadership within higher education. 
FEMA can trace its history back to the Congressional Act of 1803 after 
government assistance was provided to a fire-ravaged city in New Hampshire (Dunkel & 
Stump, 2007). They came to define an incident as “an occurrence or event, natural or 
human caused, that requires a response to protect life or property” (FEMA IS-700.A). 
The agency, though, was officially established in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter. In 
2003, when George Bush signed the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-
5, Management of Domestic Incidents as a response to the 9-11 attacks, he directed the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop and administer a new system (LaBanc, 
Krepel, Johnson, & Herrmann, 2006). This directive required all federal agencies to adopt 
and use the National Incident Management System (NIMS) “as their individual domestic 
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incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and 
mitigation programs and activities” (FEMA IS-700.A).  
The system provides a consistent, nationwide approach for multiple agencies or 
jurisdictions to work together to build, sustain and deliver the core capabilities needed to 
achieve a secure and resilient nation (FEMA IS-700.A). The Incident Command System 
(ICS), a component of NIMS, is a flexible, collaborative system that “consists of a 
standard management hierarchy and procedures for managing temporary incident(s) of 
any size” (FEMA IS-100.HE). Together, they “answer how to manage emergencies from 
preparedness to recovery regardless of their cause, size, location or complexity” (FEMA 
IS-700.A). 
The concept of the Incident Command System was developed more than 40 years 
ago in the aftermath of a devastating wildfire in California. During 13 days in 1970, 16 
lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed, and over 0.5 million acres burned. The 
overall cost and loss associated with these fires totaled $18 million per day (FEMA IS-
100.HE). Although all of the responding agencies cooperated to the best of their ability, 
numerous problems with communication and coordination hampered their effectiveness. 
As a result, Congress mandated that the U.S. Forest Service design a system that would 
“make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California wildland fire protection 
agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to allocate suppression 
resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations” (FEMA IS-100.HE).  
The Forest Service’s system gradually became a national model for best practices, 
until Homeland Security produced the official NIMS manual in 2004 (FEMA IS-
100.HE). This manual made ICS a key component. In part, it created essential features 
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that all universities (especially those that generally require mutual aid from other 
agencies) must properly implement. Without suitable application, universities across the 
nation are left without the appropriate resources to seek assistance during times of need.  
Generally, FEMA is associated with disaster management for states and cities. 
However, institutions of higher education are not immune from environmental, human, or 
facility incidents, emergencies or disasters (Coombs, 1999; Zdziarski et al., 2007).  An 
example of such a crisis, and discussed in more detail later in this review, was Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. Students and faculty were forced to leave New Orleans and attend other 
universities across the nation (some permanently), crippling city’s higher educational 
system.  
Universities in New Orleans were forced to deal with several agencies (including 
FEMA) who were overwhelmed in handling city-wide issues. This caused a lot of 
confusion and miscommunication, leaving the door wide open for mishaps to occur. 
“Whenever outside assistance is summoned to deal with a campus incident, questions can 
arise over ‘who’s in charge’” (Dunkel & Stump, 2007, p. 122). For example, institutions 
with NIMS-compliant plans have what are referred to as emergency operations plans 
(EOPs).  
A university EOP, if NIMS compliant, will provide a command structure 
and assignments of responsibility and authority; a concept of operations 
focused on mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; and a series 
of annexes or appendixes that address specific emergency response 
functions such as communication and warning, fire and rescue, public 
information, evacuation, and the emergency operations center (EOC). 
(LaBanc et al., 2006, p. 55) 
 
Had these New Orleans institutions had a comprehensive plan in place prior to the 
hurricane they may have had a more efficient and effective recovery period. 
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Protecting lives, preventing injury, and minimizing property damage are among 
the primary goals of NIMS/ICS. These goals are important and relevant because they 
address our basic need for physical safety, as detailed in Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of 
needs (Figure 2). However, the need for safety extends beyond the physical. It transcends 
into the social-emotional, the organizational, and the cultural (as cited in Cole, Henry, 
Tyson, Fitzgerald, & Hopkins, 2009). One framework that recognizes and integrates all 
four of these aspects is the Tagiuri model, which has been identified by Cole et al. (2009) 
as an appropriate framework for examining school climate and the related aspects of 
safety. Based on this model, one should see that learning not only requires a secure 
physical setting, but also a caring, welcoming, and predictable environment. 
 
Figure 2. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 
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Tagiuri (1968) presented four intersecting components of organizational climate: 
culture, ecology, milieu, and organization or structure (Figure 3). According to Tagiuri, 
as articulated by Lindahl (2006), organizational culture includes: 
Assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, ways of thinking, behavior patterns, 
and artifacts; this definition seems to parallel closely many of the 
prominent authorities in the field. However, his construct of organizational 
climate tends to be more encompassing than that of many of his peers. 
Within ecology, he included buildings and facilities, technology, and 
pedagogical interventions. Within milieu, Tagiuri subsumed the race, 
ethnicity, socio-economic levels, and gender of organizational members 
and participants, their motivation and skills, and the organization’s 
leadership. His organization or structure construct includes 
communication and decision-making patterns within the organization, the 
organizational hierarchy and formal structures, and the level of 
bureaucratization. Although this definition is so comprehensive as to 
resemble French and Bell’s (1998) organizational systems model and can 
somewhat blur the core definition of organizational climate, it serves as a 
good reminder of the interrelatedness of all these factors with 
organizational climate and culture. It also illustrates the broad range of 
organizational issues that must be taken into consideration when planning 
for large-scale organizational improvement. (p. 4) 
 
This theory can be used by any organization and is easily adaptable into the ICS model, 
especially for educational organizations. Institutions with a school crisis team, or a 
similar group, but unfamiliar with ICS, should be comforted in knowing that many 
similarities exist with their organization’s standard culture of safety and security. Both 
follow a hierarchical system and acknowledge that multiple levels of response may occur. 
The only key difference is that the more comprehensive structure and function of ICS 
will allow for a coordinated response should other agencies need to be involved in the 
crisis (Nickerson, Brock & Reeves, 2006). 
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Figure 3. Tagiuri’s Model of Organizational Climate. 
 
Given today’s increased number of threats and the national trend of dwindling 
institutional budgets, colleges and universities must be ready to partner with local, state, 
and federal agencies to respond to and recover from an emergency.  
ICS allows campus personnel and community responders to adopt an 
integrated organizational structure that matches the complexities and 
demands of the incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional 
boundaries. With institutes of higher education blending into the larger 
community response system, ICS allows all involved to know their roles 
and work together, without jeopardizing anyone’s voice or authority. 
(FEMA IS-100.HE) 
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By using the Incident Command System, institutions can help ensure the safety of its first 
responders, students, employees and visitors. It can also help achieve response objectives 
and the efficient use of resources. 
Using ICS during crises only succeeds, though, when everyone assumes personal 
accountability. Emergency plans require an all-hands, all-lenses methodology, that will 
offer a multifaceted approach to safety. Institutions must dramatically increase their 
ability to develop, practice, and effectively implement functional incident response plans. 
In a world where resources must be shared more frequently due to budget crunches, 
organizations must have the infrastructure capable of supporting external aid and multi-
agency coordination. In a true crisis, leadership must understand that this pre-planning 
could be the difference between $100,000 in damages or $1 million – and in some 
extreme cases, between life and death.  
Academic Definitions and Typologies 
 Definitional morass of crisis has also affected academic institutions. As our 
society combats economic issues, “crises” in higher education can include that of 
decreasing budgets, faculty hiring, student rights, academic freedom, etc., and are often 
“of their own making” (Dressel, 1981, p. 178). Consolidating many of the corporate and 
governmental definitions and typologies, Zdziarski (2001) initially believed that all 
crises, especially in higher education, could be categorized into four categories: natural, 
facility, criminal and human. For the purpose of this study, Zdziarski’s later adapted 
definition of crisis (2006) will be the metric used for his well-rounded explanation that 
hits the main arguments made by aforementioned authors in terms of disaster, issues and 
risk management.  
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He classified “a campus crisis [as] an event, often sudden or unexpected, that 
disrupts the normal operations of the institution or its education mission and threatens the 
well-being of personnel, property, financial resources, and/or reputations of the 
institution” (Zdziarski, 2006, p. 5). Like Skinner and Mersham (2002), Zdziarski (2006) 
posited that there are three levels of crisis: (a) “a disaster is an unexpected event that 
disrupts normal operations of not only the institution but the surrounding community as 
well,” (b) “a crisis is an unexpected event that disrupts the entire institution,” and (c) “a 
critical incident is an event that causes a disruption to part of the campus community” (p. 
5).  
 In a later publication, Zdziarski et al. (2007) created the Crisis Matrix (Figure 4) 
and reduced Zdziarski’s (2001) original four categories of crises down to three: 
environmental, facility and human (the “natural” group being renamed to 
“environmental”, and the “criminal” group being enveloped into “human”). All of these 
crises are part of the larger Crisis Management Cycle (Figure 5), or Crisis Management 
Process - Planning, Prevention, Response, Recovery and Learning. It is these models that 
make up the core of higher education crisis management systems. 
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Figure 4. Zdziarski, Rollo and Dunkel’s Crisis Matrix. 
 
 
Figure 5. Crisis Management Cycle. 
 
As noted earlier, Zdziarski’s (2006) definition of crisis has been the best 
summarized description for academic institutions. It takes the commonalities of corporate 
and government typologies, while bringing the uniqueness of higher education into the 
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fold. It is distinctive because of the specific challenges and opportunities that only 
universities experience during times of crisis, much like the studies is this next section. 
Historical Significance of Crisis Management in Higher Education 
 Though crisis is not a term that can be traced back to a specific date or incident, 
there are several tragedies that have occurred throughout America that have inextricably 
changed the fabric of our culture. Specifically for higher education, universities have 
been seen as organizations “of social harmony built on charitable foundations that [work] 
to enhance the intellectual abilities and professional capabilities of all members of a 
collaborative academic community” (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010, p. 1). As such, each 
institution, “for better or for worse, is expected to be – and needs to be – an institution 
especially committed to life and safety” (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010, p. 2).  
This expectation is once again supported through Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of 
needs. He posited that once the basic physiological needs are met, all humans have a 
desire to feel safe. This tenet was something parents felt, into the early 20th century, 
campuses should offer their children (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010; Muffet-Willett, 2010). 
However, as history has shown us, this has not always been the case. Over the last five 
decades, some unfortunate incidents created a national movement in higher education for 
institutions to better learn from, react to, and prepare for crises.  
As discussed in the first chapter and supported by others like Zdziarski (2001), 
there is no empirical research on this topic. The following incidents simply offered 
practical examples of the aforementioned literature, as well as needed historical 
significance, by illustrating a few key moments in our history that have led to the 
formation of university crisis management systems as we know it today. 
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University of Texas-Austin  
The long-standing view of universities as safe havens changed on August 1, 1966. 
The Texas Bell Tower at the University of Texas-Austin was the tallest building in the 
entire city at the time, with a height of 307 feet. All citizens were free to climb to the top 
observation deck for a 360-degree panorama of the city. It was this vantage point that 
attracted Charles Whitman, a former U.S. Marine Corps sharpshooter, to campus. At 
around 3:00 AM that day, Whitman killed his mother and his wife, leaving a note stating 
he did not want them to suffer for the actions he would commit later in the day. Close to 
noon, Whitman opened fire on the UT-Austin campus for 96 minutes. He killed 14 
people, and injured dozens more. (Ferraro, & McHugh, 2010). 
 Though this was not the first crisis to ever happen on a college campus, nor the 
last, “this incident stands out for its undeniable impact on the community and the nation” 
(Zdziarski et al., 2007, p. 7). Given that the event occurred in a state’s capital, media 
outlets were more readily available to capture the gruesome details. The nation was glued 
to their television and radio sets as the events unfolded. The incident marked the first 
time a university crisis was at the center of news coverage. 
UT’s police officers at that time did not carry weapons and could not 
appropriately take charge of the incident, hence Whitman’s lengthy stand-off. Because of 
this inability to respond, “police agencies across the nation began developing a new type 
of response” (Zdziarski et al., 2007, p. 8). Snow (1996) credited the UT incident for the 
creation of the first Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT), which of course has 
had a long-standing impact on crisis incidents across the nation.   
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Kent State 
 During the 60s and 70s, there was a large amount of protests related to civil rights 
and anti-war campaigns. On April 30, 1970, U.S. President Nixon announced that the 
country would be invading Cambodia and, hence, widening the Vietnam War. The next 
day, an anti-war rally was held within the Commons of Kent State University. After 
peaceful demonstrations turned into violence within the city, Kent Mayor, Leroy Satrom, 
declared a state of emergency. He sought Ohio Governor, James Rhodes, to dispatch the 
Ohio National Guard to the university.  
 On Monday, May 4, another rally was held on campus. Just before noon, the 
National Guard asked the protestors to disperse. When they refused, General Canterbury 
of the National Guard ordered his men to prepare their weapons. After the crowd once 
again refused to stop the protest, gunshots and tear gas was released into the crowd, air, 
and/or ground. “Altogether between 61 and 67 shots were fired in a 13 second period” 
(Lewis & Hensley). In total, there were four students killed and nine injured.  
The event triggered a nationwide student strike that forced hundreds of colleges 
and universities to close. H. R. Haldeman, a top aide to President Richard Nixon, 
suggested the shootings had a direct impact on national politics. Political researchers 
have posited that the Kent State shootings eventually destroyed the Nixon administration 
and “[came] to symbolize the deep political and social divisions that so sharply divided 
the country during the Vietnam War era” (Lewis & Hensley). 
Lehigh University 
 One of the seminal cases on how institutions across the nation changed their way 
of approaching on-campus incidents was the murder of Lehigh University freshman, 
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Jeanne Clery. In April 1986, Josoph M. Henry entered a women’s residence hall where 
Clery resided, and proceeded to rape, beat and murder her. In an interview by People 
Magazine (1990), the parents of Jeanne Clery recounted how “they assumed Lehigh was 
as safe as it looked.” At the time of Clery’s murder, Lehigh only had 12 security guards 
for its 5,400 student population, and had 38 violent offenses in a 3-year period; for 
context, Penn State, with six times as many students, had just 24 incidents (Gross & Fine, 
1990). However, no parent or student had any way of knowing this unless they contacted 
the FBI for the university’s crimes report.  
With the loss of their child as a motivation, the Clery family used the money 
gained from a law suit settlement with the university to form a foundation and lobby the 
Pennsylvania legislature to require colleges and universities to create an easily accessible 
report of on-campus crimes. They soon gained national momentum, and in 1990 the 
federal government passed the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act (later 
renamed the Clery Act). The Act required all institutions that obtained federal funding 
(including financial aid for its students) to keep and disclose information about crime on 
and near their respective campuses (securityoncampus.org).  This federal mandate “has 
changed the nature of the discussion on college campuses at orientation programs, putting 
front and center the expectations of today’s parents regarding the responsibility of 
institutions to protect and warn their children about potential harms” (Rollo & Zdziarski, 
2007, p. 10).  
Syracuse University 
 For the first time in the history of higher education in the U.S., international 
terrorism had affected our opinion of student safety outside of campus. On December 21, 
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1988, the transatlantic Pan Am Flight 103 from London Heathrow International Airport 
to New York’s JFK Airport exploded in mid-air and crashed down around Lockerbie, 
Scotland. Attacked by two Libyan nationals, the bombing accounted for the deaths of 259 
passengers and crew members. Among the flight manifest were several students returning 
to the U.S. from study abroad, but Syracuse University claimed the most with 35 students 
aboard the plane (archives.syr.edu/panam/). 
 Like with the UT-Austin murders, this incident brought national coverage and 
shocked the nation, forcing Americans to realize how vulnerable we really were. Through 
this incident, the U.S. had officially re-entered an era of international threat. “Once again, 
the scale of this tragedy and its impact on our campuses changed the way we view our 
off-campus experiences but also affected our sense of safety from forces in the world that 
until this incident seemed far away” (Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007, p. 11). We were later 
reminded the impact an incident of this nature could have on the landscape of higher 
education during the 9-11 terror attacks. 
University of Florida 
 On the first day of classes at UF in August 1990, two female student bodies were 
found inside their apartment complex. Within the next five days, three additional bodies 
were found, all but one were female, and all were murdered by Danny Rolling. Once 
news broke of the tragedies, the university was overwhelmed by concerned parents and 
inquisitive media outlets. The switchboards were jammed and news trucks lined the 
campus (Collison, 1990). “The age of the twenty-four-hour news channel and satellite 
television trucks that allowed any story of local significance to immediately become a 
national story dawned,” (Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007, p. 12).  
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 Unlike with the University of Texas-Austin incident, where it took days to set up 
a press conference, the University of Florida did not have the luxury of time. The nation 
was watching and waiting for a response. The university, and all institutions moving 
forward, had to put plans in place that allowed administrators and spokespersons to 
respond quickly and accurately in a time of such tragedy (Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007). The 
community demanded to know that the university was safe. However, John V. Lombardi, 
university president at the time, made a poignant statement that resonates until this day: 
“Unfortunately, there are no 100% safe environments in America or at any university. To 
tell you there is no risk is simply not to be realistic” (Collison, 1990). 
Hurricane Katrina 
 Hurricane Andrew devastated the South Florida region in 1991, and after the 
effects it had on the University of Miami and Florida International University, institutions 
across the nation realized the impact a storm could have on their operations and the lives 
of their constituents (Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007). However, no one could ever have planned 
for what occurred to New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina wiped out 
the entire city. Though numerous institutions across the region and other states were 
affected (Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi), none were greater than Tulane 
University, Xavier University, Loyola University, Dillard University, Southern 
University and University of New Orleans – all in the heart of the city – with almost $2 
billion in damages (Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007). As noted earliest in the literature review, 
institutions were left to fund themselves as FEMA focused its efforts on city-wide issues. 
 Led by the now revered Tulane University president, Scott Cowen, universities in 
the area sought mutual aid from colleges and universities across the nation to allow their 
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students to enroll and continue their studies in schools outside of New Orleans until the 
institutions could re-institute their basic infrastructures. Through this tragedy, we learned 
that “even resources can be shared, among institutions that before Katrina seemed 
divided by an uncrossable chasm formed through history, traditions, and culture” (Rollo 
& Zdziarski, 2007, p. 22). Faced with this unthinkable task, Cowen stated in a press 
conference: “This is the most significant reinvention of a university in the United States 
in over a century,” (Pinto, 2005). Cowen’s numerous articles on the challenges faced by 
institutions in New Orleans have become a key resource to university presidents and 
crisis management teams. His recent book will be discussed in further detail later in this 
chapter.  
Virginia Tech 
  Described as “the bloodiest and most pitiless assault in the history of American 
higher education,” April 16, 2007 marked a day few in higher education will ever forget 
(Ferraro & McHugh, 2010, p. 16). The mass shooting, done by Seung Hui Cho, occurred 
on two parts of campus, leaving 33 dead. The first shooting, leaving two dead, made 
officials believe it was “domestic” in nature and that it was an isolated incident (Hauser 
& O’Connor, 2007). Though institutional protocols were followed for the first incident, 
the university was not locked down, allowing Cho to go on a 9-minute shooting rampage 
later in the day inside Norris Hall. The decision to not shut down operations after the first 
incident sparked criticism against the administration on whether they communicated the 
potential dangers to the campus community in an appropriate and a timely manner.  
Prior to this incident, the UT-Austin shooting was the deadliest event to occur at 
any university. Also more worrisome was the killer’s ties to the university. Once the 
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investigation into the murders and the assailant began, it was discovered that Cho had 
seen psychologists on campus. This fueled a national conversation on the responsibility 
the university had to disclose Cho’s erratic behaviors and thoughts for the greater safety 
of the community, and how accountable or liable the institution was to the families of the 
deceased students. This debate continues today as campus incidents tied to mental health 
issues, like the Florida State shooting (which occurred while this study was underway), 
become more rampant.   
Summary 
 Though these cases were just a few of the unfortunate incidents to have happened 
on university campuses over the last five decades, they were nonetheless significant to 
the study. In each of these examples, attention was given, lessons were learned, actions 
were corrected, and crises were defined. It was through these incidents that universities 
have learned to manage and lead in crisis. Crisis managers and crisis leaders alike have 
evolved into their roles today, in part, because of it. 
Leadership in Crisis 
The previous sections provided a contextual foundation for this study and an 
overview of crisis and crisis management, as well as the historical significance of those 
two within higher education. We now turn to the focus of the study, crisis leadership. But 
before one discusses leadership in crisis, it is important to first understand the definition 
of leadership.  
Despite the variable meanings by different authors and organizational cultures, 
most can agree that a leader is not necessarily a manager (Daniels & Daniels, 2007). If a 
leader offers direction, vision, and inspiration, “a manager, then, is a technician who 
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helps people, processes, and systems function together efficiently” (p. 35). Though many 
commonalities exist, there are fundamental differences that one must understand. Leaders 
deal with change and effectiveness, and also have a focus on creating, the external, and 
the future (pp. 40-44). Managers, on the other hand, deal with stability and efficiency; 
they focus on delivering reinforcers, the internal, and the near-term (Daniels & Daniels, 
2007, pp. 40-44). It is through this perspective, that I separated a crisis manager from a 
crisis leader throughout the rest of this study. 
Leadership Skills Defined 
Leadership, as defined by Seeger at al. (2003), “frequently frames the larger 
meaning of the crisis, which may be necessary for followers to begin the initial 
sensemaking process that ultimately leads to coordinated, harm-reducing actions” (p. 
239). They posited that crisis leadership has four factors. Traits refer to a leader’s 
personal qualities; style refers to specific actions and behaviors taken by the leader; 
contingency focuses on matching the leader’s style with the specific task at hand; and 
symbolic to the “qualitative and symbolic dimensions of the leader’s activities” (pp. 243-
247). Likewise, the functions of crisis leadership are divided into what leaders can 
actually do pre-crisis, during crisis, and post-crisis.  
Expanding on a leader’s traits, Inc released a short article in 2014 titled “5 Things 
Successful Leaders Do in a Crisis.” Though focused on business leaders, the article still 
touched upon characteristics that all leaders, regardless of their field, can implement 
during times of crises. The first two lessons were that leaders “don’t let their emotions get 
in the way” and “are brave.” In other words, leaders should always remain calm. 
Becoming overwhelmed can lead to fear, which can transcend into the team becoming 
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worried that the situation is direr than it actually is and/or they will not be able to 
overcome the situation. Leaders being “accountable for their victories and their losses” 
and that they “don’t take failure personally” were the next two traits. Successful leaders 
not only own up to their mistakes and accept the responsibilities placed on them to act 
and respond, but they also do not take offense if their decisions don’t go as planned. 
Lastly, “successful leaders possess positive attitudes from start to finish.” During and 
after crises, teams and communities can be frustrated and/or exhausted. It is important for 
a leader to always offer encouragement, support and appreciation for their team’s hard 
work – despite any setbacks.  
Leadership, of course, also entails perceived and actual power, authority and 
influence. Dressel (1981) defined each of these by their respective relationship to one 
another. Power, he viewed, was “the ability, by any means, to control or determine the 
formulation, interpretation, or application of policy” (p. 75). Authority was the 
“recognized power” that was granted to specific leaders by their office and/or supervisor 
(p. 75).  Influence, on the other hand, was “informal power” used in consultation, 
persuasion or suggestion (p. 75). It is important to understand these dynamics within any 
organization, so that decisions can be made by the right person, for the right reason, and 
at the right time. 
The skills of insight, decision-making, communication, and focus are not unique 
to crisis management, but they do “[make] a difference during the management of a 
crisis” (Silva & McGann, 1995, p. 125). Leaders must develop insight to constantly 
question rules, policies, and practices in order to see the incident in its truest form (Silva 
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& McGann, 1995). They must avoid “addressing symptoms rather than the cause of a 
crisis” (p. 129).  
Management books advise that one of the keys to a successful leader is good 
decision-making. However, the important variable in crisis “involves isolating pivotal 
pieces of data that prompt rapid decision making and swift action” (Silva & McGann, 
1995, p. 132). Similarly, and according to Muffet-Willett and Kruse (2008), “the ability 
of a leader to adapt to a changing and complex environment is a key foundation of crisis 
leadership” (p. 255). They created a Crisis Leadership Continuum (Figure 6) that 
showcased the differing types of situations crisis leaders could be faced with. The point 
they were making was that decision-making in crises conditions is difficult enough for a 
seasoned leader, let alone an ill-prepared one. They posited that experience and training 
can go a long way to better prepare leaders to act. 
 
Figure 6. Muffet-Willett and Kruse’s Crisis Leadership Continuum. 
 
Crisis communication, though not a topic detailed thoroughly in this literature 
review, is also and nonetheless critically important. According to Silva and McGann 
(1995), “the key to developing effective crisis communication lies in stopping bull----!” 
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(p. 136). Honesty, especially to your employees, will build trust in the leader’s actions 
and in the management system. The last of the four skills discussed by Silva and McGann 
is focus, which is described in terms of “concepts” instead of “activities” (p. 136). Here, 
leaders must center their decisions on the overarching goal for that specific incident, 
instead of handling each question or issue separately.  
As previously mentioned, decision-making is at the root of crisis leadership. 
Dressel (1982) offered seven dimensions for decision-making that still stand true today: 
(a) “the awareness or consciousness that a decision is expected and is being made,” (b) 
“the importance or interest attached to an issue and a decision regarding it,” (c) “the 
process by which the decision is to be made,” (d) “the identification of exactly what is 
involved in making the decision,” (e) “the amount of flexibility or rigidity that exists both 
in directing the nature of the decision and in the decision itself, “ (f) “the identification of 
whether the decision deals with structural, procedural, or substantive matters,” and (g) 
“implementation and evaluation” (pp. 62-64). Leadership, then, must understand that 
practices are not necessarily rules. Turning a practice into a regulation is itself a “double 
decision” (p. 69). So it is with crisis management.  
Of course, the skills desired by crisis leaders and crisis managers alike can vary 
from organization to organization. Lerbinger (2012) described the two most common 
forms of crisis decision-making: maintenance learning and shock learning. Maintenance 
learning describes a system where employees “uphold an existing system” (p. 307). In 
other words, they do the same things the same way just because that is the way they have 
always been done. Shock learning, on the other hand, is when an event occurs that shakes 
up the organizations protocols.  
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However, Lerbinger (2012) proposed that crisis leaders and managers should 
follow Warren Bennis’s decision-making method of “innovative learning” (p. 307). 
Bennis posited that the core characteristics of this learning style are “anticipation and 
participation” (as cited in Lerbinger, 2012, p. 307).  
Unless executives incorporate the additional modes of crisis management 
problem solving in their lexicon of competencies both they and their 
organizations will falter. But if executives adopt new perspectives and 
acquire new skills in dealing with expanded external environments, they 
will become leaders and their organizations will excel. (Lerbinger, 2012, 
p. 311) 
 
Therefore, it is critical for leaders to also be open to learning new techniques and gaining 
knowledge through all methods, even if through their own failures as noted earlier by 
Mitroff & Anagnos (2001).   
Unless there is a firm decision made by top management that crisis management 
is an important aspect of the organization’s values and policies, there will never be a way 
to enforce it when the time comes to implement the plans. Though this stance was alluded 
to in Dressel’s work, it was something that was specifically addressed in the study’s 
findings. During the participant interviews, decision-making in crisis was be raised as a 
sub-theme to Culture. The data analysis of those responses confirmed Dressel’s position.  
Importance of Top Management 
Early warning signs to any crisis are important to the successful response of and 
recovery from the incident. Therefore, constituents, especially employees, need to be 
empowered to speak up when they know of potential risks and threats (Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001). For crisis management programs specifically, “experience demonstrates 
repeatedly that without a champion nothing significant will occur with regard to any 
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major program in an organization” (p. 149). These champions can come from all parts of 
the organization, but one must obtain buy-in from the whole leadership and management 
teams on the reasons why CM is so important. “In other words, one must sell 
simultaneously up and down the entire chain of command” (p. 151). 
Zdziarski (2001, 2006); Harper et al. (2006); Zdziarski et al. (2007); and 
Hemphill and LaBanc (2010) have all alluded to the importance of the university 
president and how integral his/her support is for crisis management plans and teams. 
However, none of them discussed how that support transcends into the campus’ desire to 
inculcate a culture of safety, or explained why their involvement is in fact significant. 
Muffet-Willett’s (2010) dissertation on crisis leadership took one of Zdziarski’s (2001) 
proposed research directions and focused on university crises from the administration’s 
perspective. The biggest takeaway from her work was the Higher Education Crisis 
Leadership Practical Process Model (Figure 6). 
This model consisted of five actions that she believed contribute to effective crisis 
leadership in universities. The first action, which related most directly to this study, is 
“top administrative support and involvement” (Muffet-Willett, 2010, p. 149). The deed 
not only provides a symbolic investment in the process, but also contributes to 
accountability and effective management of the entire system. For those organizations 
that have crisis management teams, “without the involvement of upper administration, 
the collaborative structure … can become loosely held together, leading to power 
struggles, egos, and turf war issues among the group members” (p. 135). Therefore, 
effective crisis leadership is intrinsically tied to the relationship with the crisis managers. 
The leader “must value the team’s formation, support the team with a charge, and be 
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ready to provide resources to assist the team’s work” (Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007, p. 
62).   
 
Figure 7. Muffet-Willet’s Higher Education Crisis Leadership Practical Process Model. 
 
It is important to remember to always keep top management informed of all 
emergency incidents, and ignore the “until it’s really necessary” response (Skinner & 
Mersham, 2002, p. 33).  Providing “filtered” news to the top management only leads to 
poor decision-making because the CEO did not receive all of the facts (p. 48). The “don’t 
tell the boss mentality” can also be a detriment (p. 48). However, excluding them from 
the communication cycle altogether is just as bad. Recent cases have illustrated “that non-
involvement by the top ranking officer of the corporation can waste time, impair 
decision-making, and jeopardize the company’s credibility” (p. 60).  
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For these reasons, organizational leaders must first look at the culture of trust, 
accountability and communication they have created and are continuing to build. 
Employees should always feel comfortable in approaching leaders with serious concerns 
and constructive feedback. That is why providing access to top management, cannot only 
open the lines of communication, but it can remove any speculation that the leadership 
has turned a blind eye to an incident or is involved in a cover-up. A relevant example of 
this was the Penn State scandal where lower ranking staff members were afraid to speak 
up about Jerry Sandusky’s actions against children. The times the incidents were 
reported, the administrators who knew thought they did their due diligence by “reporting 
up” to the university president even though they did not verify that President Spanier took 
proper corrective action. 
Sometimes incidents move into the public domain like stated by Seymour and 
Moore (2000), which cause, especially in recent years, the media to focus all their energy 
in uncovering the truth. In these instances, the president often has the most credibility, 
and is seen “as a true representative of the company, as a person who can make decisions, 
and speak for the company” (Fearn-Banks, 2011, p. 37). However, it is important to 
know when the CEO should speak and when the crisis is so specialized that an expert 
should be assigned to be the official spokesperson (Fearn-Banks, 2011). Here, crisis 
leaders (or presidents) and crisis managers create a symbiotic relationship; both 
depending on each other to succeed.  
Though their roles are different in times of crisis, presidents and managers must 
nonetheless work together to mitigate the incident at hand. Crisis leadership becomes the 
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tool to bridge communication gaps, solidify institutional values and work towards 
common goals.  
Crisis Leadership in Higher Education 
Mitroff (2004) defined the differences between crisis management and crisis 
leadership: the previous being “reactive” and the latter “proactive” (p. 10). In other 
words, crisis management can also be termed “crash management – what to do when 
everything falls apart” (Pauchant, 1992, p.10); whereas, crisis leadership takes a more 
high-level, pre-incident, strategic approach. Of the universities researched prior to the 
start of interviews, most had two or three employees assigned to lead the crisis 
management effort (as defined in this study). Usually they were an in administrative 
position who reported to one of the vice presidents and had operational oversight of on-
campus incidents. The president, on the other hand, (for the most part) served as the 
principal leader during times of crisis. It was expected that in true crises (i.e., not small 
incidents), he/she set the tone for the response and was the spokesperson for the 
constituents involved. This differentiation between manager and leader is the mainstay of 
my research. 
Crisis leadership is loosely defined as supporting a healthy infrastructure for crisis 
management, dedication to constant training and policy review, accepting that wrong 
actions can offer the organization a unique perspective on how to improve, and the ability 
to influence others to follow the leader’s ethical commitments (Seeger et al., 2003; 
Klann, 2003). However, it is important to separate the “integrated design” of crisis 
leadership and the “centralized” structure of crisis management (Mitroff, 2004, p. 19). 
Whereas adding another committee or department can add to the growing bureaucracy of 
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an institution, developing the infrastructure for crisis leadership to thrive is tantamount to 
the safety and well-being of the institution as a whole and not just on a case-by-case basis 
(Mitroff, 2004).  
An example of this infrastructure is the organization-wide management team 
recommended by the ICS. It is suggested that colleges and universities perform table-top 
exercises throughout the year that allow for real-life simulations of potential crises. To do 
them properly, the crisis management team is not the only one involved. The university 
administration, including the president, forms what is called the Executive Policy Group 
(EPG). While the CM team handles the detailed oversight of the incident, the EPG 
handles all major decisions like closures, evacuations, etc. Their purpose is to offer a 
holistic approach to the issues at hand, while balancing the individual needs proposed to 
them by the team.  
Keeping these models in mind, Klann (2003) argued that there are three 
components of effective crisis leadership: communication, clarity of vision and values, 
and caring relationships. As also discussed by Dressel (1981), Klann (2003) urged leaders 
to use their influence as an ability to persuade and motivate, but not in an authoritative 
way. “[This] difference lies not in the importance of influence as a leadership capacity 
but rather in the particular context of crisis itself” (pp. 11). Dressel (1981) also observed 
that “few administrators who have been at an institution over a period of time with no 
serious problems can adjust to a crisis situation” (p. 179). Only through preparation, 
lessons learned and experience can one truly be ready for crisis. This is another aspect of 
Muffet-Willett’s (2010) model, which describes the need for collaborative training.  
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As such, there is a key disparity between “a successful leader” and “an effective 
leader” (Klann, 2003, p. 20). Similar to Seeger et al. (2003), Klann (2003) posited that 
“an organization’s senior leadership is needed before, during, and after a crisis, and its 
quality can determine the length, severity, and ultimate consequences of the crisis” (p. 
21). The decisions, actions and behaviors that crisis leaders offer will inevitably affect the 
success of the institution’s response. 
Along these lines, Zdziarski (2001) conducted a survey of the National 
Association of Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA) member institutions about 
their perceptions of crisis management teams. One of his questions related to the internal 
stakeholders with the greatest involvement in crises, which resulted in an interesting fact 
- the university president was ranked 13 out of 23. Zdziarski (2006) noted that “the 
ranking [was] less important than the point it illustrates: although the president is 
informed and involved in most campus crises, he or she may not necessarily be directly 
involved on the crisis management team” (p. 15). Contrary to the ICS recommendation, 
this involvement will of course depend on the institution’s campus culture, created by the 
significance placed by the president’s leadership. 
Melding into these factors and functions are the president’s own values and 
ethics, the core guiding principles of any person’s actions and words, which are brought 
out most visibly during crises (Seeger et al., 2003). These individual philosophies can 
affect an institution’s attitudes towards crisis management, as noted by Fred P. Pestello, 
President of Saint Louis University, in a 2015 AGB Trusteeship article: “Like Polaris 
Guiding Ancient Mariners To Safe Shores, a College’s or University’s Deep-seated 
Values Are the Beacons That Its Executive and Board Members Should Rely Upon to 
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Lead Them Through a Crisis”. He believed that sometimes crisis leaders are so focused 
on the short-term responses needed during crises, that they lose sight of the university’s 
mission, vision and values. When this occurs, trust in the leader’s capabilities can 
sometimes be undermined. For example, Florida International University’s first 
institutional value is “freedom of thought and expression.” If they were to have a large 
protest on campus and a hasty decision was made by the administration to shut it down, it 
would, in theory, go against one of the university’s core values.  
Every university is different. They each have different missions, student 
populations, research foci, and campus cultures. As such, the role of every president is 
different; each with their own goals for their tenure. The safety and well-being of campus 
is always a concern for presidents, but how deep-seated they make those values greatly 
depends on the importance placed on them. Sometimes the lack of attention can create a 
culture of apathy or non-reporting, causing room for errors to grow. This perspective is 
supported by the study’s findings and are discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters.  
Presidents are seen as leaders, academics, politicians, fundraisers, chief 
executives, but also most recently as “targets” (Trombley, 2007). The latter alludes to the 
recent scandals affecting campuses around the nation, namely “human crises” (Zdziarski, 
2001) involving allegations of child molestation, embezzlement, hazing, murder and 
failed communications. Presidents have been named key conspirators, regardless of their 
direct involvement in an incident. Because they are the institutional leader, the public is 
holding them more accountable for the actions (or lack thereof) of their organizations. 
Key examples of this are: (a) the criticism of Virginia Tech President Charles W. Steger 
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for supposedly not properly warning the university community of the threat related to the 
2007 on-campus shootings, (b) the 2012 resignation of FAMU President James H. 
Ammons after the hazing death of one of the university’s band members, and (c) the 2012 
charge of perjury against former Penn State President Graham Spanier during the 
Sandusky trial for claiming not to have known about the incidents.  
Especially in today’s universities, “when a president takes the lead in crisis 
preparedness of an institution, ultimately he/she takes ethical responsibility for its 
constituents and their well-being” (Burrell, 2009, p. 57). This accountability measure is 
yet another thing that differentiates a crisis manager from a crisis leader in my study. The 
study’s findings both supported and opposed this opinion by defining the presidents’ role 
in crisis and analyzing the relationship between managers and their leader.  
Personification 
 As noted earlier, former Tulane University president, Scott Cowan, released a 
book on his experiences leading Tulane through the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Many in the field of higher education have called his speeches and articles a shining 
example of effective leadership in crisis. His book, The Inevitable City (2014), not only 
describes the journey he and his colleagues went through in New Orleans, but also broke 
down the leadership components he used throughout the recovery process.  
 In his introduction, Cowan shared what he believed leadership is and why it is 
important: 
Leadership is about making a significant positive difference in the lives of 
organizations and people. It involves envisioning a future that does not currently 
exist and working with others to realize it. The journey from vision to outcome is 
a long one that requires giving of yourself, empowering and inspiring others, 
being willing to give and take, and finding the courage to act and the 
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determination and will to succeed. To effect transformational change is often 
difficult and chaotic, but leaders always act to ambitiously optimize a situation, 
aiming for the best possible in a highly imperfect world. They recognize good 
ideas, understand and respect conflicting points of view, and actively engaged 
with others. Most important, they don’t quit till they get it done. (pp. 6-7) 
 
For Cowan, leadership came down to ethical and moral decision-making, individual life 
lessons including one’s upbringing and personal beliefs. Using this as a foundation, 
Cowan shared his perspective on what happened during Katrina through 10 leadership 
principles, each described in its own chapter: (a) do the right thing, (b) seek common 
ground, (c) marshal facts, (d) understand reality, (e) aim high, (f) stand up for your 
beliefs, (g) make contact, (h) innovate, (i) embrace emotion, and (j) be true to core 
values.  
 Doing the right thing “is what separates true leaders from those who do not have 
the capacity or insight to search out what’s required to resolve complex issues” (p. 13). 
As noted earlier, crisis leaders have to bear an added level of accountability. Their 
decisions to do what they believe is what “determines success versus failure” (p. 13). 
While the leader at the end must make a call, a decision should not be made without 
gaining input from experts and colleagues.  
Effective leaders have the ability to find commonalities and bring people together 
because they are good listeners, can see all points of view, empathize with those 
who may oppose them, and find the connecting tissue of ideas that forms the basis 
of principled and fact-based decisions. (p. 29) 
 
In other words, collaboration and teamwork is important in crisis decision-making. In this 
shared process, facts and reliable evidence direct the leader to make informed judgement 
calls. This information gathering leads to the fourth element of crisis leadership for 
Cowan, which is “the ability to understand the reality of situations” (p. 72). Although this 
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data collection is key to decision-making, so is understanding the differing variables of 
the situation at hand. With school in session, President Cowan had to frame his decisions 
quite differently than if the hurricane had hit during a university break.  
 In crisis, leaders must set goals, both short-term and long-term, to help guide 
those involved on where to focus their energies. The main goal in crisis, as noted by Fink 
(1986), is to always move towards crisis resolution as efficiently and effectively as 
possible. However, in order to do so, crisis leaders must establish order and vision, as 
also discussed by Klann (2003). These goals, though, must always be set with integrity. 
People will follow those who stand for something they respect, who adhere to a 
code of ethics, and who are consistent in their thoughts and actions. A leader who 
lacks a moral compass, compassion, and a willingness to fight for his or her 
beliefs is not worth following. (Cowan, 2014, p. 119) 
 
Leaders in crises should be dependable, and their decisions should always be consistent 
with their words, actions and beliefs. And when they are not, a proper justification should 
be shared in order to keep transparency.  
 Tied to collaboration, which was mentioned earlier, relationship-building is also 
critical to successful crisis leadership, a point also raised by Klann (2003). These 
partnerships offer open and shared communication as well as cooperative engagement, 
which can lead to innovation and creativity. President Cowan spoke about the types of 
institutional cultures that “are laboratories for progress, yielding novel approaches that 
have the potential to alter the landscape of the future” (p. 164). Just as important as the 
university’s culture, it was equally important to understand and accept the community’s 
beliefs, values and histories. This emotional component also has a great effect on crisis 
decision-making, especially when dealing with systematic change.  These cultural 
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elements all contribute to a leader’s own culture. His/her own values and beliefs can be 
changed by their environment. However, for Cowan, a leader’s core values will forever 
remain unchanged. “Leaders remain true to core values of responsibility, persistence, 
integrity, and creative problem solving, with an eye to the ultimate good. By 
strengthening inner character, a leader develops the capacity for results, showing the way 
forward by example” (p. 207). In sum, Cowan believed that all leaders in crisis must 
make forward-thinking decisions with all available facts, through collaboration, with 
conviction and for the greater good.  
Summary 
 Significant events in the last 50 years have contributed to these definitions of 
crises, while also shaping the landscape of campus safety and security. Crisis 
management teams offer an important contribution to that sense of protection, by being 
the day-to-day accountable officers to the campus community. However, without support 
from top management, crisis management teams would be limited in their successes. 
University presidents, based on the literature review, serve a critical role as crisis leaders 
in setting the institutional tone when responding to crisis and influencing their respective 
campuses to implement effective crisis management plans.  
A study of this nature is important in order to start creating a concise view of 
crisis leadership within higher education. Crisis, crisis management and crisis leadership 
can mean different things to different organizations. Corporate, governmental and 
educational literature all have their own unique nuances. In the context of higher 
education, for example, crisis is best defined by Zdziarski et al. (2007) as an intentional 
or unintentional, human, environmental or facility incident, emergency or disaster. 
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However, this definition was taken solely from a student affairs perspective. It is through 
this definitional morass that I found the basis of my research, and sought to find clarity 
amongst crisis managers and leaders alike. That is why interviewing both university 
presidents and their respective crisis managers aided in answering how both groups 
define crisis, crisis management and crisis leadership, while also understanding the roles 
they each believe they played as well as how those roles contributed to a culture of safety 
and preparedness. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Restatement of the Problem 
As noted in Chapter 1, several authors have all produced significant work for 
student affairs professionals seeking insight into crisis management. Their research 
offered a unique perspective on how universities can better plan for, respond to and 
recover from major campus incidents. They all touched upon the importance of the 
university president and how integral his/her support was for university crisis 
management systems. However, none of them detailed how that support transferred into 
an institution-wide ethos of safety. The differences and relationships between crisis 
managers and crisis leaders are of integral importance. The purpose of this dissertation, 
therefore, was to better understand the phenomenon of crisis leadership in higher 
education through the lens of university presidents and their crisis managers.  
Research Questions 
In an effort to better define crisis leadership in higher education, three research 
questions formed the basis of this study: 
1. In the State University System of Florida, how does each president and crisis 
manager define “crisis”, “crisis management” and “crisis leadership” on their 
campuses? 
2. Per those definitions, (a) What roles do crisis managers and crisis leaders see 
themselves playing in crisis management and crisis leadership, respectively?, (b) 
What roles do the crisis managers see the presidents playing in crisis 
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management, if any?, and (c) What roles do the presidents see crisis managers 
playing in crisis leadership, if any?  
3. How do those definitions and perceptions create a culture of preparedness towards 
and support of crisis management systems at their universities? 
Research Design 
 A qualitative study was selected as the basis of research because of the goal to 
find meaning (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007) in the phenomenon of crisis leadership from the 
perspective of institutional administrators.  Literature in this field has discussed how 
important top management is for crisis management, but only one study that I have found 
(Muffet-Willett’s 2010 dissertation) and one book (Cowan, 2014) have investigated the 
university leaders’ perspective on crises. Likewise, in the review of the literature, no 
work was located that discussed whether the assumptions made by the student affairs 
authors discussed in the literature review about the presidents’ role in crises were in fact 
relevant to the study of crisis leadership.  
Purposely, a case study was chosen because its definition matched the research 
parameters: “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) 
stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Merriam-Webster, 2015). 
The way the research questions were framed – use of the “how” and “why” questions – 
and the study’s focus on contemporary events are additional reasons why a case study 
served as the best research method for this dissertation (Yin, 2009). The study was bound 
within the context of crisis leadership through the perspectives of university presidents 
and crisis managers in the State University System of Florida. More specifically, this was 
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an “instrumental case study” where the “case is examined mainly to provide insight into 
an issue or to redraw a generalization” (Stake, 2000, p. 445).  
The study’s theoretical framework was based on a basic interpretive approach, 
seeking how the participants made meaning of crisis leadership in higher education. 
Merriam (2002) stipulated that this type of research involves “phenomenology and 
symbolic interactionism” (p. 37).  Drawing from these, this study facilitated a general 
understanding on how university presidents across the nation made meaning of crisis 
management and crisis leadership, especially in a time where more accountability is 
being placed on their shoulders.  
Adding to the interactionism of the interpretive approach to case studies is the 
political theory called Miles’ Law. Rufus E. Miles, Jr. was an assistant secretary for three 
United States Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson. His law stated that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Miles 
postulated: “We see things and form judgments of things from our own perspective. We 
need to discipline ourselves to see things from other’s vantage point” (McKinney, 2008). 
Similarly, how crisis leaders and crisis managers form their own definitions and 
understand their own roles (and perceive that of the other group) could also establish the 
relationship dynamics (symbiotic, independent, or otherwise) between crisis managers 
and crisis leaders at universities.  
The main method of analysis for the study was modified analytic induction. 
Because a goal of this study was to find commonalities between the presidents’ thoughts 
on crisis leadership, while also keeping in mind that there could be vast differences, this 
procedure allowed for in-depth data collection and analysis. This also tied well with the 
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decision to use purposeful sampling as it is the sampling method used in analytic 
induction (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). 
Role of the Researcher 
 The impetus behind choosing crisis leadership as my dissertation topic was 3-
pronged. I must first start on a personal level. On November 14, 2004, two FIU students 
(one, a member of my sorority and the other, a member of a fraternity – but both friends 
of mine) passed away from carbon monoxide poisoning while they were talking inside a 
car. As the incoming president of my sorority, I was charged with organizing 
remembrance vigils, forced to conduct media interviews, and thrown into caring for 100+ 
women who were now under my leadership. At 22, I was ill-equipped to handle so much 
responsibility. No doubt, it reframed my collegiate experience in a way few could 
understand.  
A week after their passing, I began working for FIU’s Office of the President. 
Throughout my 10 years in the office (from 2004 through the time this was published), I 
had seen my bosses (formerly President Maidique, and currently President Rosenberg) 
deal with a lot of different crises. As an observer of or participant in all of their decisions, 
I had definitely grown professionally. My unique vantage point gave me an exclusive 
perspective into the pitfalls and opportunities of crisis leadership in higher education.  
Lastly came my academic experiences. Towards the end of my doctoral 
coursework, I took a class called Crisis Management in Higher Education. The course 
was taught by our Dean of Students, Cathy Akens, and it gave me an opportunity to 
explore the CM field in greater detail. Through a class assignment where I analyzed the 
Bonfire incident at Texas A&M in 1999, I found that my interest in crisis management 
  
58 
had increased. The next semester when I was tasked for another course to commence this 
study’s literature review, I was able to delve deeper into the crisis management and 
higher education literature. During this time, I learned about the lack of empirical 
research in this arena. After consulting with my boss, President Rosenberg, about my 
dissertation research options, I decided that with my personal and professional 
experiences, my direct contact with university presidents, and the need for expanded 
research on crisis leadership in higher education, there was a niche in the literature to 
which I could contribute.  
In further preparation for this study, I participated in four trainings that would 
contribute to researcher credibility. The first, required by the University Graduate School, 
was the Institutional Review Board (IRB) training in social and behavioral sciences 
research. This course offered me the foundation needed for the appropriate conduct of 
human subjects’ research in my field. The other three were FEMA certification courses: 
Active Shooter (IS-907), National Incident Management System (NIMS) An Introduction 
(IS-700.a), and Introduction to the Incident Command System for Higher Education (IS-
100.HE). Though voluntary, these FEMA trainings provided me a strong bridge between 
the literature and the real-life processes that public universities go through. Specifically, 
since all SUS universities are required to follow NIMS protocols for emergency 
management, this procedural knowledge became useful during the participant interviews 
(especially when meeting with the crisis managers from emergency management 
departments).  
Additionally, I also participated at my home institution’s quarterly tabletop 
exercises through the data collection and analysis period of this study. These gatherings 
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are meant to simulate real-life scenarios, test how the administration would respond, and 
analyze if there are any gaps in communications, resources, and/or operations that the 
university should address. I attended tabletops on a hurricane, chemical spill, cyber-
security breach and protest. Like with the FEMA trainings, these helped provide me 
contextual familiarity with the terminology, personnel, and operations of a crisis 
management system.  
Participants 
 Purposeful sampling is a key characteristic of case studies. The particular unit of 
analysis is selected out of the researcher’s interest in the topic, but “depends upon what 
you want to learn and the significance that knowledge might have for extending theory or 
improving practice” (Merriam, 2002, p. 179). Because of the scarce empirical research 
available on crisis leadership in higher education, it was important to select university 
presidents and crisis managers as the participants for this study. However, because states 
and institutions differed so variably in their educational policies and procedures, it was 
best to narrow the pool of possible participants so that the data could more easily be 
accessed and analyzed.  
The State University System of Florida (Figure 8), which was chosen as the 
sample for this study, boasted 12 universities. According to the Florida Board of 
Governors’ (BOG) 2013-2014 Accountability Report (the most recent version available 
at the time of this study’s publication), the System served close to 338,000 students; 77% 
being undergraduate students, 18% graduate, and 5% as unclassified (i.e., non-degree 
seeking, dual enrollment, etc.). Total degrees awarded for the 2013/2014 academic year 
totaled over 83,000, and the system employed over 62,000 full-time and part-time 
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personnel. The SUS’s diversity in population, infrastructure and mission were the reasons 
it was selected as an appropriate sample, so that it could be representative of current 
public university systems in the United States. 
 
Figure 8. Map of the State University System of Florida. 
 
Since only the SUS was selected for the study sample, it is important to clarify 
why not all universities in Florida were selected for the study. Because private 
institutions tend to have more academic homogeneity and are not always required to 
follow federal and state policies on safety and security (e.g., NIMS protocols, federal 
reporting, etc.), including them in the sample simply did not meet the study’s scope and 
participant criterion.  
The following list (in alphabetical order) summarizes each of the 12 SUS 
institutions who were asked to participate. All enrollment numbers listed were based on 
Fall 2013 data (which was the academic term used in the BOG’s last published 
  
61 
accountability reports) and rounded to the nearest 1,000. Cities and acreage were 
included for each university because of one of the sub-themes (“size and location”) that 
came out in the findings.  
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU), with 420 acres of land, 
was founded in 1887 in Tallahassee. Their enrollment was 11,000. Their newest 
president, Elmira Mangum, was confirmed by the Florida Board of Governors in 
February 2014. Until then, Larry Robinson had served as interim president after a very 
public band-related hazing incident forced former president, James H. Ammons, to resign 
amidst the scandal in 2012. Going into data collection, I was cognizant that this interview 
would be difficult to obtain because of FAMU’s cautiousness to discuss any matters 
related to the band. Proposed approaches on how this sensitive matter was handled is 
discussed further in the Research Design and Limitations sections.  
Florida Atlantic University (FAU), with 850 acres, was founded in 1964 in Boca 
Raton. Their enrollment was 31,000. John W. Kelly was elected the university’s new 
president in January 2014. Their outgoing interim president, Dennis Crudele, who was 
the university’s Chief Financial Officer, took over after the university’s sixth president, 
Mary Jane Saunders, resigned amidst several controversies related to faculty, students 
and donors. 
Florida Gulf Coast University (FGCU) was founded in 1991 in Fort Myers with 
760 acres. Their enrollment was 14,000. Wilson G. Bradshaw is their 10th president, 
serving since 2007. 
Florida International University (FIU) was founded in 1965 in Miami. With two 
main campuses, they lie on 573 acres. Their enrollment was 53,000, making them the 
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fourth largest public university in the country and the second in the State of Florida. Mark 
B. Rosenberg is their fifth president, serving since 2009. 
In 2012, the Florida State Legislature created Florida Polytechnic University 
(FPU), the SUS’s 12th institution, with 138 acres. This establishment, hence, dissolved 
the University of South Florida’s polytechnic campus. Florida Polytechnic resides on a 
new campus in Lakeland and opened for classes on August 25, 2014. Randy K. Avent is 
FPU’s founding president. Because they were still building their infrastructure, it was 
decided prior to data collection that no FPU crisis managers would be contacted for 
interviews.  
Florida State University (FSU) was founded in 1851 in Tallahassee with 475 
acres. It serves as one of the two flagship institutions for the State. Their enrollment was 
41,000. Eric J. Barron was their 14th president, serving since 2010. However, news 
shocked the SUS when he unexpectedly announced in February 2014 that he accepted a 
job offer from Penn State to become their president. FSU provost, Garnett Stokes, took 
over as interim in April 2014 and served until John E. Thrasher took office in November 
2014. The timing of this transition, and the on-campus active shooter incident (both 
having occurred amidst this study’s data collection), added some unique challenges to 
participation. Details are discussed later in this chapter. 
New College of Florida (NCF), with 144 acres, was founded in 1960 in Sarasota. 
Their enrollment was just under 800 students.  This low number is because they focus 
solely on undergraduate liberal arts degrees. Donal O’Shea is their fifth president, serving 
since 2012. 
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University of Central Florida (UCF) was founded in 1963 in Orlando with 1,415 
acres. Their enrollment was 60,000, making them the second largest public university in 
the country and the largest in the State of Florida. John C. Hitt is their fourth president, 
serving since 1992. UCF also boasts an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), a top 
model within the SUS. 
Sitting on 2,000 acres (the most of the entire SUS), University of Florida (UF) 
was founded in 1853 in Gainesville. It serves as one of the other flagship institutions for 
the State. Their enrollment was 50,000. J. Bernard Machen was their 16th president, 
serving from 2004 through 2014. On January 1, 2015, W. Kent Fuchs became UF’s new 
president. The timing of this change in leadership, similar to FSU, caused some 
scheduling challenges that are also addressed later on. 
University of North Florida (UNF) was founded in 1972 in Jacksonville. Their 
enrollment was 16,000 with 1,300 acres. John A. Delaney is their fifth president, serving 
since 2003. 
University of South Florida (USF) was founded in 1956 in Tampa. Their 
enrollment was 48,000, with 1,913 acres (the second most in the SUS). Judy L. Genshaft 
is their sixth president, serving since 2000. 
Lastly is the University of West Florida (UWF). They were founded in 1963 in 
Pensacola. Their enrollment was 13,000 with 1,600 acres. Judith A. Bense is their fifth 
president, serving since 2008. 
These SUS presidents comprised a potential sample of 12 participants. However, 
the sample also included each president’s crisis managers. Some universities had a 
decentralized crisis management system where student incidents and disaster 
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management (for example) were overseen by different administrators. Those more 
“technical experts” (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 176) offered the study a unique perspective 
into how, if at all, they believed presidents fit the role of a crisis leader and why and how 
those perceived roles played a part in creating the appropriate institutional culture of 
safety, security and preparedness. 
In searching online, it was quickly evident that each institution defined the role of 
crisis manager differently. Therefore, it was difficult to locate the appropriate person(s) 
on each campus who had the most relevant oversight to crises as defined in this study. 
Not only did they all have different names (e.g., Safety Officer vs. Director of Emergency 
Management) and reported to different administrators (e.g., some police departments 
were under Student Affairs while others were under Finance), but each university divided 
their oversight for crisis management differently (e.g., Chief of Police for injuries, 
Director of Facilities Management for building incidents, Dean of Students for personal 
matters, etc.). In other words, each university potentially had more than one crisis 
manager (as defined in this study) available for interview. As to not miss any key 
participants or offend anyone by my assumptions that they would be suited for my study, 
I sought the assistance of two colleagues to participate in a pilot study: Cathy Akens (FIU 
Dean of Students) and Amy Aiken (FIU Director of the Emergency Operations Center). 
Details on their insight is described in the Data Collection section of this chapter. 
Prior to the pilot study, there was an initial proposed sample of 23 participants 
(one president and at least one crisis manager for each university, except FPU whose 
president was the only one to be included). There was, of course, no guarantee that all 
proposed participants would be willing or available to meet. For example, it was posited 
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that with so many presidents new to their posts, a request of this nature would be at the 
bottom of their priority list; and it was understood that the scope of the research could 
change dramatically if no president would agree to an interview. Therefore, extra effort 
was placed on confirming presidential participants.  
Data Collection 
 The method for seeking interviews with the presidents and crisis managers was 
intentionally different given the idiosyncratic challenges in scheduling interviews with 
persons in their positions. University presidents, of course, are extremely busy and 
require special effort in getting past their “gatekeepers” (Seidman, 2013, p. 47). Crisis 
managers, on the other hand, could be difficult to locate given that each university 
classified their roles/titles differently.  
All Participants 
Each interview was what Rubin and Rubin (2012) called semistructured. In other 
words, there was a limited number of pre-determined questions while allowing the nature 
of the conversation to specify follow-up questions as necessary. An outline of these 
questions was generated from a pilot study, which was meant to help “refine [the] data 
collection plans with respect to both the content of the data and the procedures to be 
followed” (Yin, 2009, p. 92). FIU Dean of Students, Cathy Akens, and FIU Emergency 
Operations Center director, Amy Aiken, were selected as the participants in the pilot 
because of their expertise and my professional relationships with them. Though they were 
pilot participants, their interviews were included in the final findings described in the 
next chapter.  
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The initial interview protocol (see Appendix A) included six joint questions (i.e., 
questions that would be asked of both the presidents and crisis managers). This list had 
three questions related to how each participant defined crisis, crisis management, and 
crisis leadership; and an additional three questions about their perceptions of what roles 
presidents and crisis managers play prior to, during and after a crisis. Participants from 
each group (i.e., presidents and crisis managers) then had one additional question posed 
to only them.  
Akens and Aiken both offered detailed feedback to the proposed questions, 
especially in how best to reframe the questions. They also provided good insight as to 
being careful when choosing certain terminology with certain groups. For example, 
Akens proposed I change an initially planned use of the word “top management” to 
clearly stating “president” so as to not confuse the participant in thinking I was including 
university vice presidents into that group. Another example was when Aiken noted that 
reporting structures vary so much in her field that I needed to be sensitive to how I 
framed certain questions about leadership.  
Once the pilot interviews were completed, there was a clearer direction for the 
proposed interview questions and edits to the interview protocol were made accordingly.  
Subquestions were also created to the initial six joint questions so that there was room for 
follow up questions depending on how participants responded. I also added two questions 
for each participant to answer. The first was asking them to describe their biggest 
challenges. The second was for them to list their “wish list” for their position, assuming 
there were no political or financial restrictions. At the end of each participant interview, 
at the recommendation of Akens, it was also decided to show them a copy of Zdziarski et 
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al.’s (2007) “Crisis Matrix” (Figure 4). Showing this image allowed me to tie it back to 
the start of the interview (i.e., defining crisis) while also emphasizing the purpose of the 
study once more.  
A few questions were also added specifically for each group. For crisis managers, 
questions about their reporting structure and duties as well as what trainings/certifications 
they and their teams received were included. For the presidents, three targeted questions 
were included. The first related to crisis managers, and who the presidents perceived to fit 
that role on their campus. This was a topic recommended by Aiken. The second question 
was linked to their accountability. After the incident at Penn State, university constituents 
(i.e., faculty, alumni, parents, etc.) began to place a greater burden on presidents to be 
aware of all potential risks for the university and address them immediately. The new 
question aimed at seeing how presidents felt about that perceived added role. And finally, 
I asked the presidents for their thoughts about an article from The Leadership Challenge 
that described the Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership. Each practice (Model the 
Way, Inspire a Shared Vision, Challenge the Process, Enable Others to Act, and 
Encourage the Heart) with a brief synopsis was read aloud to them one by one, and they 
were asked to respond to what extent they agreed or disagreed.  
Once the interview protocol was finalized (see Appendix B), participants were 
contacted for an interview. This process is described in more detail in the next two 
segments. All participants were required to sign a written consent form (see Appendix C) 
prior to the interview. Each interview was voice-recorded. Field notes were taken to not 
only supplement the recordings, but also to keep track of new follow up interview 
questions. 
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Presidents 
A contact list for the 12 SUS presidents was pulled from the Florida Board of 
Governors. Each president and his/her scheduling assistant was initially contacted via 
email. All requests included an introduction of the researcher and study, a copy of the 
study’s 5-page abbreviated proposal, and the requested parameters for the interview (i.e., 
length of interview and requested interview deadline). Five universities initially 
responded, all agreeing to participate in the study. After one month’s time, a follow up 
email was sent to those who had not yet responded. Two more confirmed participation, 
but one subsequently cancelled because of the presidential transition that was occurring at 
his university. 
Each president who agreed to an interview had the option to select a one-time, 2-
hour interview that would take place in-person, by video-conference or via phone 
interview. Having been a scheduler for two university presidents myself, this structure 
was set based on my own experiences responding to students asking my boss to 
participate in their research projects. Rarely were there times when meetings ran on 
schedule or as planned. Delays occurred, interruptions happened, meetings were 
shortened, and tangent conversations were commonplace. The person meeting with the 
president often left with only a fraction of his/her discussion items met. The scheduler 
would then then forced to find time to schedule yet another meeting in the president’s 
already full calendar. Therefore, I had intentionally added 30 minutes to my proposed 
interview timeline so that there were minimal negative effects to the president’s schedule 
and/or my interview goals.  
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Though in-person interviews were the preferred method of data collection for this 
study, it was understood that the presidents’ schedules constantly fluctuated. Sometimes, 
conducting an interview while the president is being driven to his next meeting or while 
traveling – though not optimal for the interviewer – would be the only time they actually 
had to participate in an uninterrupted conversation. Therefore, limiting the interviews to 
only in-person could have reduced my sample size, simply out of the presidents’ 
unavailability. This thought process was supported by Rubin and Rubin (2012) who 
noted that “elites may give you relatively short, one-time interviews” (p. 175), so it was 
imperative to take advantage of all possible options for data collection.  
Luckily, all presidents who agreed to participate also agreed to meet in-person. 
This meant that I traveled to their respective universities for the interview (with the 
exception of one who asked to meet during a Board of Governors meeting). All travel 
costs associated with these interviews were incurred by me. One presidential interview 
was my home institution, so no costs were incurred for that meeting. Two more 
interviews were within driving distance, and the remaining three interviews required 
flights (with three of these five also requiring hotel stays). 
At the start of each interview, the written consent form was presented. A 
summary of IRB regulations was reviewed. Of importance here was the promise of 
confidentiality and anonymity. “Maintaining confidentiality of information collected 
from research participants means that only the investigator(s) or individuals of the 
research team can identify the responses of individual subjects” (IRB Website). However, 
because this dissertation was a case study with university presidents, who are all 
considered public figures, it was impossible to guarantee confidentiality or anonymity. 
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Though this study is considered to have minimal risk, the presidents were informed about 
this limitation up front. Participants were also informed that they could stop the interview 
at any time if they felt the line of questions made them uncomfortable and/or they needed 
to address a pressing matter for work. 
All presidential participants committed to the full allotment of time, so the 30-
minute time buffer that was added to the interview request was not necessary. Each 
interview lasted around 70-90 minutes. After each visit, the signed consent form and field 
notes were securely stored in a locked filing cabinet. All corresponding voice recordings 
and other relevant electronic files were saved to a password-protected computer 
purchased solely for this study’s data, and also backed up on an external hard-drive that 
was kept in my campus office. 
Crisis Managers 
The interviews with the crisis managers were structured similar to that of the 
presidents: a one-time, voice-recorded, 2-hour interview. However, the method for 
scheduling differed from that of the presidents in two ways. The first was that the crisis 
managers were not offered a phone or video interview. The crisis managers were not 
contacted for interviews until after their respective president confirmed participation. 
Therefore, their emailed request listed the date that I would already be on campus. Using 
this method showed each prospective participant that the study was being taken seriously 
by the leadership, which assisted me greatly in confirming all of the participating 
presidents’ crisis managers for an interview. The second difference was that some of the 
crisis manager participants were gathered through snowball sampling (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2007) instead of purposeful sampling as was done for the presidents. 
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During the pilot study interview with Akens, she provided me a list of names and 
emails for all of her counterparts (i.e., Deans of Students) across the SUS. Aiken, on the 
other hand, advised that her counterparts would be more difficult to track down as titles 
in their field varied greatly. She thought it best for her to email her colleagues across the 
SUS to see who would first be willing to participate after reading a summary of the study. 
In this case, much like the schedulers to the presidents, Aiken served as a gatekeeper to 
the SUS crisis managers. She forwarded me all email acceptances to which I responded 
via email thanking them for their agreement to participate. In my email to them, I noted 
that I would follow up to schedule an interview as each of their university president 
agreed to participate.    
After conducting the pilot study, the goal for crisis manager participants was to 
get two for each school, one from Student Affairs and one that dealt with Emergency 
Management. Given the inconsistent reporting structure for university personnel who 
deal with crises, it was important to collect data from crisis managers throughout the 
hierarchical spectrum. Based on this plan, and the total number of universities, there was 
an initial sample of 22 crisis managers (i.e., two per university, with the exception of 
FPU). It is important to note that no law enforcement or health personnel were included 
in the sample. This was intentional as the literature (and also confirmed during the pilot 
study) considered them more of crisis responders than managers.  
Using the aforementioned tactic of contacting the crisis managers after their 
president had confirmed, all crisis managers who were contacted for an interview 
accepted to be participants. Therefore, based on the total number of presidents who 
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agreed to participate (6), including the two pilot study participants who had already been 
interviewed, there was a total of 10 crisis manager participants.  
At the start of each interview a synopsis of the confidentiality and anonymity 
issues was provided. Unlike the presidents, the public has little knowledge of who crisis 
managers are or what roles they play. However, given that all SUS institutions are subject 
to Florida’s Sunshine Law, their information could be found with enough research. 
Hence, the crisis managers were also treated as public officials and were not offered 
confidentiality or anonymity.  
Data Analysis 
After each interview, the voice recordings were professionally transcribed by an 
online company called Rev. Since transcriptions are never 100% accurate, all 
transcriptions were read through once with the sole purpose of correcting any typos made 
by the transcriber as well as any improper syntax or grammar used by the participants. 
These were manually corrected. Field notes were then added into the transcriptions, as 
needed.  
Both a posteriori and a priori coding methods were used in developing initial 
categories (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). As each interview was analyzed, “certain words, 
phrases, patterns of behavior, subjects’ ways of thinking, and events [were repeated and 
stood] out” (p. 173). For the presidential interviews, since each were asked for their 
thoughts on the Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership, these codes were created prior 
to transcription. Examples of some initial codes were “campus-specific highlights,” 
“research verification,” and “leadership qualities.” Throughout analyses, these codes 
were listed throughout each interview, and subsequently grouped to form larger themes.  
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These updated coding categories were bundled into an index at the end of each 
interview, and then compared to all other interviews conducted. As code comparisons and 
differences began to appear between interviews, the coding categories and themes were 
further refined. For example, “external partnerships,”, “cross-departmental meetings,” 
and “internal partnerships” were all bundled into a Teamwork and Collaboration 
category. This process continued until all scheduled interviews were conducted. Once the 
analysis for each participant was complete, the coding themes were cross-analyzed across 
each group and between participants once more. A total of 14 thematic categories were 
formed. After even more modifications, the themes were then richly described in order to 
answer the study’s three research questions.  
Though no confidentiality or anonymity was given to any study participant, each 
president and crisis manager was still assigned a pseudonym. Originally, each participant 
was a study code. This assignment was given based on their position and the order of 
when they were interviewed. For example, the first president interviewed was classified 
as President 1, or P-1, and the third crisis manager interviewed was Crisis Manager 3, or 
CM-3. After these were assigned, each study code was transferred into name (see 
Appendix D): CM-1 became Carlos, CM-2 became Amir, CM-3 became David, CM-4 
became Toby, CM-5 became Mitch, CM-6 became Rhashad, CM-7 became Bradley, 
CM-8 became Pearce, CM-9 became Andrew, CM-10 became Jeremy, P-1 became Jose, 
P-2 became Ralph, P-3 became William, P-4 became Julian, P-5 became Martin, and P-6 
became Josiah.  
Additionally, since there were only three female presidents in the SUS and a 
handful of female crisis managers, there was a concern that use of the female pronoun 
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would more easily identify those participants. Therefore, all participants were assigned a 
common pronoun – taking the one of the majority of the participants (i.e., masculine). 
Twelve of the 16 study participants were male, and hence any reference of “she” or “her” 
or were changed to “he” or “his.”  
Each university was also assigned a study code for the instances when institution-
wide matters were addressed in the findings. Universities were labeled following a 
similar standard as with the participants (i.e., order of when university was visited). For 
example, U-5 was used for the fifth university where a participant interview from that 
institution took place.  
The latter three points, though not necessary, were intentional. Each reduced the 
probability (of course, only to the extent possible) that readers would automatically 
connect responses to a specific participant or university. This helped avoid that the 
readers would develop their own assumptions about the participants’ leadership style and 
culture of the participants’ universities. While not all participants minded having their 
names included in the study, it was decided to take an “all or nothing” stance. Since some 
participants did prefer the use of pseudonyms, then all participants were assigned one.  
Data Integrity 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) proposed four criteria for evaluating qualitative research 
and enhancing trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. Member checking occurred throughout the interview to ensure accuracy 
of the researcher’s interpretation and understanding of the data. After an initial read-
through to correct any typos and redact sensitive or non-relevant conversations, all 
participants were provided a copy of their interview transcripts for further verification of 
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the data. No participants provided any edits or feedback to their transcripts. As with all 
interview materials, the edited transcripts, codes and analyses were stored in a password-
protected computer and also backed up in a secure portable external hard-drive.  
As data collection and analyses progressed, the study’s research design was 
improved in order to account for findings’ conditions. After completion, drafts of this 
study were also shared prior to dissertation committee approval with colleagues who have 
experience with leadership and/or crisis management in higher education: Elizabeth Bejar 
(FIU Vice President of Academic Affairs), Cathy Akens (FIU Dean of Students and 
Associate Vice President of Student Affairs) and Nance Guilmartin (leadership consultant 
and international author). Their feedback on the overall structure and findings of the 
study contributed further to the study’s trustworthiness.  
Limitations 
Rubin and Rubin (2012) discussed the difficulties of interviewing “elites”, or 
“those at the top of the social, political or economic hierarchy” (p. 175) – in this case, 
university presidents. They believed that this group may be too busy to take an interview 
or have no desire to agree to an interview.  Outside of availability, there was also a 
concern about presidents participating openly during their interview (i.e., censor 
themselves). There were several methods implemented throughout the data collection 
process to avoid these pitfalls.  
The first method was working through the presidential gatekeepers, or scheduling 
assistants, who were an important step towards the successful collection of data. The 
advantage in this scenario was that I used to be one of these gatekeepers. From 2008 to 
2011, I served two university presidents as their scheduler. Also, though in a different 
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capacity, I was still working for a university president throughout this study. Not only 
was I sensitive to the challenges presidential assistants faced in trying to confirm meeting 
requests that were not relevant to university operations, but many of the schedulers that I 
used to work with were still in their positions.  
Having those relationships in place, no doubt, enhanced the chance that their 
president reviewed my request. However, it did not guarantee it. Despite their best 
efforts, a couple of schedulers were just not able to make it work. One university 
president was amidst transitioning out, and had agreed to meet with me after the new 
president took office. Unfortunately, more pressing matters arose that forced multiple 
rescheduled meetings, which caused the interview to ultimately be cancelled altogether.  
How universities, specifically presidents, dealt with crises on their campuses was 
another sensitive issue I had to address, especially given the scrutiny placed on leadership 
in recent years. Bogdan and Biklen (2007) made an important note on this matter:  
When the trust level is low, when people are sensitive to particular topics, 
when there are strong barriers between insiders and outsiders, when the 
subjects feel they have a lot to gain or lose by what they say and with 
whom they speak, or when there are clearly delineated factions and 
subgroups, the researcher needs to tread with care. (p. 100)  
 
For an institution like FAMU that had been severely guarded after the hazing-related 
death and the subsequent administrative resignations, it was integral for me to assure a 
safe environment for the interview. Therefore, the intended outreach strategy in 
requesting interviews was sensitive to those issues. Outside of the aforementioned items 
listed in the interview request correspondence, the interview requests included two key 
points: (a) no questions would be asked related to campus-specific incidents, unless the 
interviewee brought it up on their own and allowed for the topic to be included in the 
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interview, and (b) if at any point, the interviewee felt uncomfortable with the line of 
questioning and/or direction of the conversation, he/she was free to ask for a topic change 
or stop the interview.  
 The combined issue of availability and timing came to light while I was trying to 
confirm the FSU president. Not only did their previous president abruptly depart, causing 
a lengthy presidential transition, they experienced an active shooter incident on campus 
during the data collection process. Between the scheduling demands of being a new 
president and the newness of the student injuries/death, it was evident that I would not get 
the interview.  
Given these challenges with the presidents, in total, six presidents agreed to meet; 
two declined; and four did not respond. 
 In terms of researcher bias, a general concern of qualitative studies was what 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) referred to as “unusual problems of ethics.” “An unethical case 
writer could so select from among available data that virtually anything he wished could 
be illustrated” (p. 378). One of the reasons that I assigned pseudonyms was so that I may 
use as much of the available data as possible without jeopardizing their jobs or 
relationships. Additionally, I did not believe that I had any biases that swayed the 
direction of the data analyses. Though I did realize that using my supervisor as part of my 
study could produce an uncomfortable scenario, we had spoken about my research 
enough that I believed the interview was taken seriously and handled professionally.  
Another potential bias related to the study’s topic. Crisis management can, of 
course, be a difficult subject to discuss – especially when campus-specific examples are 
critiqued. The focus of the research was directed specifically to the definition of and roles 
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in crisis leadership, not to analyze or judge a university’s response to a previous incident. 
As such, I purposefully did not investigate any university incidents or the universities’ 
responses to them. Though slightly knowledgeable of some national or state incidents 
that were in the news, this unbiased perspective, I felt, offered me enough distance to not 
cloud the analysis of their responses.  
The final limitation was the debate on the generalizability of case studies. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a limitation of conducting case studies was 
that the results may not be commonly accepted for a larger population. Therefore, though 
results can be grouped into themes and a general understanding of the findings can be 
offered, they would argue that the findings of this study could not be generalized to all 
public university presidents and crisis managers across the nation. However, Flyvbjerg 
published an article in 2006 aimed at debunking this and four other “misunderstandings” 
about case studies. Specifically related to the generalizability of case studies, Flyvbjerg 
suggested the following: 
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be 
central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to 
other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific 
development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated. (p. 12) 
 
In other words, the supposed inability to generalize case studies to a larger population (in 
this case, generalize the SUS’s findings to public universities across the nation) could be 
considered just a matter of semantics. 
Summary 
 As far as the methodology is concerned, the study’s theoretical framework was 
based on a basic interpretive approach, seeking how the participants made meaning of the 
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crisis management phenomenon in higher education. The purpose of this dissertation was 
to better understand the phenomenon of crises on university campuses through the lens of 
crisis leadership. This study sought to learn how presidents and crisis managers defined 
“crisis” and “crisis management” on their campuses; how presidents and crisis managers 
used those definitions to structure their perceptions of crisis leaders, including themselves 
directly; and how those perceptions contributed to the campuses’ creation and 
maintenance of a culture that supports crisis management systems.  
Because of the scarce research available on crisis leadership in higher education, 
though, it was important to select university presidents and crisis managers as the sample 
for this study. Prior to outreach, an initial possible sample of 34 crisis leaders and crisis 
managers comprised this case study (i.e., 12 presidents plus 2 crisis managers per 
university with the exception of FPU). Given the sampling techniques and participants’ 
willingness to participate, that total number was only an estimate. In the end, a total of 16 
persons (6 presidents and 10 crisis managers) participated in the study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
Participants 
After contacting all university presidents, a total of six agreed to participate in this 
study. As noted earlier, one president declined outright, another president agreed but then 
regrettably declined after too many scheduling conflicts, and four did not respond to any 
interview requests. Of the university presidents who agreed to participate, two crisis 
managers from each of their universities, except for FPU, also agreed to participate. No 
crisis manager from FPU was interviewed because the university was still building their 
infrastructure and did not have anyone in the role of crisis manager (as defined in this 
study).  
Of the two crisis managers from each university that were interviewed, one was 
from the field of student affairs and the other from either emergency management (EM) 
or environmental health and safety (EHS). Student affairs was selected for their direct 
involvement with “human” crises, specifically those involving students. As David put it, 
their job “is the people side.” EM and EHS were selected because of their experience in 
managing campus emergencies and disasters. In the instances where both an EM and 
EHS department existed at a university, EM was chosen as the participant since they 
were more aligned with how crisis and crisis management were defined in this study. 
This brought the total number of study participants from all units to 16 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. 
Study participants listed by title 
 President Vice Pres. of 
Student Affairs 
Dean of 
Students 
Director of 
Emergency 
Management 
Director of 
Environmental 
Health & Safety 
Total 
interviewed 
6 1 4 3 2 
 
It is important to note the multiple titles for crisis manager participants. For the 
Deans of Students who were interviewed, three of the four held additional titles (e.g., 
Assistant Vice President, Associate Vice President, etc.). This was dependent on how the 
university’s reporting structure was framed, which is discussed later in this chapter. Some 
Directors of Emergency Management had variable titles (e.g., Director of Emergency 
Operations), and some Directors of Environmental Health and Safety held supplemental 
roles (e.g., University Safety Officer).   
Crisis managers from schools that did not have presidents participating in the 
study were not contacted. This was because one of the study’s goals was to gain insight 
on how presidents and crisis managers worked with each other. For comparative purposes 
(in the event that institutional idiosyncrasies were discussed during the interviews), it was 
important to have at least one participant from each group for each university.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, each participant, though not promised anonymity or 
confidentiality, was assigned a pseudonym. These aliases were assigned in date and time 
order of each interviews and then by a person’s name. Each participant was also assigned 
a common pronoun to avoid the reader from easily identifying the participants or 
universities who had female presidents and crisis managers. When university 
characteristics like size, location and reporting structures were discussed, a similar date 
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order pattern was followed for each university. Therefore, university study codes ran 
from U-1 to U-6. Any ellipses found within participant quotations note removal of 
repeated or excess words, and any brackets found were used to fix tense issues or to 
replace proper nouns (i.e., names, university-specific programs, etc.) with generic 
pronouns and/or references.  
Findings 
This part of the chapter outlines the data results from the 16 interviews conducted 
with SUS presidents and crisis managers. Throughout coding and analysis, several 
categories emerged. Those categories were bundled into five themes: Definitional 
Morass; Culture; Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability; Resources; and Variability 
of Crisis. All thematic categories were richly described using the literature review as well 
as the data collected in the interviews. The findings will be later used in Chapter 5 to 
answer the study’s research questions.  
Definitional Morass 
Chapter 2 thoroughly described the nuances in trying to define the word crisis. 
Though a standard definition of crisis in the field of student affairs exists (i.e., Crisis 
Matrix - Figure 4), this study aimed at finding a common definition of crisis, crisis 
management, and crisis leadership within the context of higher education from the 
perspective of university presidents and crisis managers. The first three interview 
questions for each participant revolved around how they defined these three terms within 
their roles.  
Crisis. All crisis managers were relatively consistent in how they saw crisis. 
Student affairs professionals defined it mostly under the terms of students (e.g., crimes, 
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student deaths, etc.); environmental health and safety employees saw crisis more as 
environmental or facilities-related (e.g., storms, chemical spills, etc.); while emergency 
management folks viewed crisis more holistically, or cross-departmentally (e.g., active 
shooter, hurricane, fire, etc.).  
Presidents, on the other hand, defined crisis on a larger scale. Their point of view 
matched that of Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) and Mitroff and Anagnos (2001). William 
believed crisis is “something that’s catastrophic that has brought impact on the university 
community.” This stance was reinforced by the last three presidents interviewed. Julian 
stated that crisis was “campus-wide;” that “there are problems, but a crisis affects 
everybody in the whole institution in general.” Martin felt that crisis was a “major abrupt 
disruptive challenge, probably implying personal or institutional harm that could be 
potentially long lasting.” Similarly, Josiah thought that crisis meant: “A situation that 
calls for resources beyond the ordinary. It is in complexity, size or seriousness beyond the 
routine. It calls for a level of response that’s going to go across boundaries probably, 
organizational boundaries.” Ralph offered an additional stipulation to these points: 
“Anything that’s significantly newsworthy, not in a particularly good way. … Things that 
you can’t anticipate.” This issue of public criticism is addressed later in the chapter. 
As discussed in the literature review, Zdziarski et al.’s (2007) Crisis Matrix, has 
three axes: type (i.e., environmental, facility or human), severity (i.e., critical incident, 
campus emergency, or disaster), and intentionality (i.e., intentional or unintentional). This 
matrix was shown to each participant (with the exception of Mitch and Bradley who 
answered the first interview question of defining crisis by using the terms in the matrix) 
at the end of each interview in order to tie it back to how they defined crisis.  
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Andrew called it “a very comprehensive model that would touch on any other 
situations that a university could or would face.” Almost all others agreed with this 
sentiment. However, there were three participants who had some concerns or comments 
about the matrix. Martin had a concern about the intentionality axis: “When I talk to 
people about these kinds of issues, basically, what I say is expect the unexpected. … I 
don’t like dichotomies, so I’m not comfortable with intentional and unintentional. … I’m 
not too sure it’s black and white is what I’m saying.” We discussed the example that an 
intentional campus emergency can have negative unintended consequences, and hence, 
Martin was hesitant to accept that intentionality was on one axis with an “either or” 
quality.  
Ralph went on to suggest that another axis should be added to the matrix 
altogether – likelihood: 
I’m an analytics guy.  … Likelihood’s a big one and when you start looking at 
what types of crises you could have, one of the things that’s important to keep in 
mind is which ones have the most likelihood. … Generally what you would do is 
you would do plots of likelihood versus impact. … Then plan for the ones that 
have the highest likelihood and the highest impact. 
 
Given Ralph’s academic and professional background, it was important for him to be able 
to prepare his university for crises around the most likely scenarios. This belief is an 
example of the impact on culture, the next theme that will be discussed.  
The third comment was from Jeremy who argued against the entire matrix. For 
him, in the world of emergency management, “State Statute 252 will give you definitions 
of what you should be looking at when it comes down to that type of thing.”  After our 
interview, I researched the statute, as this was not something I had previously looked 
into. In the Florida Statutes, Title XVII (Military Affairs and Related Matters), Chapter 
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252 (Emergency Management), Part 1 (General Provisions), Section 34 (Definitions), the 
following terms are defined: disaster, catastrophic disaster, major disaster, minor disaster, 
division, emergency, emergency management, local emergency management agency, 
manmade emergency, natural emergency, political subdivision, and technological 
emergency. Given these specific definitions, Jeremy noted: 
A lot of people have a hard time with that. They think a disaster and an 
emergency is the same type of issue but they really are different definitions. 
That’s what I was saying with the crisis, that’s a little bit different too because 
they don’t really define what crisis is in here as well. This is how we’ve been 
doing things and this is how all of our plans are represented with these type of 
definitions. 
 
Jeremy’s structured thought process about definitions was unique, as he was the only 
study participant under the emergency management or environmental health and safety 
that referred to this statute, let alone incorporated it into divisional safety plans. No doubt 
his professional experiences contributed to his informed position on the matter.  
 Of all the responses, though, the most unique and intriguing came from Jose and 
Andrew. Both of them defined crisis as an “opportunity.” Jose believed: 
They’ve got an expression in politics which is, “Never waste a crisis.” The 
thinking is, use a crisis as an opportunity to energize and maybe do something 
you couldn’t get done otherwise but for the crisis. I guess, again, this is one of 
those things that comes down to definitions. I think you always want to end up 
better after. You want to end up better every day so if a crisis can somehow make 
you better, make your team be more bonded, morale improved, an opportunity for 
more money or funding, training. You don’t want to waste a crisis. You want to 
see if you can get something good out of it. 
 
His sentiment was supported by Andrew:  
It’s an opportunity for us to look at our policies and our protocols and ourselves 
from a critical lens, and to make sure that at a moment’s notice that we are 
nurturing, that we are supportive, that we are on message, that we do put our 
students first, and whatever that crisis may be - it could be an active shooter, in 
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could be a natural disaster, it could be a single student incident -…that’s an 
opportunity for us really to make sure that our students are taken care of. 
 
On the topic of opportunity, David noted that sometimes “it takes something bad 
happening to get folks’ attention; even when it comes to safety in general.” This is 
supported by Lerbinger’s (2012) belief that “shock learning” is one of the most common 
forms of crisis decision-making, as well as Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1992) premise that 
crisis management is much like “crash management” when change only occurs when 
things go wrong. This impetus, though it contributes to a reactive culture, is sometimes 
needed in order for support to be gained and resources to be allocated (both topics that 
are discussed in later sections). 
This generally positive twist on crisis, though, was the complete opposite opinion 
of Pearce and Julian who both defined crisis as simply “trouble.” The dichotomy of these 
points of views I think was due in great part by their own experiences dealing with crises, 
which leads into the differing definitions of crisis management and crisis leadership.  
Crisis management vs. crisis leadership. When setting up the interview 
protocol, the intention was for each participant to offer a separate definition for crisis 
management and crisis leadership. However, in some of the interviews, participants 
defined leadership by defining management, or vice versa. Amir, who came from the 
emergency management side, had cautioned about the challenges in defining crisis 
management: 
Crisis management has a very different connotation and it almost feels like it’s 
dealing with the students. 
 
Because of the very siloed effect of it ... Because there’s a lot of people on 
campuses that are doing Crisis Management, but they’re doing it within their 
context and within their world. 
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In other words, how certain units define crisis informed how crisis managers define their 
own roles in managing those crises. As such, I joined the responses into one category so 
that the comparative and contrasting analyses could more easily be understood. 
 Crisis management. Most participants saw crisis managers as the on the ground, 
action-oriented teams. This is in line with Mitroff’s (2004) point about crisis management 
being more reactive in nature. Rhashad defined crisis management as “the people who are 
in positions to deal with the crisis when they occur.” For participants like Bradley, the 
lines between management and leadership were clearly defined: 
The president may give a directive and then my job is to execute and make sure 
that those things are done. At the same time as a manager, part of my job is to 
manage up and to make sure that my boss has the information that he needs. He 
can provide the president with timely accurate information so that [he] can make 
the best decision that [he] can with the information that [he] has at the time. They 
are hand in hand but there is definitely a difference between management and 
leadership, philosophically, to people. 
 
Andrew agreed: 
Crisis management is the actual process that we go through until our campus 
community is back to some sense of normal operation. It is not a one-hit 
operation. It is not simply talking points. It is making sure that from start to finish, 
we check all the boxes, and that we move our campus back to a place where they 
are whole after that crisis has taken place. 
 
That to me is crisis management. It’s not only managing the actual crisis in that 
moment, but subsequently everything that comes thereafter for our campus 
community. 
 
And so did Julian: “The management team really does the implementation and makes 
sure that the right people are notified, properly notified. That’s how I see them. 
[Leadership] decides what to do and [management] carries it out.” Jeremy, though, 
advised that he felt crisis management, while different than crisis leadership, was specific 
to his role in emergency management. For him, crisis management is described by the 
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phases of the Crisis Management Cycle (Figure 5). To this point, Jeremy added that 
collaboration across crisis managers in a university is also important: 
I have to be the jack of all trades, master of none; but I need to know who those 
masters are, who the subject masters are. I pull up into the right environment and 
then they help us with the response and we help manage that. We identify 
objectives, goals, responsibilities. 
 
Along these lines, for some, the roles of crisis managers differed from that of crisis 
leaders.  
Crisis leadership. Defining leadership in crisis was a little harder for participants 
to define. They all agreed that leadership was critical, but who served in that role varied 
from participant to participant. Mitch agreed that there had to be someone “above the 
fray” who can think more clearly about the overall picture, but noted that presidents serve 
that role whether anyone believes they are or not: “Well, I think the higher up you are, 
the farther you are away from serving. You’re basically a leader by definition. You’ve 
been given a role as a leader.” 
For the most part, though, participants commonly viewed crisis leadership the 
way Muffet-Willett (2010) described crisis leadership, as a broader term where the 
president is not necessarily the sole leader (i.e., inclusive of the executive leadership). 
Julian made the following point: 
At the top, the top leader - the president or the vice presidents - they really decide 
the direction, the tone, the face, the level of how bad things are, and the direction. 
… Management implements that tone; that face. 
 
Similarly, Josiah stated: 
I’ll go back to the old Peter Drucker thing. Management is doing things well; 
leadership is being sure you’re doing the right things. … If it calls for leadership 
and many crises do, then you probably get up into the upper levels of the 
administration. 
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Josiah’s reference to Peter Drucker was complemented by Ralph’s perspective: 
I don’t think [crisis management and crisis leadership] are exactly the same. I 
think crisis leadership is what you do after it happens. I think there used to be a 
saying: “Managers do things right, and leaders do the right thing.” That’s 
different. I think a leader is doing the right thing and setting an example of how 
you deal with a crisis. Managing the crisis is … making sure that you’re 
effectively executing. … Crisis management also, I think, has a connotation of 
risk management, which is also anticipating what some potential crises could be 
and having things in place that might allow you to more effectively manage them 
once they happen. 
 
For William, “leadership directs the management.” As Daniels and Daniels (2007) noted, 
leadership is more about integrated, strategic direction while management is more about 
centralized, efficient systems.  
Additionally, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, Muffet-Willett (2010) discussed 
how this top management is needed in order to avoid certain pitfalls like “ego” and “turf 
wars.” Bradley believed that none of these should be present during a crisis: 
There’s no room for ego when managing a crisis.  It’s like some people would 
want to be out-front or out with the credit for solving this problem.  It can’t be 
about that. It has to be about helping those people that are going through the tough 
time or difficulty.  If it’s about showing how well you manage that or didn’t, then 
you’re in the wrong business - because you take pride in your work.   
 
William took a similar stance, and shared how his leadership style has been imbedded 
into his decision-making process: “What we had developed with my VPs now over the 
years is when you come in this room, we all leave titles and egos outside. The only ego 
needed in this room is [the university’s].” Regarding this sense of equality, Jose added: 
“We’ve got some clearly defined roles. We also have a lot of overlap where our vice 
presidents feel fairly comfortable in stepping in another person’s turf.” What these 
participants were trying to address was the point that having the institution’s best interest 
in mind, especially when safety is of concern, must be the number one priority in crisis 
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leadership. As William stated: “the leadership in a crisis has to go beyond just effective 
actions.” 
Overlap of management and leadership. A few participants, however, felt that 
crisis management and crisis leadership overlapped. Rhashad thought that “it’s probably 
a shared thing among a lot of people.” Martin also believed that there was a “shared 
responsibility for student safety.” Adding to this notion, Andrew noted: 
They actually bleed over, because crisis leadership is critical in any crisis type 
situation. The actual leadership who’s taken ownership of moving us through that 
crisis has to be, well, competent; have to be committed; have to be very decisive. 
It’s important that the actual leadership empowers every corner of the university 
to be engaged in the overall crisis management issue. I’m seeing too many 
institutions have a core group of people trying to manage everything, while 
everyone else stayed on the fringes looking lost, confused, disconnected. That’s 
not crisis leadership. 
 
Crisis leadership is making sure that to the best of your ability that you have 
educated, you have trained every corner of the university to say, “Listen, in a 
crisis, we’re all leaders not because you’re the president, not because you’re the 
dean of students.” … That to me is where I think institutions should continue to 
move when we talk about crisis management. How do we empower? How do we 
equip every corner of the university to have leadership pop up, top-down, 
grassroots level, and so forth? 
 
However, to this comment, Jose described “leading and management as picking among a 
set of options.” He shared a quote from a Russian author named Anton Chekhov: “Any 
idiot can face a crisis – it’s day to day living that wears you out.” As Bradley put it, “a 
leader can be a manager and a manager can be a leader.” In other words, there is no real 
difference between leadership and management, which is contrary to the ideas of Daniels 
and Daniels (2007). To these participants, either way, there is a collective responsibility 
needed from all involved for success to occur.  
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Conversely, Martin, while he believed it could overlap, felt defining both terms 
was issue-specific: 
If it’s an issue that has an urgency that transcends planning, then leadership and 
management may be one in the same. If there’s a longer lead time, then leadership 
and management should be separated. … I don’t think there’s a bright line. I think 
it’s a question of the intersection between the leader’s perception of the 
seriousness of the matter, the urgency with which it must be addressed, and the 
capabilities and perceptions of the team that is designated to address them.  
 
I think it’s very situational dependent. … A lot of that depends upon what the 
leader’s tolerance levels are on one end and his personal sense or her personal 
sense of responsibility for the health and well-being of those who he or she is 
responsible for. 
 
Seeger et al. (2003) and Klann (2003) held this same belief; that the quality of leadership 
can decide and control the extent of and response to crises. Toby, agreed that response 
and action all depended on the matter at hand: 
One size just doesn’t fit all. … It really is a matter of organizing all the 
information, evaluating all the information, taking what you have, looking at the 
resources with which you can tap into, and then develop and respond to the 
situation that fits that situation the best. 
 
Again, it’s crisis management if you want to call it. That isn’t a science. It’s an 
art. You need to be able to put those factors together.  
 
The variability of how leaders respond to and act in crises is something addressed later in 
this chapter. In sum, in trying to define these three terms, Jose said it best: “I guess it’s 
going to depend on either the speaker or the listener how you mean each of those words.” 
Culture 
Some literature has noted that the institutional culture (i.e., demographics, 
location, history, etc.) is key in building a safe community, while others have posited that 
leadership sets that tone through their personal values and direct emphasis placed on 
safety and preparedness. During their interviews, all participants were asked about the 
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creation and maintenance of such organizational cultures at their universities. The 
following categories fell under this second theme: size and location; communication; 
presidential values; and institutional values. 
Size and location. When I visited each campus, I drove around the campus 
perimeter at the start of the day (morning), I walked to all of my meetings, and I drove 
around campus once more at the end of day (evening). I took note of all major entrances 
and exits, emergency call boxes, lighting, distance between buildings, and other security 
features. This was done not to place judgement on what the university had or was 
lacking, but so that I could better understand what it was like to be a student, employee or 
visitor on their campus should an emergency arise. This also allowed me to tailor my 
questions and frame my analysis related to campus size and location to each participant’s 
university. 
Of the six universities interviewed, four had what I would define as isolated 
locations. They were built outside of the city center and core suburb area and/or were also 
surrounded by nature preserves or farmland. When asked if their unique locations aided 
in keeping their university safer, and therefore sustaining a cultural infrastructure, 
Rhashad noted that their isolation “is a drawback in some areas, but…not being in that 
urban environment helps a lot.”  
As noted by Julian, one of the positives to being isolated is the ability to shut 
down the campus during an emergency: 
I think it helps us, and the reason is - when I look at other universities - there are 
so many entrances and exit points, it’s impossible to control. I shut those 2 gates; 
it’s over. You’ve got to cross that swamp to get to campus. So I love it, with 
restricted exit and entry. I can really close off campus easily. 
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However, Mitch offered a different view to the benefits isolation offers a campus: 
Well, you could make an argument that it has [helped with safety], so far. If you 
really want to be cynical about it, you could say we’re a prime target for 
somebody to come and really do some damage, because we’re so isolated. 
 
Pearce agreed that a minimum number of entrances to a campus is a benefit, as 
mentioned by Julian. But similar to Mitch’s opinion, Pearce thought it was just as 
important for all crisis managers and leaders to understand the potential contrasting 
dangers: 
Now on the flipside - when you are trying to evacuate campus say for a bomb 
scare or if something happens that we shut the campus down. [Thousands of] 
employees and all the students trying to get off at one time…becomes an issue. 
 
As Bradley noted in his interview, we must all think about how those unique campus 
characteristics fit into an EOP – both as an advantage and a hindrance to campus safety 
and security. 
Of the two universities that were closer to their city center or core suburban areas, 
Martin expressed caution regarding the openness of his university: “It’s wide open. We 
have to hope against hope that our capabilities are able to identify when there may be 
situations of challenge. That’s a function of training, breadth, and luck.” This comment 
tied to the overarching issue of size and demographics, and the idiosyncrasies they posed 
(i.e., institution-specific characteristics that can affect how crises are seen and managed), 
which was also a topic raised by participants.  
When asked whether incidents have occurred on campus due to the surrounding 
community (i.e., crimes/dangers by non-university members), all six presidents identified 
some sort of issue occurring during their tenure. However, as Jose stated in his interview: 
“You know, for some reason, the denser the population, the higher the crime rate.” To 
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this point, William shared that he believed his university’s low crime rate “is in large part 
because of our location.” He then added: 
When we have prospective students and their parents come on campus, we 
underscore that. [Our university] has to be a destination and you just don’t wander 
in here. You have to be coming here [purposefully]. That is a good thing.  
 
In other words, according to Jose, U-1 and U-6 would then naturally be placed at higher 
risk for incidents to occur on their campuses than the other four universities represented 
in this study because of their location. 
 An additional challenge for universities, as discussed by Jeremy, is growth. The 
more universities expand within and outside their main campuses, the more susceptible 
they will be to incidents if emergency operations plans are not quickly adjusted to the 
increased size and new locations. The issues related to growth are discussed further under 
the fourth theme, Resources. 
Communication. Silva and McGann (1995); Mitroff and Anagnos (2001); Klann 
(2003); and Fearn-Banks (2011) all addressed communication as being a critical 
component of crisis leadership. Though questions on crisis communication were not part 
of the presidents’ interview protocol, ease of communication as well as the respective 
gaps were brought up by all participants at least once. All agreed with the aforementioned 
authors that communication is key. David stated: “Obviously the number one issue is 
communication. Staying in communication and being informed. There’s two sides of that, 
staying informed and then communicating what you know to the right folks.” Jose added 
that the timing and accuracy of communications are also of importance: “Communication 
is critical. It’s [critical] to the various audiences that you need to communicate with. … 
You’ve got to respond. You don’t want to over respond, but you’ve got to respond in the 
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correct way.” Open messaging channels, transparency and timeliness of decisions are all 
part of crisis communications. How presidents deal with this is detailed more in the next 
thematic category of “presidential values.” 
A few participants touched upon the ease in which they communicate across 
campus. Mitch noted that their small size helps them communicate effectively and 
efficiently during crises: 
Because of our size, we’re able to…pick up the phone: “What are you going to 
do? You got this. You’ve got that.” … We’re not that stratified, so I have access 
to the president. I have access to the provost. Any time I need to talk to them. 
We’re also going to be a first-name-basis campus. I can pick up the phone with 
the chief of police. He could phone to me. We can talk. We don’t have to go 
through protocols to get down to talk to somebody. … That works effectively, and 
we know each other, because we’re still relatively small. 
 
Bradley agreed with this sentiment: “If we hear about something or we see something 
percolating, we try to give each other a heads-up.” And Toby (who was from Student 
Affairs) shared that despite the separate supervisors, he is “on the phone with the [police] 
chief every day.” The ability to have open dialogue and allow information-sharing 
definitely contributes to a culture of safety. 
 Other participants, though, referred to the communication gaps they must deal 
with at their universities. Martin made a transparent statement about what he believed his 
university was lacking: 
Our communication networks in a crisis are very weak. … We are comfortable 
with what we do in the Emergency Operations Center, but to what extent are the 
unit managers, department heads knowledgeable on what they really need to do, 
what kind of telephone networks they need, and how they’re going to put Humpty 
Dumpty back together again if we get hit by a dirty bomb or some kind of major 
wind event or water event? I’m uncomfortable about what happens below. 
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By “below”, Martin meant those employees outside of the EOC participation list (i.e., 
administration, support staff and faculty). Interestingly, Martin was the only president 
who addressed real communication issues that needed to be fixed. This self-awareness 
likely comes from personal values and direct involvement in crisis management systems, 
which are both addressed in the next segment.  
For the interviews with crisis managers, they were asked how communication 
worked during crises, especially when reporting out issues that may need the president’s 
attention. Rhashad advised that he continuously reported things up to his supervisor, not 
just during incidents. His boss, in turn, would decide what raised to the level to the 
president: “I keep trying to push information up so they’re aware of things that are going 
on. Because I think a lot of times, they are so insulated that they don’t really know what’s 
going on.” Bradley expanded on this issue of reporting up information. He believed that 
continuous information to top management can better prepare them for when an issue 
does have to go to the president: 
Humans are humans and we naturally are filtering things.  What one person may 
see as important, [another] may not think that that’s important enough to make [it 
up the] chain, which could leave out a big chunk of information.  Sharing 
information and talking about this emergency response team we’re trying to build 
- that’s the place where I think it can cut down on communication errors.  It also 
enables the vice presidents and I to get so deep down into the weeds where they 
can make decisions at a larger 50,000 feet area of management that can inform 
[the president]. … As the president, there’s just so much going on.  I do a lot of 
briefings for [the VP] and he’ll give them to [the president], or I’ll give [the 
president] assessments or numbers or trends or issues.  I make sure that the 
appropriate people that interface with [the president] have that information so that 
it’s ready for when [the president] needs them. 
 
Therefore, as reinforced by Skinner and Mersham (2002), these crisis managers held that 
over-communication (i.e., sharing constant informing, not just when it involves bad 
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news) is better for the safety and well-being of the university community than under-
communication.  
Toby followed the same standard of informing his supervisors, but more so 
because of the potential escalation of an incident: 
I wouldn’t say I elevate [matters], necessarily. I would say I inform. The reason I 
inform is whenever there’s a possibility even of an incident on campus that might 
be newsworthy, [the VP] needs to know. The President needs to know. The Vice 
President for Public Relations needs to know. Because I don’t want them to be 
caught in the sense, as I say, with their pants down. It’s important that they know 
what’s going on. 
 
Specifically related to an issue that is “newsworthy”, Bradley and Andrew, respectively, 
articulated how to handle those situations best: 
Yeah, we have our internal operating protocol on how I’m filtering at the AVP 
level before they get to [the VP]. The directors are filtering things, but if it’s 
going to make front-page above the fold of the paper, that’s something that’s 
going to go all the way up to [the president].  If it’s going to be on the page 
six…[the president] is pretty good about hiring good people and trusting them to 
do good work too.  This is a sign of leadership. You got to empower and trust the 
people.  You got to train them and you got to trust the work that they’re doing and 
that they’re giving you good information.  
 
You have to tread very, very lightly. … [Police are] going to be very limited in 
what they can share and what they’re going to share in the midst of an ongoing 
investigation. That’s a part of crisis management. Then, as information is critical 
and sensitively handled, then you also have to be prepared to deal with the media. 
That’s another piece of crisis management. When you talk about your actual 
leadership team, a part of that should always be …your actual news team. They 
need to know what you know, and the university needs to be talking from the 
same script. That is important. 
 
Bradley highlighted the importance of the leadership’s ability to be accountable, while at 
the same time letting their crisis management teams do the work they were hired to do; 
and Andrew discussed the significance of all university officials speaking with one voice, 
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while protecting the sensitive matters at hand. Both perspectives are valid points to 
consider in crisis communication. 
For the interview with presidents, they were asked how they preferred to receive 
information. Jose shared the communication strategy he has with his direct reports: 
I meet with our Vice Presidents. We schedule them three times a week: Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday mornings. Usually one gets cancelled because I’m out of 
town or whatever. A required topic is if we have a violent crime, a sexual 
misconduct allegation, or hazing. We discuss every single one of those and what 
we’re going to do and what needs to happen and the process. Then we’ve got a 
continuing schedule to go back over them. … You get the various perspectives to 
make sure we’re not dropping the ball on something. 
 
Jose later noted, though, that he sometimes takes a middle ground when receiving 
information. He likes to be quickly informed of important issues, but only in true 
emergencies when a decision from him is required: 
All of the VPs are direct reports. The Police Chief is not a direct report, but the 
Police Chief would also contact me [directly in an incident]. You know, you don’t 
have to call between 9 PM and 7 AM unless you think there’s something [I] really 
need to know or that it couldn’t wait until the next day. Email is a wonderful thing 
too. You wake up and they’ve given a report. … If there’s something, “Hey, I 
need you to decide this” or “should we notify the board?” That’s another little test 
to do a notice. You don’t want your board to read it in the newspaper or see it on 
the news that night without you telling them first. 
 
William advised that he prefers to be informed expeditiously. There was no concern from 
him on how or from who he gets information; as long as he gets it: “All of my reports 
about incidents that might rise to the level of crises or even tragedies, I get that 
information. I get it directly. I get it quickly.” Julian acknowledged that though he likes to 
remain informed and has no problems with being contacted by non-direct reports, it 
usually does not happen that way: 
The first person to know is the person who can do something right now. … Then 
I’m the second to know, either just to inform me that this is what happened and 
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this is what they’re doing, or we’ve got a stop-gap measure of “What should we 
do next?” But I’m usually not the first to know. 
 
Josiah, on the other hand, prefers that his team handle the initial action steps and/or 
analyses before information gets to him. He prefers to have as many of the facts vetted by 
his team as possible before he needs to make a decision or offer a response: 
I want to know from them, from the VPs or someone who knows from them, what 
they’re best assessment is. We’ll talk about it is; what we know now. I try to 
emphasize it. We need to be very mindful of what we know and what we’re 
supposing. 
 
From these interviews, it was evident that communication styles of presidents was all a 
matter of personal preference that has been formulated by their professional, academic 
and personal experiences.  
 Presidential values. Seeger et al. (2003) discussed four factors of crisis 
leadership (detailed in Chapter 2) and how those characteristics could affect decision-
making. A president’s character, or personal traits, has a lot to do with how he responds 
to crises. How much a president is involved or not involved in decisions, crisis response, 
or support can also contribute to the university’s culture; specifically, how much 
importance is placed on these matters. All participants were asked how involved 
presidents are and should be during these events at their universities. The findings 
showed that presidential involvement in crises greatly depended on their own personal 
beliefs, values and experiences, which then framed their perspective on how to deal with 
crises.  
Personal beliefs. Prior to the interview with the first presidential participant, I 
was exploring to see if there were any recent publications that I could use to further 
enhance my interview questions. I found a website called LeadershipChallenge.Com, 
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which aims to “liberate the leader in everyone.” They teach people how to lead using 
their Five Practices of Exemplary Leadership: Model the Way, Inspire a Shared Vision, 
Challenge the Process, Enable Others to Act, and Encourage the Heart. Two of these 
practices coincided with two of Klann’s (2003) three components to effective 
leaderships: clarity of vision and caring relationships. Gordon Meriwether, a retired Navy 
Captain and the Founder of The Uriah Group, a crisis leadership consultancy, wrote an 
article on the website titled “Leadership in Crisis” and how crisis leaders could 
incorporate these five practices. Towards the end of each interview (prior to showing 
them the Crisis Matrix), I asked all six presidential participants about their take on these 
leadership methods. 
Modeling the way, or showcasing balanced leadership, was the practice that most 
resonated with the president participants. Jose offered his experiences with “inept” 
leaders:  
We’ve all seen people that have lost it and they’re sharp-tongued and quick 
deciding. That’s why in a strange way, a crisis almost calms me down because 
I’m going, “Okay. I’ve got this much time frame to make a call. Let me make the 
best call I can.” That means I need to make sure people are comfortable giving me 
input and I’m not being rash. 
 
Ralph added that it was important to instill assurance of presidents’ leadership 
capabilities in others: 
People have to have confidence in you, especially during a crisis. During a crisis 
the people you’re leading have to be confident that you know exactly what you 
are doing - you know - how you are going to get them through.  
 
William, Julian and Martin, respectively, all agreed that an appropriate level of calmness 
in crises was also very important: 
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I think you need to be appropriately calm, cool, and collected. Sometimes a crisis 
requires not yelling or losing it, but to bring a different balance, if you will, to it. 
A right to, in my opinion, display a sense of urgency or a sense of urgency, as 
needed. … I think that the way I would say is having the appropriate emotional 
equilibrium. Some of that might be exhibiting heightened emotion. I don’t think 
the whole approach should be characterized by that, but the emotions should be 
appropriate. 
 
I do think that it’s important for me to remain calm. Never let them see you sweat; 
never let them see you cry. That doesn’t mean you don’t do it. Don’t ever let them 
see you do it. 
 
I think the most important quality as a leader is to remain calm. That being calm 
implies confidence, implies purposeful behavior, implies solution-centered 
decision making, and it also implies working with a sense of urgency. But not 
urgency that is unexamined. It’s examined urgency. 
 
While Josiah agreed with the latter three presidents’ opinion on keeping stable emotions, 
he did add in an extra point about empathy: “People sometimes want to see some 
emotion, but they don’t want to see you being ruled by your emotions. … They don’t 
want you to seem you’ve lost control.” For this first practice, it was clear that emotional 
self-awareness was an important characteristic for crisis leaders to have.  
The second practice, inspiring a shared vision was about goals. Crisis leaders 
should always implement common objectives. Jose shared thoughts on this as part of his 
definition for crisis (i.e., early communication) in the previous section. For William, 
goals were something that should be shared prior to any crisis occurring: 
I think that that shared vision should be clear before the crisis happens. … We 
need to understand, going in, the factors that contribute to the decisions that you 
make. You don’t start visioning in a crisis. You don’t start assessing whether or 
not you all have this shared vision in a crisis. That should be done before. It 
should be actualized in a crisis. It shouldn’t be developed. 
 
Julian believed the concrete reason behind a needed response was more important than an 
overall vision: “I think we need to keep our larger and practical, not vision, but purpose 
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in front of our mind and not let people get distracted, because crises distract people.” 
Martin and Josiah, on the other hand, felt inspiring a vision was the responsibility that 
each president has to keep the university safe: 
I think that leadership has the obligation to define the situation to set the targets 
and to help with or guide the execution. … People want to know, I think, that the 
leaders understand the situation. They understand how it impacts on the 
university’s people.  
 
Based on their responses, it was apparent that presidents preferred a more realistic, 
tangible approach to leadership as opposed to thinking in abstract plans. This, though, 
was contrary to Mitroff (2004) and Fearn-Banks (2011) who described that approach to 
be more in line with crisis management, not crisis leadership. 
The third practice, challenging the process, was the ability for a leader in crisis to 
be flexible and adapt to the changing circumstances, which are also points made in 
Dressel’s (1982) seven dimensions for decision-making. Martin’s point of view matched 
the perspective taken by other participants when defining crisis management and 
leadership; that there was a sense of shared responsibility: 
I think there’s [three] qualities. One, great listening skills and two is really good 
questions, being willing to ask good questions. Then to take corrective action if 
necessary. Great listening skills, one. Two, great questions. Three, willingness to 
take corrective, make mid-course corrections. 
 
It’s a shared responsibility asking great questions, but in the first instance, the 
principal has to have a commitment to, not just talking, but also listening and 
challenging and posting up good questions, so that those who are direct reports 
and others in the room also understand they have that same ... that it’s a shared 
responsibility down the line, down the chain of command.  
 
Josiah also expressed that adjusting the leader’s course of action as more information 
comes to light was also important:  
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You can’t let process rule. It’s a guide and if it breaks down and isn’t functioning 
then you got to be able to step in and lead the formation of a better, another 
process. 
 
You need to understand, if your preconception of the situation doesn’t match the 
reality then you’re going to have to alter your assumptions to match the living 
understood reality. 
 
More insight on this practice is discussed in the upcoming segment of decision-making, 
as well as under the Variability of Crisis theme.  
 Enabling others to act is about effective partnerships and was the fourth practice. 
Responses to this are described in more detail under the “teamwork and collaboration” 
sub-section of the Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability theme.  
The last practice, encouraging the heart, touched upon the importance for leaders 
to take care of their own. Crises can take a toll on first responders and crisis managers, 
and that must not be lost on presidents. Jose shared a quote that one of his consultant 
friends shared with him once:  
He said, “This is a time when the president almost needs to be pastoral to the 
employees in the workforce.” That you almost need to become a comforter and a 
shepherd. You need to help lift their spirits up.  
 
Martin agreed with the unique role he has played in supporting those affected by crisis 
incidents:  
You got to be in touch. You got to be in tune. That also means that you got to be 
in touch and in tune with yourself and I feel that your empathy is critical here and 
that empathy is probably the major factor in being able to understand your team 
where they’re at and also to stay calm to ask good questions.  
 
By empathy, that obviously implies that they’re going to have really good 
listening skills. I think that’s very important. The leader has to be able to maintain 
himself or herself in a really good frame of mind, alert, and not unintentionally 
send off contradictory non-verbal communications in particular. 
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More on this topic is detailed in the support category of this section. The five practices, 
though not universal, are a good measure for crisis leaders. Each presidents’ individual 
perspectives can tie into how they make decisions, offer a response and show support in 
crises.  
Crisis decision-making. There are countless decisions made prior to, during, and 
after crises occur. Some may seem insignificant and happen almost instinctively, while 
others can be so major that they require group consensus. How much a president is 
directly involved in that decision-making process is what is discussed in this segment.  
Josiah felt that it is not necessary for him to be involved in all decisions or 
response scenarios. His comment tied back to earlier comments made about 
communications and trusting your teams to act:  
We’ve got two natural spokespeople for us there who are also very good at 
thinking through what needs to happen. They will typically involve me as little as 
possible. That is probably a pretty good rule.  
 
If you think about how the public is going to respond especially if you - this is 
often the case - don’t really have a full understanding of the facts. It’s probably 
better that the president not be the one who speak because you’re going to be held 
to your account for whatever gets said. I don’t mean that I’m reluctant to take 
responsibility … It’s not that at all. We’re just trying to think: “we’re going to get 
through this as an organization.” If there’s a chance that inaccuracies creep in, it 
may be better that the president not be the one who speak. However, if it’s a really 
serious enough problem, inevitably the president is going to get involved. 
 
For Josiah, there were clear levels of separation between him and some decisions. But to 
the point of an organization riding out the storm as a community, William believed that 
joint decision-making was also critical: 
When we walk out of here, it’s the cabinet that has decided to go this way. That’s 
why I tell my VPs: “Leave it all here. Say what you have to say.” Once I’ve 
decided, you don’t go out and say, “I didn’t agree with that but he did it anyway.” 
That doesn’t help anything. 
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Expanding on the notion of collaborative decision-making, Ralph added: 
 
When my direct reports say “yes” too much I get upset at them. 
 
[I] tell them that they have to start pushing back on some things. It’s encouraged, 
and I think that it’s the only way you really do leadership right. Not everybody 
knows everything, so I encourage it. I tell everyone, every organization I’ve been 
at, is that my goal is to never hire anyone that’s dumber than me and therefore I 
expect everybody to be smarter than me and then to push back when they don’t 
agree. 
 
I certainly instigated a culture where pushing back and question[ing] things is 
appreciated. ... I think that being adaptable and being able to listen to other 
people’s views on in it, but there is a point where, at some point, you have to 
make a decision. 
 
Ralph worked best under teamwork and open communication channels, but also 
understood that group consensus was not always feasible when safety was on the line. 
William, like Ralph, also felt that his team should challenge decisions: “If you talk to 
members of my team they know that I strongly encourage that because I think that’s how 
we get the most out of what we’re doing.”  
Adding further to, and summing up well, the responsibilities each president has 
for making decisions, Jose shared: 
In a crisis, usually you’ve got a time crunch. I don’t mind them because what I’m 
doing is trying to assemble decisions, getting as many options as I can get 
picking. Because you don’t have time to reflect and you don’t have time to second 
guess and to research and to contact other people and get advice, you’re just doing 
the best you can.  
 
You’ve got to be willing to kind of challenge the convention. The more good 
options you can have developed or that you can develop, the better off you are. 
That means that you’ve got to keep making sure each step of the way that you’re 
doing ... You’re making the best decision or the best choice. 
 
Jose’s point of view was in line with Silva and McGann’s (1995) opinion that an 
important piece of crises was the ability for the leader to respond and act quickly. In the 
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end, when a person’s or the university’s safety and well-being are on the line, regardless 
of who makes the decision – whether it is the president directly or the president 
empowering his team to make the calls – a decision must be made.  
Crisis managers were asked similar questions, but flipped on its side; in other 
words, how they viewed their president’s involvement in making decisions. From a crisis 
manager’s perspective, David understood that a crisis manager and a president play 
different roles in crisis leadership: 
The way it works is the president, obviously, has the ultimate decision making 
authority but he doesn’t play an active role on our team, incident command team 
or staff. He is advised on situations by the command staff, incident commander 
and or the chief of staff for his office. Then he ultimately makes the final decision 
like we’re going to close the campus or cancel classes or whatever it might be. 
He’s involved in those decisions. We’re kind of the feet on the ground, the day to 
day operations and then we advise up through the command staff as to decision 
making. 
 
Jeremy took a similar stance: 
 
At the end of the day, the buck stops at the president. As [emergency manager], I 
have to make sure that we’re making the right decisions on [the leadership’s] 
behalf. Not just for them but for the university overall. Because if anybody at any 
level of that crisis leadership makes a bad decision, it’s going to be somebody 
he’s going to answer to, because eventually we all work for [the president]. 
 
… When it comes down to leadership, I understand my role and I also understand 
that at the end of the day, [the president] is going to make the final decision. What 
[the president] needs in order to make that final decision is going to be 
information, and it’s my job to make sure that he gets the information he needs to 
make the final decision. 
 
Decisions during crises come quickly. In order to make the best decisions possible, 
information from experts (i.e., crisis managers) is utterly important. The roles played by 
presidents and the university in crisis leadership are discussed in greater detail under the 
third theme. 
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Crisis response. Crisis managers, by their job descriptions, are built to respond. 
They are trained and paid to take immediate action and follow through post-crisis. 
However, crisis leaders (i.e., university presidents) vary in their need to respond to a 
crisis. Almost always they will be quoted in a press release or university message 
(normally drafted by their media relations team), but rarely do they get in front of a 
camera or physically visit those affected by the crisis. Contrary to this stance, Mitch 
described his president as extremely involved with campus crises: 
He’s very involved. He’s a very sensitive person. He’s a very caring person. It’s a 
small campus, still. He believes he should have a role in these things, and he’s 
very good at it. He gets personally involved with the families. He goes and talks 
to them. He speaks to student groups. 
 
Julian and Martin followed this same position during crises when it has affected student 
lives: 
 
Almost always, I’ll try to get to the hospital and offer some words of, if you can, 
comfort to the parents – to let them know we are concerned. … It’s genuine. It’s 
not reflexive. 
 
My preference would be to have contact. ... It is situational, but my preference is 
to give contact as I think that’s the human thing to do; and to be aloof and to be 
distant is ... It’s easier, but it’s not the right thing to do. 
 
Later in the interview, Martin elaborated on a specific incident that occurred at his 
university a few years earlier, and how he responded to the victims’ family and the 
community: 
I thought it was the right thing to do. Not to hide, be very direct. Be reassuring, 
because that was part of the purpose of the message to say, “This is a safe 
campus.” To express profound regret, dismay, but at the same time, be calm and 
provide reassurance that we were going to find that perpetrator on one hand, and 
also that the university would be okay. 
 
There were people out there who second guessed - for about two years - my direct 
hands-on approach to some things. … It’s easier not to descend out of the bunker. 
It’s easier not to show emotion. It’s easier to be concerned, but only moderately 
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engaged. It’s a lot easier. You let somebody else carry that load. It’s not the right 
thing to do, particularly if the buck stops with me, but there was a lot of second 
guessing. I think, in most instances, there would be under any circumstance, but 
you do what you think is right and you got to live with it. 
 
Jose added that presidents have a lot of responsibilities on their plate, but agreed that they 
must never lose touch with the emotional aspect of the crisis: “You’ve got a million 
things you’re thinking of. You’re thinking of more than just someone that’s hurt, but you 
need to always try to convey sensitivity.” From their perspective, presidents will be 
criticized regardless of what they do or don’t do, how much or how little they respond. 
Bradley shared his opinion on the importance of leadership in crisis response: 
Being someone that is engaged when we have those type of emergencies, that’s 
the leadership, it gives you like I know “I’m here.”  It’s not just to check off a 
bunch of checks that I’ve done these things in an action. 
 
Since there is no perfect way to respond, as with communication, how presidents directly 
respond to crises is a matter of their personality. In other words, if they value empathy, 
they will likely be more involved with their university’s crisis management system and 
response efforts. 
Support. The fourth aspect of presidential values in crises is the support they 
show to their crisis managers. For crisis managers, only two participants felt they 
received the necessary support from the university’s leadership. The first, was Amir, who 
felt that not only his president’s words, but also actions, spoke loudly: 
The fact that we bring what we call the top 40 [university leaders], …that it’s 
mandated by the president, that’s it’s not [emergency management] sending out 
the email, it’s the president wants this to happen, so people respond - it makes all 
the difference in the world. 
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Outside of tangible support like training and funding, Bradley elaborated on when he 
believed the president would be involved at his university and how his president shows 
support in those instances: 
There are levels of critical incidents, crises or emergencies.  I think probably 
disasters and emergencies, those are going to involve our president because they 
are affecting the broader campus.  If there is a student that has indicated suicide or 
ideations, but no threat of harm to others, that may be a crisis that I’m navigating 
as Dean of Students.  [The president] may not necessarily need every minute by 
minute update of what is going on.  That might stop at either me or the Vice 
President for Student Affairs or the [campus response group], which is our 
incident response team. … Where the leadership comes into play is say [the 
president] giving support and talking about the [campus response group]. … Still, 
though [he] may not have [his] hands on every single critical incident, that 
leadership behind it saying “yes, I trust my staff, I empower them, I am briefed 
and updated as needed.”  Not micromanaging if there is a smaller issue on 
campus. 
 
For him, presidents can also show symbolic support (as mentioned by Seeger et al., 2003) 
to their crisis managers by enabling them to act.   
From a wider perspective, Amir discussed the current subculture within 
emergency management and how he viewed the relationship dynamics of support: 
I don’t feel that same commitment across the SUS. I think you’re going to find 
out when you speak to the emergency managers. I’m thinking they’re basically 
going to speak badly of their administration because - it’s not like there’s bad 
relationships by any means. I don’t think the sense of priority is there than the 
way it is here, because they are university presidents or dealing with so many 
other things that at our level we’re not even aware of and things that until you 
work in administration, you don’t understand what the administration’s going 
through. 
 
He added: 
 
[Presidents are] all going to “talk the talk”, because they have to and because on 
some level they do understand it. Let me not, short change them. They do 
understand it, but that actual commitment, isn’t there the way it is at all places. 
Let’s just put it that way. It’s not across the board.  
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I think you’re going to find that. And I think that’s going to come out. You’re 
going to hear that from some of the Emergency Managers. 
 
There may be some - I don’t want to use “bitter”, I think that’s too strong of a 
word. 
 
But there may be some frustration there. And, unless you have somebody fighting 
for your cause to the administration, somebody at a higher level, it’s a tough fight. 
It’s a tough, tough fight and you’re just sort of going and going and going. 
 
I think that’s key and I think that, in terms of the micro-managing, ... I think it’s 
about knowing the priorities of the institution and knowing some of the things that 
you don’t necessarily want to make a priority, but you’re forced to. And that 
happens when there’s an incident. 
 
In other words, Amir was implying that true support is only shown when an incident is 
occurring or has occurred because presidents then have no other recourse but to be 
involved. From Amir’s perspective, and as supported by Mitroff and Anagnos (2001), 
unless a crisis manager (and their department) has a champion within the leadership, it 
will greatly affect their department’s worth amongst the university’s priorities.  
Institutional values. Outside the values held by presidents, there is also a sense 
that each university has its own set of beliefs and values regarding safety, security and 
preparedness. Sometimes this culture is created because of what the president values 
himself, other times via the community in which the university was established. Tying 
into the earlier sub-section on communication, Jose shared his opinion on creating a sense 
of open communication amongst his team: 
One of the things I had the hardest time getting when I first got here was you want 
your vice presidents to feel comfortable in disagreeing with you and with each 
other and to not feel that if the President disagrees with them, or another VP 
disagrees with them, that they’re belittled or shamed or they’re in trouble. Or they 
may be getting demoted or they may be getting fired. You’ve got to create a 
culture of openness in there where people are not afraid to bring forth bad news. 
Where they’re not afraid to say, “Hey, I know you’re doing this. I think you’re 
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making a mistake.” Once you get that, when people feel that they’re comfortable 
with that, you’re miles ahead. 
 
The notion of empowerment was described by Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) in the 
literature review, and is an example of a president’s values being indoctrinated into the 
university’s modus operandi. On the other hand, William underscored the value his 
university places on safety, which he noted in the interview was a value that was 
imbedded in the university prior to his arrival: 
We pride ourselves on our low crime rate. … Our philosophy is, and we tell this 
to parents, a safe campus depends on all of us. We do what we can, but everyone 
has to be responsible for the overall safety of the campus. They all need to 
understand that. Your own behavior, the behavior of others that you observe that 
is disruptive for the campus, all of us participate. That’s easy to say but that’s our 
philosophy about safety. 
 
These institutional values, as touched upon by William, must be supported by the 
employee base and student body. Toby believed: 
There has always been … a pervasive sense [that you are a] member of the 
[university] community and you watch out for each other, and you respect each 
other, and you’re civil towards each other, and all of those other things. … I know 
when I do my crisis management workshop for new faculty and staff, I get in my 
soap box for a little while and say, “Here’s how we keep the campus safe. We 
care about each other. We respond to each other.” … There is a kind of pervasive 
“take care of each other” message on campus. … I think that’s why I have 
students calling me up and [expressing] concern about [other] students.  
 
Martin felt the same way regarding Toby’s opinion as to why students are open about 
their concerns: 
I think you have to have a community that is certainly…caring and that can have 
essentially early warnings in terms of students at stress, as well as visitors who 
may be out of place. That’s the second thing. I think as well, you have to have the 
confidence that if there are those issues that we got the skills to respond and to 
keep people safe. I think it’s a combination of things. 
 
Additionally, Andrew had the following take about his student body: 
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I think overall, I’m very confident that our students are very cognizant of trying to 
be as safe as possible. … I think for the most part that they make some very good 
decisions. … I think that is also challenged by what I call the superman mentality, 
and that all of us have. That mentality is “Not me. It won’t happen to me. I can 
take care of myself.” That sometimes positions us to let our guard down in 
situations where we normally wouldn’t. … We don’t see danger in things the 
same way at 18 and 17 that we may at 22, 23, and 24. All of those things are a 
significant factor. 
 
Josiah agreed with Andrew’s perspective on the effectiveness of systems because of the 
current societal culture: “The other thing is now the kids don’t want email. You have a 
great system but if they ignore it or block it. They all feel invincible, immortal.” This 
awareness of strengths and weaknesses of their own communities is critical to building an 
institutional culture where everyone’s safety and well-being comes first.  
Connected to the universities’ values on safety, I received thoughts from both 
presidents and crisis managers on how they perceived the importance of preparedness. 
Outside of personal crisis response, one president (Ralph) expressed his stance on 
creating a culture of safety at his university and also discussed his plans to personally 
improve preparedness at this university: 
I think there’s certainly a difference between creating a culture versus 
preparedness. Although part of preparing is contributing to the culture - that we 
do that up-front. I’d say that they were related: create a culture of safety plus 
preparing for it. I think that maybe if you do the preparations, and you spend a lot 
of time on that, then that starts instituting a culture.  
 
I think it’s Peter Drucker that said that “culture eats strategy for breakfast every 
day.” That’s one of the really difficult things in higher ed or at companies or 
anywhere else: is that you can come up with a strategy, and it’s the best strategy 
in the world, but if the culture of the organization doesn’t support it you’ll never 
implement it. That’s one big advantage we have. 
 
One of the things that we have on the list to do is a whole enterprise risk 
management study. … We’re putting a team together to go do at least some 
beginning risk management, crisis management, types of planning. … It’ll be 
driven by me, I think.  We’re small enough. The other thing is I’m hands-on 
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enough. I’m an analytical person, so I like doing studies and things like that, so 
generally what’s happened in these things is I’ll just appoint a team and say “let’s 
do a study.” Then I’ll work with them fairly closely. 
 
The latter part of Ralph’s comments on preparedness tie back to his earlier suggestion of 
adding likelihood to the Crisis Matrix. It was clear that running assessments and being 
vigilant of risks is an important part of his leadership style. Complementing Ralph’s point 
of view, Amir also talked about preparedness as well as the importance of that culture: 
We want to create a culture of preparedness, meaning that whatever comes our 
way, we’re going to be ready to respond to it. Whether it’s a police incident, 
whether it’s a weather incident, whether it’s something happening with our 
students, our faculty, our staff, there’s something going on here every day. If it 
starts to become bigger and badder, we have the overall culture university-wide to 
be able to deal with it.  
 
We all create our little worlds and our little safety systems and our little people 
that are go-to people, we need something we can call, we all have that, but is there 
an overall university wide culture of preparedness that if I know in my little world 
that it’s hitting the fan, who can I talk to? Who can come in and step in and help 
me? Who can do that? Is that there? 
 
Whereas the safety, they’re all going to tell you, “Yeah, of course. It’s my 
responsibility to ensure a safe and secure campus for my students, faculty, and 
staff.” Nobody’s going to say that they don’t have that because they’re just not, 
because they do take steps. ... There’s a distinction there. I don’t know if you 
understand that. 
 
…That to me, that is a culture of preparedness and that doesn’t happen overnight. 
That happens with commitment. It’s not always a commitment of resources. It’s 
commitment of time and holding to your word and walking the walk and being 
the example and showing up at the exercises and being the one that says, “No, 
we’re going to do this. I don’t care whether you like it or not. This is what we’re 
going to do.” That makes all the difference in the world. 
 
Preparedness also means being proactive, which most crisis management systems are not:  
You’re always reactive. You can’t possibly be ready. … We’re not going to put 
metal detectors all over campus. We’re not going to have passes; everybody has 
to wear a necklace with your picture ID on it. … We don’t want a college campus 
to be that way. 
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A culture of preparedness, hence, equates to strategy creation, training implementation 
and steadfast, long-term commitment.  
A few crisis managers added some other key points that their presidents did not 
mention in their interviews. Toby admitted that they need to improve certain aspects of 
their crisis management system: 
When it comes to students, we’re not as good, quite honestly. Typically, I will 
meet with all the new resident assistants every year to train them. I go to all the 
orientations and talk to them about [our safety program]. That’s in 10 minutes. 
Then we give a full-blown overview [in the program]. Really, that’s about it. 
 
It was also noted that program implementation takes time, but it will eventually have an 
effect on institutional culture. Jeremy noted: 
Back when I first started it was like pulling teeth to get people to write safety 
plans and emergency plans for the buildings, now everybody wants one. The 
mindsets [have] changed, which is great for us but it’s a lot of work for us. 
 
Support by presidents and investment by the top management no doubt helps support a 
culture of safety and preparedness.  
 Expanding on the earlier section of “size and location,” the type of universities we 
have within the SUS (i.e., public, open-access) also matters in building and sustaining 
this culture. Ralph discussed how his university recently looked at safety measures: 
There is a fence that goes around the campus, and there was discussions about 
whether we do a gated campus. We did study that and look at that and came to the 
conclusion that it wasn’t worth it to do. 
 
For Ralph’s university, physical barriers of protection did not remove the potential risks 
of crises still occurring. Andrew supported this sentiment of the need for protection: 
As you indicated, because we are a public, open institution, and there [are] no 
gates, like you have around some private institutions or much smaller institutions, 
our campus can be easily accessed by any and every one. That has its advantages 
and disadvantages. I think that our students are very cognizant of that. 
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William also added to this perspective as it related public universities across the nation: 
 
We’re very open. This is not a gated community. None of our universities are. 
That’s just the nature of our public universities and not just in Florida. It’s 
anywhere, all over this country. I just assume I can walk on a public university 
campus and just walk in. 
 
All university constituents need to be aware that issues like location and lack of physical 
barriers make the SUS unique, and this uniqueness can bring with it some limitations to 
safety. This transcends, though, the issue of fencing. Upcoming issues like allowing guns 
on campus (SB 176 was approved in March 2015 by the Senate Higher Education 
Committee of in the Florida Legislature, which could have allowed anyone to bring a 
registered, concealed gun onto campus, but eventually died in judiciary) can also help or 
hinder this culture. As Martin expressed: 
The common denominator is students and student safety and each of them has 
unique circumstances that we have to be very attentive to. … No two campuses 
are alike. They’ll each have the opportunities for extreme risk and damage and 
danger. 
 
This also means that universities cannot simply implement other processes and operations 
simply because it worked elsewhere. As William noted: “what works at an urban 
institution is not necessary; in fact, could be counterproductive at [our university].” Crisis 
managers and crisis leaders alike have to take a close look at the distinctive features of 
their size, demographics and missions in order to create and sustain a culture that best 
suits their university. 
Roles, Responsibilities and Accountability 
Presidents and crisis managers each have unique roles and responsibilities that 
can sometimes be affected by institutional culture, which was the third theme found 
within the collected data. These roles are inclusive of how reporting structures are 
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created, the need and support for collaboration, as well as accountability measures that 
crisis managers and crisis leaders believe they must adhere to. Their interactions with one 
another can vary greatly. 
Reporting structures. This study brought to light the inconsistent reporting 
structures for crisis managers within the SUS. Each university’s organizational charts 
were recreated below, but only illustrating the hierarchy for the units being analyzed in 
the study (i.e., the 16 participants listed in Table 1).  
Given that each university had slightly different titles for their executives, though 
their roles were relatively the same, the following generic titles were given to these 
employees for the sake of remaining consistent through each description: (a) the Chief 
Academic Officer was called “Provost”, (b) the head of Finance and/or Administration 
was titled “CFO”, and (c) the leader of Student Affairs was noted as “VPSA.” Though 
police were not included in the study as participants, they were included in the following 
organizational charts given their important role in many crisis response situations as well 
as their close operational ties to the crisis managers in the study. The titles and 
departments within each chart that are in bold are those shown in Table 1 and the generic 
titles just mentioned. For comparative purposes, the titles in parentheses show each 
position’s actual human resources title at their respective university.  
At U-1, the Department of Emergency Management, which was also inclusive of 
Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and the Police, reported to the CFO. The CFO, 
in turn, reported to the president. The Dean of Students, on the other hand, reported to the 
VPSA. The VPSA reported to the Provost who then reported to the President. 
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About two years or about a year and a half ago, [the Chief of Police] and I 
reported to another AVP but after [the incident], they recognized that we need to 
be closer to our president so we actually moved up into the current chain of 
command. 
 
As noted, visibility and proximity can be tied to accountability (discussed in greater detail 
later in this section). When asked about a multi-layered reporting structure, Martin 
advised that it could be both a positive and a negative. 
It gives people the opportunity to take responsibility and to take action 
independent of the chief executive officer’s involvement. …  That’s a good thing 
because you want people to take action. It potentially is a bad thing depending 
upon the level of risk, but what is important is good communication and trust … 
good communication and trust between the executive and his or her direct reports. 
… I think in the main though, it does increase the likelihood that responses will be 
made earlier, not later, and I like that.” 
 
Mitch stated that reporting to the president is “not as critical as long as you’re on the 
cabinet.” He added:  
If you’ve been pushed out of visibility of their biggest leadership level of campus, 
then you got more issues. Then there’s other people out there making decisions 
who have no concept of what you’re doing, and that can become a problem. 
 
In the interview with Jeremy, it was noted that “everybody’s doing it differently, so 
there’s no standard; that’s across the country, not just the State.” When asked why that 
was, Jeremy posited that not just personalities, but professional experiences mattered: 
“Some people want [these departments]. Some people don’t because they don’t 
understand it.” 
When probed about their thoughts on reporting structures, the remaining crisis 
managers had interesting opinions. When asked about the instances of multiple 
restructuring, Pearce noted: 
That shows the level of - how am I going to put it? - importance that they put on 
the departments. When you start kicking around departments like EHS - we’ve 
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moved, God I don’t how many times, physically and struck organizationally - it 
shows you the kind of importance they put on it. 
 
Pearce added that current events had also contributed to the changes in structure at his 
university:  
Look at emergency management and EHS [historically]. Emergency management 
was always under EHS in most places. Well, now with all that has been going, the 
spotlight is on emergency management. EHS is starting to recede into the 
background. 
 
What Pearce was referring to were the recent incidents like Virginia Tech and Florida 
State shootings, which have forced universities to reconsider their processes and systems; 
presidents have been forced to act (as noted in earlier sections). Given size and location, 
this may be why some of the smaller schools have not yet created emergency 
management departments at their universities.  
Roles. Universities’ core missions are all academic in nature, but their main 
responsibility is to offer their constituents a safe environment. As Julian articulated: “the 
purpose of a university is to hold classes and to get students educated and to facilitate 
their earning of a degree”, but later noted that “the whole issue is safety first.” The rest of 
this section is divided into the perceived roles crisis managers, presidents, and the 
universities as a whole each play in crisis leadership.   
Universities. To the point about safety being the most important aspect of a 
university’s responsibility, William expressed: 
What you see here on this campus is a campus that’s very intentional about a lot 
of things because we can afford to be. One of those things is safety. … That’s 
what I think about as safe campus. It’s all of our responsibility. … I know what 
the expectations are. … We have a responsibility to provide safe environments as 
much as possible both on and off campus. 
 
Martin also spoke to this issue: 
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I see the university as a sanctuary; it’s a privileged place. It’s high neutral ground. 
It ought to be characterized by serenity and order and peacefulness. For the most 
part, most universities are that, but it’s an artificial environment and so you have 
to be prepared for anything and you hope nothing happens. I think it’s our 
responsibility to keep it the way it is, but it’s [also] our responsibility to hope for 
the best and prepare for the worst. 
 
David, however, had a totally different opinion on what a university actually is: 
People have a real misunderstanding of college university campuses, anyway. 
They see them as this little, protected enclave - a Disneyland, almost - and it’s just 
not. It never was. It clearly isn’t today. When something bad happens, it really 
throws people. 
 
It’s still pretty safe, very safe, as a matter of fact, but it’s just, when it happens, of 
course, it’s a shock, because you expect it to be safe. 
 
Andrew also believed that universities have an inimitable role to play in student safety: 
We want you to know that in loco parentis, it’s still something that many of us 
believe in. When your son or daughter comes here, we take on that responsibility 
of looking after them, and helping them grow as we would our own children. 
 
Ralph, though, noted that this responsibility for student safety is dual-pronged. The 
leadership and students have to work hand-in-hand to create such a culture: 
I think [students] have responsibility as well. Too often these days in society we 
don’t hold people accountable for their own actions. We want to blame them on 
someone else, and so I think the kids have to be accountable, but we have to also 
make sure that we’re protecting them. That we’re doing everything that we can to 
minimize any of those things. We’re taking a dual-hatted role to that, I would say. 
 
In sum, and as Maslow’s (1943) theory posited, the basic need for safety and security 
must be a university’s primary goal. 
Presidents. Drilling down a level, presidents believed they played their own 
unique roles. Martin brought up the importance of defining crisis, which could affect how 
roles are perceived: 
Values are critical. Everybody is going to have a different bottom line. Everybody 
has going to have a different bright line. Everybody is going to have a different 
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risk perception. Ultimately, the president is the one who gets paid to make the 
right call, but everybody will be different in terms of how they perceive the 
situation. One person’s pending calamity is another person’s slow motion flood 
that is business as usual. 
 
Jose added: “You’re the public face of the place. You get paid a lot of money. It’s your 
job to try to keep things running smoothly and the students safe.” William also 
commented on the ultimate responsibility that presidents have: 
At the very top, the president’s role doesn’t change. He or she is the icon of the 
university. The expectation of the university community and the external 
community is that the president is in charge and leading whatever efforts there are 
going on to address that crisis. 
 
One crisis manager saw presidents’ roles, noted in an earlier section, as dependent on the 
president’s personality. Specifically on the topic of newsworthy crises, Mitch noted: 
“Presidents, depending on the campus, have different roles and different visions of what 
they’re supposed to do and some are just much more comfortable in front of the camera.” 
Another crisis manager, Amir, also mentioned this external role: “This is just my opinion, 
but I think one of the biggest crises a University President may face is protecting the 
brand.” These perspectives are all supplemental to the earlier theme of Culture, 
specifically “presidential values.” 
 The most eloquently stated opinion on the president’s role in crisis management 
and crisis leadership, and how the two intersect, came from William: 
I think in my mind, leadership directs the management. A true crisis, what I might 
see as a crisis, it’s important for me as a president to make sure my management 
team understands that we’re in crisis mode. We know what we do in crisis mode. 
It’s important that people know their roles. They don’t change a lot at the very 
top. My role is going to be the same whether that crisis was in student affairs or 
academic affairs or you mentioned environmental health and safety.  
 
I think it’s the president - the leader of the organization - [who] really sets the 
foundational approach to crises. Everyone needs to be on that same foundation.  
  
126 
In sum, as Julian noted, “[presidents are] responsible at the end of the day.” 
 
Crisis managers. Moving further down the organizational chart are crisis 
managers who have their own responsibilities in building a safe environment at their 
universities. David and Jeremy, respectively, shared: 
Our role is trying to basically keep the university out of trouble and keep folks 
from getting hurt. 
 
We’re the doom and gloom folks and thinking about the worst case scenarios, but 
that’s what we get paid to do and have a solution for those worst case scenarios. 
 
Crisis managers can also have a supporting role in crisis leadership, as Amir and Jeremy 
advised:  
If you have an administration or university president that knows what systems are 
in place, they need not know the particular details and it’s not their job to know 
all of the details. That’s why I’m here. 
 
When it comes down to crisis management, the way I view it as my job and my 
role at this university, is to identify who has what specific roles here…to help us 
respond to any particular crisis because they’re all going to be different. 
 
Within crisis management, there are also unique roles played within the departments 
involved. Specifically for student affairs, David advised that in his world, they are 
“always thinking about ‘what impact does it has on the people of this campus?’” For 
police, Andrew stated that in a real crisis “university police is the ultimate authority, not 
the president.” All of these roles collectively, though differing and university-specific at 
times, support a healthy and safe environment. 
Teamwork and collaboration. Working in cooperation with other units, internal 
to your department and the university, as well as externally, is crucially important for the 
success of crisis management and crisis leadership. Jose shared his thoughts on 
teamwork: “We want to be in this together. If you can kind of get it to where people are 
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all pulling the same way and understanding why they’re pulling, that’s great.” Martin 
expressed his expectations for his crisis managers: “I do expect teamwork. I do expect 
collaboration and really good communication.” When asked if he felt his emergency 
management team had enough staffing, he stated: “I think that’s about right as long as 
they are continued to be collaborative with and embedded in the university.”  
All participating universities advised that they had partnerships with local police, 
fire, and emergency operations agencies. This was in line with the literature on FEMA 
and how institutions receiving federal support can more easily receive mutual aid funding 
during and post crises. These interactions are critical to the success of any crisis 
management system, especially in a university-wide incident. Amir and Toby shared their 
perspectives on this: 
We’ve broken down some of those high-lows and I think that’s huge anywhere 
and anything and you know that relationships make everything. No matter what 
you’re trying to do, it’s all about the relationships. When something happens, 
that’s not the time to develop those relationships. You’re too late, you’re already 
behind the eight ball. 
 
Developing that network and developing the relationships, so that you can 
collaborate seamlessly is really important. … The other part of it is, again, we 
operate as a team. Not only that - many hands make light work. When you’re 
trying to figure out what’s going on, if you’re looking for someone or whatever, it 
just helps to have more eyes. 
 
Another crisis manager (David) recognized, though, that they could give more focus to 
nurturing those types of relationships: 
Interacting with all the agencies - we don’t have anybody that’s really actively 
reaching out to all the appropriate agencies, to stay in communications, to stay in 
the know, to develop those relationships as a resource if we ever need it. 
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In addition to these structured partnerships, two participants mentioned how their 
universities have created inter-departmental projects to aid in being a university with a 
more proactive culture. Jeremy noted: 
We’re working on that as a collaborate project right now with a lot of our team 
folks and a lot of our other folks. We didn’t do a good job drawing up, 
implementing those processes early on but we now we recognize it’s a gap and 
we’re working on fixing it. 
 
And Josiah shared: 
We’ve also got, in addition to the crisis management group, we’ve got another 
group that meets periodically that just tracks issues. Their charge is to think about 
the things that may impinge on us. In other words, if you had been really listening 
to some of the dialogue about sexual assault for instance, you might…have gotten 
your campus a month’s head start …  
 
What are the issues that are floating around out there that are just pretty clearly 
going to get to campus one way or another? 
 
This awareness of and sense of ownership for the existing gaps within the safety, 
security, and preparedness realm of the university is definitely a plus in terms of crisis 
leadership. It also leads into the next responsibility that universities and their leadership 
have: staying accountable for the roles they play and the actions they take. 
Accountability. As with roles, the level of accountability for crisis managers, 
presidents and universities vary. However, no greater pressure of responsibility is placed 
than on presidents. Adding to this, there is also a sense of accountability placed on the 
SUS to also serve as a cultural ambassador of sorts to all 12 universities for safety and 
security.  
Presidents. Presidents were each asked how accountable they believed they were 
if a national issue like at Penn State occurred at their university. Each had their own 
special take on the matter. Jose noted: 
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The problem - and you’ve been in a President’s office – it’s 90 miles an hour. 
Sometimes people are intentionally not flagging things and you just think, “Oh, 
it’s no big deal. No big deal. No big deal.” You’ve got to kind of always be 
sensitive that this may be a bomb. This may be a ticking bomb. This may be a 
time bomb that will blow up later. This may really be a problem. I need to make 
sure that we batten down those hatches. 
 
Ralph’s thoughts on this matter (i.e., dual-pronged responsibility) were mentioned 
previously in the “roles” section of this theme. Similar to Jose’s thoughts on the amount 
of information presidents receive, William offered this response: 
I think that of course presidents can’t know everything. That’s why the upper 
administration needs to reflect the values that the president holds dear and adheres 
to. 
 
You can have a lot of debate about that of what’s that’s about really is that one of 
the values of the organization. People have to understand that. One value is not to 
cover up transparency, honesty, integrity. You apply that to everything. 
 
The folks you put in leadership positions in the various divisions in the university 
need to understand that, need to reflect that. When that’s not happening, hopefully 
then [it won’t] reveal itself in a crisis. I think you’ve heard the saying, “Character 
is not developed in a crisis, it’s revealed in a crisis.” 
 
Julian also shared: 
 
I think that Penn State showed us that, when in doubt, report it, whatever it is, to 
the police. 
 
At the level of a Penn State, at a University of Florida, you can’t own all of them. 
I mean, there’s no way to do it. You have to assume that the chain of command is 
making sure that you’re finding out the ones that are really, really important and 
the ones that you really need to be involved in. My Board Chair…He says when 
you’re the CEO, you can’t be into all the details but you need to be in some of the 
details. You’ve got to be able to discern when you’re meddling and 
micromanaging and when you’re being responsible for really getting down to 
understanding what has gone on. 
 
Partially contrary to Julian, Martin believed: 
I prefer sins of commission or I think people need to take action. That’s what they 
get paid to do. I have a lot of curiosity and I don’t apologize for that and I want to 
know. Then I have to rely on my gut instincts to determine whether what I’m 
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hearing squares [with] what I’m saying, and whether what I’m hearing and seeing 
square with what I feel in terms of my values and the concerns that I have. I think 
that there’s no single fixed response to that. 
 
Josiah also had a slightly differing perspective:  
When it involves something that either by board of governor’s rule or by statute, 
the president has to do then I’m going to do it. If it’s something that can 
legitimately be delegated, I may well do that. We jokingly sit around here - but 
only joking in part - that the first law of academic administration is if it’s worth 
doing, it’s worth delegating. 
 
If you have good people and you trust them, it is generally a good thing to 
delegate, not always, but generally. You need to know when to step in and say 
this isn’t the usual. If you got good people, they certainly know more about their 
area than I will and by and large, we’re better served by letting him make the call 
at the senior level for sure. I know them. I may not know some of the people 
down the line. 
 
Josiah later added: 
I think one of the things we need to do in a situation like that is without seeming 
to try to duck responsibility, point out that we are in the early stages of something. 
Here’s what we think we know but we’re not often in cases like this. New 
information emerges or details are discovered that are misinterpreted and whatnot. 
Try to manage expectations somewhat. There are situations where that’s simply, 
you’re going to be overwhelmed.  
 
To the extent you can, try to help people understand that while, yes, you do have a 
lot of people working for you, reporting to you, it is the nature of a lot of these 
situations that full knowledge of the facts emerges over time, if ever. There are 
things you know and things you don’t know. There are things you don’t know you 
don’t know. …. Often, it’s true, it’s what you think you know that aren’t, so that 
really gets you.  
 
The important takeaway here, as discussed in the “communication” segment of the 
Culture theme, and noted by Amir, is that “no reaction will sink an institution.” 
Regardless of who responds, a response must occur.  
State University System. Outside of the accountability placed on each university 
and its president, there is also a sense of accountability for safety as an entire system. 
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Along the lines of leadership support, several participants were questioned about a 
request from the State University Systems’ Chancellor that asked for all universities to be 
on an urgent call to discuss safety and preparedness across the SUS. On September 18, 
2014, the following email was sent out to all presidents and their assistants: 
At our Board meeting this week, the Board discussed the topic of campus 
security. Our Board members believe it is important to provide a safe learning 
environment for our students.  During the meeting Chair Hosseini asked the 
universities to work together to determine what additional measures can be taken 
to enhance the safety and security of our campuses for our students.    
  
With that said, I would like to schedule a conference call on Friday, September 26 
at 10:00 a.m. (EST). During the conference call we will be discussing how we can 
make our campuses safer and to ensure that we are doing all that we can to 
prevent sexual assaults on our campuses. We will work together over the next few 
months and will report back to the Academic and Student Affairs Committee. I 
would ask that either you or a designee be part of this discussion. 
 
Given the topic of the call correlated with my dissertation topic, I joined the call (no 
permission was needed given that the BOG is governed by Sunshine Law and all 
calls/meetings must be open to the public). I was eager to learn about the BOG’s plans, 
but was let down when the call only lasted 10 minutes. Only a brief summary of the UCF 
Workshop held a couple years back and notice that a follow up gathering should occur 
was discussed.  
When probed about his thoughts of the call, Mitch believed, though short, there 
was good intent behind the call: 
I think [the BOG is] beginning to realize - not beginning to - they realized that 
this is a very, very dangerous flashpoint for them; that they really [have to] do 
what they can do to control it. … [The Chancellor] understands that … the college 
campus today is very, very much more volatile than it was 20 years, 30 years ago, 
and so I think they’re realizing that the mental health concerns with campus and 
the ability to respond to crises is a much more fluid situation than it used to be. 
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William agreed with this thought: “There needs to be some type of system 
acknowledgement that this is something that could happen anywhere and we need to be 
prepared.” Conversely, Jose noted that the shortened call was likely due to the sensitive 
nature of the topic:  
What I think they really concluded was, you don’t have a public conference call 
for a university to say, “Here’s three things I’m worried about. I don’t have 
enough counselors. I don’t have enough cops. I don’t have a bomb dog. I don’t 
have a this. I don’t have a that.”… You invite opportunists. There’s healthier 
ways to convey that. That’s why I think he shortened it.  
 
I don’t know if it should be a university system issue or not, or should that just 
be...[dependent on] each school. Each institution’s dealing with it’s ... You know, 
you’ve got your own geography, your student mix, and your location. 
 
Though understanding their perspective, sometimes words and the attention given to a 
topic matter. Nonetheless, words must be turned into actions. 
The accountability measures placed on presidents and the SUS tie into the next 
theme: Resources. How, when and if resources are allocated are always a criticism shared 
post-crises by constituents and the media, which ties into the earlier comments made on 
trying to change the culture from a reactive to a proactive state. 
Resources  
The fourth theme deals with the availability, or lack thereof, of safety and 
preparedness resources provided to institutions. These resources are inclusive of budgets, 
personnel, space, training, and institutional support.  
Available resources. As noted earlier, universities play a distinctive role in safety 
and preparedness. Given that safety must be their number one priority, David believed: 
“That’s…I think where university probably can excel, because it has resources. It’s just a 
matter of figuring out how to use those resources most effectively.” The one university 
  
133 
that has used their resources best has been the University of Central Florida, who was 
hailed by all participants as the best emergency management system in the State. Many of 
the following points are related to how their operation runs, as well as a workshop that 
UCF held after a March 2013 active shooter incident in their Tower 1 residence hall.  
Of the six universities that participated, U-1 and U-6 had stand-alone Emergency 
Operations Centers where training and live incident management occurs. Both of those 
universities also have mobile command units that can be used on the actual site of a 
campus incident. U-6’s student affairs program had the greatest multitude of resources 
for student health and safety. Two examples provided in the interview were free taxi 
vouchers for students who are too intoxicated to drive home or back to campus, and a 
mobile water station that roams campus on Friday and Saturday nights. It was evident 
that these robust programs were due, in part, to the universities’ more urban locations and 
larger populations.  
These resources often yield robust crisis management systems. Success of these 
systems, though, takes time and money. As Amir noted,  
When you think of all the range of specializations and the talent that we’ve 
cobbled together here at [U-1], it’s a work of years; it’s a work of decades. You 
can’t do it overnight. So if you lose a whole cadres of specialists, you’ve really 
hurt your institutions and set it back. 
 
Amir also felt, though, that it is sometimes difficult to justify institutional support of such 
an intensive program: 
It’s hard to see the payoff of the investment. It really is. Ideally, we’ll never see 
the payoff. That is my goal. Ideally, we use this room to train, to exercise, and 
never actually have to use it. That’s ultimately the goal. That’s a hard thing to 
quantify. You’re spending a lot of money on what-if scenarios.  
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Outside of financial support, it also takes a strong commitment from the leadership. 
Something that both Amir and Jeremy discussed during their interviews. For Amir: 
I have, here, the best “buy-in” from an administration. I can tell you that without a 
doubt. One of the factors that makes my job easy is that the administration gets it, 
and they buy into it. They have an understanding of Emergency Management. 
They know that it’s important. They know that sometimes you’ve got to spend 
money - up front.  
 
To invest the time, the commitment, the money. Coming here every semester I 
can guarantee you that there is not another University President that has done as 
many tabletop exercises as ours has. That, to me, is crucial, because if you don’t 
have that “buy-in,” it’s very difficult to get any traction. 
 
For Jeremy, direct commitment from the administration was also critical. It was because 
of his former supervisor that he obtained all of the space and funding to build his 
program. This departmental champion, as noted earlier under the topic of presidential 
support, is truly key to a program’s success. 
  Needed resources. During the interviews, each participant was asked for their 
wish list of sorts – putting aside any financial or political restrictions their universities are 
currently under. The recurring theme from crisis managers was that, as Rhashad so 
pointedly stated, “basically, all of this comes down to money.” This lack of funding 
creates a deficiency in effective operations. It can sometimes be like a system of 
bandages that is holding the entire system together. As Pearce noted: “You do what you 
can; you do everything you can and you hit the highlights; hit the high points and the 
things that will get you in trouble.” In order of the frequency stated amongst participants, 
the list of needed resources breaks out into money for personnel, physical resources, 
training, and space.  
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 Personnel. For staffing, Jeremy noted that potential future growth would change 
his desire for more employees: 
I feel pretty comfortable with saying I think from the emergency manager 
perspective, as far as staffing goes, I got what we need. I mean, the next 
university closest to us has two people. I mean, we got five. We’re in good shape 
in my opinion. Now, if we keep building more and more campuses that might 
change. … We might need more staff to support the rest of the regional campuses.  
 
Other crisis managers pointed to current key deficiencies they would like to immediately 
address. For David:  
Number one would be an emergency manager, a dedicated person to fill that role. 
I think that we’re large enough. As well intentioned as our folks are and as highly 
trained as we’ve become and practiced as we’ve become, we’re still missing out 
on that expertise. 
 
[Also], I think it would be helpful to have more resources for mental health. 
[Student affairs professionals] basically were generalists. We’ve become very, 
very specialized and people are not comfortable dealing with the crises for 
mentally ill people or mentally unstable people, and even our own student affairs 
people don’t know what to do, because they’ve been trained as administrative 
roles, not counseling roles. 
 
For Mitch and Bradley, as shared also by David, that personnel gap fell within health 
services:  
I think it would be helpful to have more resources for mental health. … We need, 
almost, a crisis responder group in the Dean of Students office or in the division 
that deals with people over the short run ... like crisis case managers. 
 
I would like to have another case manager with this as mental health issues have 
grown over the last few years with the advance in psych or pharmaceutical drugs.  
… As we’ve grown as an institution over the last few years, more students are just 
needing more people [to help them]. 
 
And for Rhashad, it was about her own personal well-being: “If I had about five more 
positions, I could rest.” Undoubtedly, crisis managers are unable to focus on moving their 
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university towards a more proactive culture when they are always focusing their attention 
on putting out fires (and for some that would be literally and figuratively).  
 Physical resources. In terms of physical resources, crisis managers mentioned 
items such as equipment and programming. Jeremy had the most specific request:  
One thing on the emergency management side of the house - I think that we need 
some kind of an emergency management software to help manage an eTeam or 
WebEOC. … That software alone, to buy into it, ranges between $100,000 and 
$150,000 the first time and then after that it’s usually between $15,000 to $20,000 
annually. How often do you use it? That’s the thing. If a hurricane comes through, 
that’s one thing. You got to train people. … On emergency management side of 
the house, that’s probably the biggest gap, is that type of capability. Now, that 
also helps you with what you call a virtual EOC. 
 
Andrew, on the other hand, is “looking to create what I call Community Development 
Assistance (CDAs) that serve really as off campus RAs in our apartment complexes” 
(this would be for student housing around outside of campus that is not directly managed 
by the university). Additionally, Andrew noted that his university “could always use 
more funding in the area of education and preventive type of education.” For Pearce, the 
need lies in “money for certifications…instrumentation and instruments,” and “additional 
money for like indoor air quality testing.” And for Toby, “the biggest gap is really 
training.” 
Interestingly, only one president made mention of specific resources needed for 
his university. Josiah noted that he would “love to have a really good modern 
replacement for the old key system, whether it’s a badge or a reader.” Josiah, along with 
other presidents, simply asked for more of the obvious resources. For example, Josiah felt 
that “it’s as simple as having another half dozen police officers” and Jose mentioned that 
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they “could always argue for a couple more cameras.” For the most part, all presidents 
“felt pretty good” as to where they stood on resources.  
Training. The ability to train and be trained was one that some crisis managers 
discussed at length during their interviews. For crisis managers themselves, all advised 
that they do their best to participate in conferences and keep up with the latest literature, 
but “limits of our budget,” as expressed by Toby, cause some roadblocks. To combat this 
constraint, Mitch advised they “study very carefully what happens at other campuses.” 
This gives them a direct, yet inexpensive, method to educate themselves on best practices 
and lessons learned from other universities. For example, Mitch mentioned that his 
university was looking closely to how FSU was responding to the active shooter incident. 
Conversely, though, William felt that there was only so much training you can do without 
wasting resources: “You won’t find anything that’s really innovative. We all probably 
watch the same thing.” 
 In terms of training for the leadership and university as a whole, participants were 
asked for their point of view on what is called “tabletop exercises” (i.e., live simulations 
of potential university crises like floods, fires, chemical spills, tornadoes, etc.). They all 
discussed doing some sort of activity at their university, but responses varied regarding 
who was actually involved. Some universities advised that they partner with their local 
emergency management agencies to host a community-wide review. Others focused only 
on internal operations. Jeremy shared his take on how they manage their tabletops: 
Majority of our exercises so far had been mostly on AVPs and below but we’ve 
had discussions with the vice-presidents and the president.   
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Do I think that we need to do exercises a little more with the vice-presidents and 
our president? Yes and they agree also. They know the importance of doing it but 
we just got to get a time. 
 
This response, that no top management participates in tabletop exercises, was consistent 
with all interviewees, except Amir. He shared, as stated earlier in this section, that his 
president and all top management attended almost all of his scheduled simulations. Direct 
involvement from crisis leaders is critical if universities are to move away from “shock 
learning” and towards “innovative learning” as described by Warren Bennis in 
Lerbinger’s (2012) book.  
Mitch and Bradley had very positive comments about what the exercises provide 
their universities: 
What those do, the positive part of those, it gets the people in the room who will 
have to deal with it when it happens.  
 
We learn from it and the whole thing is a learning experience what are we doing 
right, what are we not doing that sort of thing. 
 
Amir recognized that the annual exercises they do can sometimes be excessive, but 
necessary if you want the top management to be reminded of its importance: “I hate those 
hurricane exercises every year because like how many times can you just get a hurricane, 
but when we stop doing it, that’s when we start to lose it. We get complacent, we lose the 
commitment.” David felt that his university was “well trained and well exercised, but 
we’ve been very fortunate that we haven’t really had it tested.”  
Two presidents offered their take on these gatherings. Martin felt strongly that his 
university needed more of them, but at “all levels.” Currently, his university only has 
them for the top management, yet he believed, as noted earlier in the “communication” 
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section of the Culture theme, that across-the-board implementation is necessary. 
Conversely, though, William believed that these exercises were not important: 
I don’t feel that you need to simulate that on campus because the simulations can 
go on in places where this training happens for law enforcement professionals, but 
we have not felt the need to simulate that on campus and have fire drill kind of 
thing. 
 
His point of view touches upon a point alluded to earlier that sometimes practicing 
scenarios and investing money can be more of a self-fulfilling prophecy where “you’re 
always seeing everything as a crisis” (as stated by David and Mitch). 
Space. When asked about a common space for all crisis management units, 
responses from each university were mixed. Mitch thought it would be a waste of space 
and money given their size: 
It wouldn’t hurt to have something kind of smaller scale the police could use for 
weather stuff or just if they need some space – it would be convertible for them – 
but they surely couldn’t use what Central Florida has. 
 
Toby and Rhashad both thought it would be very beneficial to them, specifically to 
improve communications:  
We could have like a behavioral intervention team building where we could all 
live together under the same roof, so that if I needed to talk to university police I 
just walk down the hall. If I needed to go to the counseling center I could walk 
down the hall. 
 
I think it would help. It would make communications easier. If I could just walk 
across the hall and talk to the director of the physical plant.  
 
Additionally, Rhashad expressed that “PECO money from the state would also help.” 
(PECO, Public Education Capital Outlay, is the State fund that provides money to each 
university for buildings, which has been dramatically cut in recent years).  
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 System-wide, Amir noted the following after attending the UCF workshop held 
after their active shooter incident: 
One of the takeaways was that they wanted funding to do [something similar to] a 
call center - like if we could get a contract - so that all the [SUS schools] could tap 
into a call center because they were obviously fielding a ton of calls with this 
incident. 
 
However, something like this would require a significant amount of funding. And with 
dwindling budgets to each university, it is doubtful to ever occur – especially when state 
employees are now more often expected to “do more with less,” which goes back to 
issues of accountability for the SUS. 
 Summary. What is clear is that universities need to be more proactive with crisis 
management, especially resource allocation. As Amir noted in his interview: “we are very 
reactive as a whole society and we tend to throw money after the fact and we throw 
commitment and resources and attention after the fact.” Following up on the earlier 
comment noted by Pearce, the sense of importance placed on a program matters greatly. 
To this point, Amir shared the following about his university: “They’re committing 
dollars, they’re committing. There’s a sense of importance and understanding the 
priorities of it.” Notably, more students equals more risk. Consideration should be given 
by both the universities and the SUS to better service these programs and departments as 
the total enrollment for each university increases and their campus reach grows, so that 
their students can be in a safe and low risk environment as possible.   
Variability of Crisis 
 In 2007, Nassim Nicholas Taleb wrote a book called The Black Swan: The Impact 
of the Highly Improbable. Black swan events were introduced by Taleb in his 2001 book 
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Fooled By Randomness, and described as an event, positive or negative, that is deemed 
improbable yet causes massive consequences. Ralph brought up this book during his 
interview and summarized it as follows: “What he essentially says is that those rare 
things really are things that you can’t plan for - you can’t prepare for - and those are the 
things that really matter.” To this point, David added: “What [crises] point out more than 
anything is that people like us or you have no ability to really respond quickly.” This 
variability of crisis was the last theme pulled from the data. Many of the participants felt 
that defining terms and roles were incident-specific and required adaptability on 
everyone’s part. This last section discusses how universities, crisis managers and leaders 
make decisions in a world of uncertainties.  
On the topic of establishing an Emergency Operations Center at his university, 
David did not believe it was worth the investment: 
How we could sustain it? It would be … we don’t have crises like that on this 
campus. It would almost have to be us constantly training; make ourselves have 
crisis - imaginary crisis - all the time just by using it.  
 
While he agreed that UCF’s model was a well-structured one that made sense for their 
institutional culture, David believed that it could change the lens through which 
universities define crises: 
They’re really prepared for a major urban environment, and I think it’s a good 
idea for them, but at the same point, if you operate that way, if you have that kind 
of facility and you staff it and you pay for it, you’re always seeing everything as a 
crisis. 
 
Along the lines of general training and an overall culture of preparedness, other 
participants shared their perspectives. William believed that regardless of how much you 
plan, it would be impossible to think of every single scenario that a university can 
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experience: “I can conjure up a lot of things; you just can’t simulate it, you can’t 
anticipate it.” Similarly, David expressed how difficult planning is because of the 
innumerable variables involved in any given crisis: 
It’s hard to answer those questions because it really depends on how a scenario, 
any scenario plays out. I mean, that’s why it’s hard to do, have written plans. We 
all have plans but they’re generic because each scenario is different. 
 
However, David did believe that planning around current events like Ebola does have it 
benefits: “Had it not been for that, we might not have ever developed a sort of a response 
for that.” 
 As noted earlier under the “presidential values” section of the Culture theme, the 
role of crisis leadership in unpredictable situations is the ability to adapt. As Julian stated, 
“usually all the real rules go out the window during a crisis.” As such, crisis leaders and 
managers must both analyze the facts in front of them and make, as Jose mentioned 
earlier, the best decision possible: “There’s not just a standard tool kit. You’ve got to be 
able to adapt and be creative on those.” David and Bradley, respectively, had similar 
perspectives: 
For the most part, it’s really…a gut feeling, just from experience and sort of 
common sense thinking, which…sometimes isn’t very common but we have to. I 
think to be a good safety officer, certainly, you have to have good common sense. 
 
When you get into an emergency, you don’t want to pull out like some 300 page 
document like okay, how do we fix this?  A lot of it is with experience you learn 
in these situations.  What’s one, common sense?  Who are the players that need to 
be involved in making this decision?  Understanding that no matter how many 
situations we have in a book, real life always has curveballs.  How do you have a 
group of smart, trained, adaptive people with broad skillsets that can respond to 
the curveballs?  
 
To the point about experience, Bradley added: 
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I think we have to gather the information as best as we can, act responsibly with 
the information that we have.  Do our diligence in addressing the issue and make 
sure that we’re trained and using active exercises to be prepared.  At the end of 
the day, there’s a reason they call them emergencies or disasters as there’s going 
to be some unknowns and some curveballs.  I think having people who [are] 
going to adapt and are flexible and are nimble enough to navigate those with 
confidence is important.  It goes back to your statement earlier about leadership 
and tenacity. 
 
However, how, why, and what decisions are made are also critically important, as Toby 
noted: “Depending upon your response, it can either be resolved or get worse.” Toby also 
felt that “you can’t always anticipate everybody’s behavior all the time.” For this reason, 
Josiah believed that if something bad is going to happen at your university, it’s going to 
happen regardless of how well you plan: 
Guess what? It’s 2015 and we get all those issues just as you do. You have your 
police force, you do your best. But if there’s an issue out there, it’s going to find 
its way on our campuses one way or another. 
 
This unexpectedness, which can create an inability to fully prepare, was discussed 
throughout the corporate definitions and typologies of crisis in the first chapter. Overall, 
how one views, prepares, and responds to crises is all based on subjective perspectives.  
In other words, each university has to make decisions on preparation and leadership 
based on their own unique culture.  
Summary 
The 16 study participants (6 presidents and 10 crisis managers) offered a great 
deal of insight on how they defined crisis leadership and its respective roles pre-, during 
and post-crises. They felt that the differing definitions of crisis; the university’s culture 
towards crisis management; the roles played by the university, presidents and crisis 
managers; resources (current and needed); as well as the inevitable variability of crises, 
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all played a critical role in leadership. Their perspectives helped to answer all three 
research questions, which are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Study 
Issues of safety and security within higher education have evolved over the last 
five decades. Universities have had to learn how to deal with protests, shootings, natural 
disasters, health epidemics, terrorism, among others. Historically, the responsibility for 
safety has shifted throughout the university from professors to police officers, deans of 
students to presidents. Accountability on university presidents to be omniscient leaders 
and keep all constituents safe has been a growing phenomenon, especially from 
concerned parents and community members.  
This study was initiated to better understand crisis leadership in higher education 
through the lens of the university president and his/her crisis managers. Of the 34 
potential interviewees with the SUS (12 university presidents plus 2 crisis managers per 
university, with the exception of FPU), 16 agreed to participate in 2-hour qualitative 
interviews. Their interviews aimed to answer the study’s three research questions: how 
they each defined crisis, crisis management and crisis leadership; how those definitions 
contributed to the roles they each played as well as the roles they perceived the others 
played; and how those roles supported and maintained an institutional culture of safety 
and preparedness.  
In a society where incidents, emergencies, and disasters on university campuses 
have increased in frequency, presidents and crisis managers have had to place greater 
emphasis on their crisis management systems. Their dedication, or lack thereof, to these 
systems, as noted by the interviews, has been attributed to their personal values and 
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professional experiences. Their beliefs, decisions, response and support can all contribute 
to the university’s overall culture of safety, security and preparedness.  
Findings and Interpretations 
Chapter 4 offered a richly described overview of the study’s findings, which were 
described in five themes: Definitional Morass; Culture; Roles, Responsibilities and 
Accountability; Resources; and Variability of Crisis. All themes helped to answer the 
study’s three research questions, described in further detail in this section. 
Research Question 1 
The first research question was: “In the State University System of Florida, how 
does each president and crisis manager define ‘crisis’, ‘crisis management’ and ‘crisis 
leadership’ on their campuses?” These definitions were all addressed within the first 
theme described in Chapter 4, Definitional Morass.  
As discussed in the literature review by Mitroff et al. (1996), the term crisis has 
multiple, subjective meanings. However, it was also posited that Zdziarski (2006) offered 
the best definition of crisis within the context of higher education. His description was 
the comparative point to which responses to the first part of this research question were 
analyzed. For Zdziarski, crises affect the university’s normal operations and were likely 
unexpected. To some degree all participants agreed on this, but what “normal operations” 
meant to them greatly differed. For some participants, a closure of a building or road was 
a disruption to university operations; whereas, others saw that merely as an 
inconvenience. For the latter participants, interference with normal operations meant the 
event had a significant university-wide effect (e.g., tornado, active shooter, etc.).  
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Similarly, and for the most part, all participants agreed on how Zdziarski et al. 
(2007) defined crisis in their Crisis Matrix. However, seeing the division of “severity” of 
crises within the matrix (i.e., critical incident, campus emergency, and disaster) did affect 
how participants viewed their involvement. While all study participants agreed that there 
was a certain urgency to crises, how each of them defined a crisis was strongly related on 
their roles. For example, crisis managers varied on whether they saw a campus shooting 
versus a chemical spill as a crisis based on whether they worked in student affairs, 
emergency management, or environmental health and safety. A campus shooting may not 
directly impact operations for EHS departments, and therefore, they may have considered 
it a crisis for the university but not necessarily one that required their attention. 
Presidents, on the other hand, almost all saw crises as something disastrous that affected 
the university as a whole; and therefore, involving them only during those events.  
How participants defined the differences between crisis management and crisis 
leadership was even more personal than how they defined crisis. A handful of 
participants viewed management and leadership in the traditional sense: leadership 
directs management, and hence presidents guide the course for crisis managers’ response 
and systems. These participants took Peter Drucker’s perspective that “management is 
doing things right; leadership is doing the right things.” This was also the stance taken by 
Daniels and Daniels (2007).  
For leaders to do the right thing and also be successful and effective, they must 
hold specific skills, which, as described by Silva and McGann (1995), include insight, 
decision-making, communication and focus. Those who took this perspective believed, 
then, that crisis management was a system that followed rules and reacted to needed 
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action; whereas, crisis leadership used a more strategic, holistic and moral approach to 
response and decision-making.  
Conversely, there were participants – both presidents and crisis managers – who 
believed management and leadership overlapped; that at times, managers must be leaders 
and leaders must be managers. These participants felt that there was a sense of shared 
responsibility to keep their universities and its constituents safe; egos and titles are 
thrown out during crises. For them, and as with Lerbinger’s (2012) support of Warren 
Bennis’s “innovative learning” method, leaders and managers alike should learn new 
skills and share their knowledge so that the entire crisis management team can succeed.  
This study sought to get a clear, concise definition of crisis, crisis management, 
and crisis leadership. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it also assumed that Zdziarski et al.’s 
(2007) definition of crisis could be a standard definition to be used by all universities. 
However, the study’s findings only provided evidence that, though there are accepted 
descriptions of these terms, there are no collective, mutually-agreed upon meanings. 
Every participant in a presidential or crisis manager position created their own definitions 
based on their titles, job descriptions, academic credentials, professional experiences 
and/or personal beliefs and values.  
For those who fill president and crisis manager positions within the SUS, it will 
be important to get a firm understanding of which point of view their departments, 
supervisors and presidents take when it comes to defining crisis as this could greatly 
affect their roles and responsibilities in crises. These perspectives can help solidify and/or 
improve communication, collaboration, and response strategies.  
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Research Question 2 
Per the aforementioned definitions, the second research question was also three-
pronged: “What roles do crisis managers and crisis leaders see themselves playing in 
crisis management and crisis leadership, respectively? What roles do the crisis managers 
see the presidents playing in crisis management, if any? And, what roles do the presidents 
see crisis managers playing in crisis leadership, if any?” These questions were answered 
by the third theme discussed in Chapter 4: Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability.  
How each university organized their crisis management departments was not only 
a testament to the importance placed on these units, but also an expression of the 
president’s leadership style. The lack of consistency in reporting structures throughout 
the SUS supports this statement. Of the six universities interviewed, no two had the same 
organizational structure for their crisis management units. Not even the Dean of Students 
was consistently under Student Affairs.  As noted by one of the participants, there are no 
standard organizational models in existence. Every structure is highly dependent on the 
university’s culture and the leadership’s priorities. This can make it difficult for crisis 
managers to argue for improved operations. 
There was also a noted frequency of changes to the organizational structure at 
some universities. The shifting of reporting over the university’s history was in large part 
to how the president set up his direct reports, and what those direct reports felt their 
primary responsibilities should cover. For example, if a CFO felt that his/her main focus 
should be the finance side of job, areas like EHS and EM could be placed under an 
Assistant Vice President. The next CFO at that university may not feel that way, and thus 
might restructure to better suit his own beliefs and/or priorities. For those crisis managers 
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who have been with their departments for several years, this can be extremely frustrating 
and disenchanting. The feeling that their unit is not an institutional priority can greatly 
affect morale and their support of leadership, as noted throughout the interviews.  
Admittedly though, if a division has a true champion for safety and security, 
reporting structures become less important. Positive change occurs when these supporters 
exist, as noted by Mitroff and Anagnos (2011) and a couple of study participants. For 
example, EHS may report to an Assistant Vice President, but if their CFO still offers 
needed resources and support to keep the EHS department running efficiently and 
effective, a multi-tiered organizational chart between crisis managers and their presidents 
is inconsequential.  
In addition to the organizational chart for each institution, the roles played and 
perceived to be played by the university, presidents, and crisis managers were also 
specifically addressed by the participants. These roles could either hinder or aid 
teamwork and collaboration. As noted throughout the findings, internal communication, 
external partnerships and cross-training were all dependent on what presidents and crisis 
managers mutually felt was imperative.  
This most certainly supported the added accountability measures now placed on 
presidents and the SUS to keep university students, employees and visitors safe. Through 
the 1960s, universities were seen as safe havens. As societal issues such as mass-campus 
violence and protests infiltrated campuses across the nation, universities were no longer 
shielded from community dangers. University administrators had to become more 
vigilant. And as crises diversified, police, student conduct, mental health services and 
emergency management departments were established and/or expanded.  
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Universities across the nation looked at incidents like Virginia Tech as a learning 
exercise, forcing them to re-examine their own policies, communication systems, and 
allocate resources. Similarly, presidents looked at the Penn State scandal to better 
understand the pitfalls of filtered communication and being too trusting of top 
management. Though educating students is their ultimate goal, universities must also 
understand that the second phase of Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs is just as critical 
to their mission and necessary to establish an institutional culture of safety and well-
being. Whether they like it or not, as posited by Ferraro and McHugh (2010), universities, 
including its leaders, have a public expectation to keep their constituents safe. 
Research Question 3 
The last research question was: “How do those definitions and perceptions create 
a culture of preparedness towards and support of crisis management systems at their 
universities?” The second and fourth themes in the findings of Culture and Resources 
helped to answer this question.  
The university’s size and location; how presidents and crisis managers 
communicate; the president’s personal and professional values, specifically related to 
crisis decision-making, response and support; and also the institution’s values (which 
relates also to the aforementioned roles the university plays) all contributed to an 
overarching culture of safety and preparedness at each university. Resources, both 
available and needed, also added to how efficiently and effectively each university ran 
their crisis management systems.  
How large a university’s enrollment was and where they were located affected 
institutional culture in terms of demographics, probability of risks, and proximity to 
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resources. A university in a secluded part of rural Florida is not going to have to deal with 
the same probabilities that a university in a metropolitan city would. Similarly, a 
university with 10,000 students versus one with 40,000 students, or one with 500 acres 
versus 1,200 acres, has different orders of magnitude to consider. This “ecology” and 
“milieu”, as described by Tagiuri (1968), all contribute to the creation of a university’s 
foundational culture. While anything can happen anywhere at any time, universities must 
of course appreciate these variables when considering where potential threats lie and how 
much institutional support to give any department in the university. 
Adding to this physical environment are the president’s own values – the 
importance they place on safety and how that stance matches with their words and 
actions. In and out of crises, all leaders inevitably have their own ways of 
communicating; and specifically in crisis, a unique way of making decisions, showing 
support, and responding. These personal philosophies can sometimes be learned through 
books, articles, trainings and seminars, but for the most part are innate characteristics 
formed over time through the president’s own academic, professional and personal 
experiences.  
An institution’s organizational climate (i.e., politics, budgetary and infrastructural 
environments), which can rarely be changed, along with the values setting created by its 
president (an inconstant variable), undeniably creates an institution’s overarching ethos. 
It is the spirit and tenets that crisis managers and their teams follow. It is the base on 
which crisis management systems are formulated. These, in turn, further perpetuate a 
university-wide culture that is passed through each employee, visitor and supporter 
throughout the years. Therefore, when things are not working, leaders must take a close 
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look at themselves; what have they been doing or not doing, saying or not saying, that 
must be changed in order to sustain a more effective culture. 
Supporting this culture are the available and needed resources to flourish such an 
environment. There were a couple of schools that had top-notch resources, including an 
Emergency Operations Center. However, all six universities interviewed offered some 
sort of list of needed resources for them to be better equipped to respond to and recover 
from crises. They each expressed a necessity for more personnel, physical resources, 
training, and/or space – all of which comes down to the need for added funding. While 
some universities have key administrative supporters who help crisis managers and their 
departments thrive, the uniqueness of the SUS provided specific challenges in meeting 
these financial demands.  
The State of Florida has cut its funding for higher education 22% between FY 
2007 and FY 2012 (Quintero & Orozco, 2012). With university enrollments increasing 
across the SUS, universities are becoming more state-assisted instead of state-funded. 
This means that universities have to use diminishing state and private funds more wisely; 
in other words, use funds to cover critical operational costs like academic programs, 
employee salaries, and building utilities. All non-critical items like units that have a low 
return on investment (i.e., large financial output and little input) are then put at risk of 
being cut or forced to do more with less.  
Tied to budgetary decisions is the demand to meet ethical, accountability 
measures. When an EHS budget, for example, remains the same, yet enrollment has 
grown by 20% and 10 new buildings have opened in the last five years, a university is 
intentionally (though albeit, indirectly) putting themselves in jeopardy of being ill-
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prepared and ill-equipped to respond to crises. As noted in the Findings, universities and 
their leaders are being held more accountable for these types of decisions. If a bad 
incident were to ever occur, and it was learned that the appropriate resources were not in 
place because of a deliberate decision to not do so, university presidents will quickly be 
blamed and targeted as the responsible party (or at least one of). While they may try to 
redirect blame, the responsibility will still be seen are theirs. 
These doom-and-gloom scenarios are also what continues to propagate a highly 
reactive culture of crisis management (i.e., only when things go wrong should 
universities act). This mentality must change if universities are to support Mitroff’s 
(2004) claim that crisis leaders must be proactive. Through across-the-board training, 
yearly examination of budgetary needs, and strategic analysis of future areas of concern, 
university presidents, as posited by Klann (2003), can become not just successful leaders 
but effective ones. 
Summary 
The last theme described in Chapter 4, Variability of Crisis, does not directly 
answer any of the research questions, but it does touch upon all of them and helps 
synthesize the answers well. As it relates to definitions, all participants at one point 
during their interviews described the “case-by-case” or “it depends” nature of crisis 
leadership. Adding in presidential values, some universities had clear-cut opinions that 
the crisis leader is the president, others take Muffet-Willet’s stance of “top management” 
being named the leaders (i.e., the executive officers of the university), and yet others 
believe that anyone in a position to respond to crises (i.e., deans, directors, etc.) could be 
classified as crisis leaders. Additionally, the findings found that many participants felt 
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that a culture of safety was naturally imbedded into the university’s mission and did not 
need specific attention, or that a culture of preparation was not sustainable or necessary in 
their environment.  
While feasible to train for certain scenarios, it is impossible for universities to 
plan for all potential crises; every incident will bring with it its own idiosyncrasies that 
can affect decision-making and response. Similarly, a culture of over-preparation can 
become counterproductive to the goals of effective crisis leadership. Because of the 
unpredictability of crises, crisis leaders and managers alike, must pay close attention to 
the facts, the university’s environment, and institutional resources. These, although can 
change over time, are, for the most part, concrete attributes during a crisis. Institutional 
and personal values as well as a sense of moral or ethical responsibility are two things 
that are more adaptable. Tied with the foundational culture, it all can certainly make or 
break how effective crisis leaders and managers can actually be.  
Limitations 
The first limitation to this study was the decision for it to be a qualitative study, 
specifically the potential for research bias in setting interview protocols and analyzing the 
data. Prior to the interviews commencing, there was concern about how much 
participants would actually share (especially as it related to their personal thoughts on 
leadership or their institution’s pitfalls). I never felt that any participant was hiding 
anything or avoiding a response. Though some were guarded at the beginning of the 
interviews, all participants seemed very transparent by the end. As evident by the 
findings, the data analysis was very comprehensive and illustrated diverse points of views 
  
156 
throughout each theme. This openness, depth, and detail are some of the key advantages 
of qualitative research.  
The lack of anonymity and confidentiality for participants was another limitation. 
Given each participant took part in a face-to-face interview and all were state employees, 
it was impossible to offer either option. However, with a concern that directly tying their 
names to their comments in the latter chapter could cause them to censor themselves, an 
intentional decision was made to assign each participant a pseudonym. Though yes, 
someone with enough time could probably “figure it out,” the level of protection and 
comfort it offered the participants far outweighed that risk. 
The total number of participants was a third limitation. Not all 12 universities 
within the SUS participated in the study. Specifically, only about half of the intended 
sample (16 of the 34) participated. Given this was a case study of the entire State 
University System of Florida, an argument can be made that this study was left 
incomplete. Unfortunately, the timing of this study was poor with so many new 
university presidents starting their posts. This caused challenges in achieving a higher 
participant rate. However, those who did participate still came from universities with 
differing locations, enrollments, demographics, and academic missions. Therefore, the 
findings still provided a unique perspective to crisis leadership and management within 
the SUS and fully addressed the study’s three research questions.  
A fourth limitation, and as noted in the Methodology section, was the debate on 
whether qualitative case studies are generalizable or not.  Depending on the reader’s 
opinion regarding this academic standing, this study could be viewed as simply a 
summary of perspectives.  For these readers, this study was able to provide richly detailed 
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findings and conclusions regarding crisis leadership within the SUS. However, it was not 
necessarily a predictor of how all public university presidents and their crisis managers 
across the nation define the meaning of and roles in crisis leadership, or how those 
definitions contribute to an institutional culture of safety. Conversely, though, this case 
study did address the phenomenon that is crisis leadership, specifically the relationship 
between university presidents and crisis management. 
 The last limitation to the study could be its lack of theoretical testing, with a focus 
on summarizing the study’s findings. Flyvbjerg (2006) also had a stance on this matter: 
The opposite of summing up and “closing” a case study is to keep it open. Here I 
have found the following two strategies to work particularly well in ensuring such 
openness. First, when writing up a case study, I demur from the role of omniscient 
narrator and summarizer. Instead, I tell the story in its diversity, allowing the story 
to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting stories that 
the actors in the case have told me. Second, I avoid linking the case with the 
theories of any one academic specialization. Instead I relate the case to broader 
philosophical positions that cut across specializations. In this way I try to leave 
scope for readers of different backgrounds to make different interpretations and 
draw diverse conclusions regarding the question of what the case is a case of. The 
goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow 
the study to be different things to different people. (p. 22-23) 
 
This study offered a descriptive narrative of the multifaceted points of view on the 
definitions and roles of crisis leaders. The findings all supported and/or opposed previous 
literature on the effectiveness and pitfalls of crisis leadership and management without 
the creation of a new theory. In sum, and in response to the perceived and subjective 
limitations, this case study was intended to be both generalizable to other university 
presidents and crisis mangers, and its findings left open for interpretation by the reader.  
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Implications for Practice 
The results of this study indicated three important factors for higher education 
administrators to consider. The first is that university support, especially from university 
presidents, is critical to the success of both crisis managers and crisis management 
systems. However, with inconsistencies in reporting structures and resources offered, 
universities will only be left at risk and open for widespread criticism if something 
serious were to occur.  
It was evident throughout many of the crisis manager interviews, especially those 
in the EHS and EM departments, that there was deep frustration on the lack of moral and 
financial support they receive from their universities (i.e., direct supervisors, division 
leaders, and/or presidents). These units are critically important to the safety and well-
being of all constituents. If they do not feel appreciated and included in institutional 
priorities, employees suffer. These sentiments can easily lead to morale issues, which in 
turn can lead to indifference. Apathy, as I was told once by a mentor, is a lurking 
murderer knocking on your door; you have to kill it before it kills you. The only way to 
do so is by crisis leaders showing crisis managers how important they really are, and how 
much they are truly needed (in both tangible and intangible ways).  
 Outside of leadership support was the issue of how crisis management 
departments are organized at their universities. Reporting structures varied university to 
university, and were mostly a function of presidential preference. Deans of Students 
should, of course, remain under the division of student affairs. Police, emergency 
management and environmental health and safety could all collectively report to the same 
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division. Based on the units’ functionalities and overlapping responsibilities discussed 
during the interviews, this alignment seems to be the most logical.  
This structure would not only increase communication and allow for quicker 
decisions to be made, but will also allow for more efficient use of resources (e.g., space, 
budgets, etc.). However, given the varying cultures of universities (i.e., size, constituent 
groups, etc.), standardization for crisis management units could be difficult to manage as 
a system-wide initiative. This proposal for merged resources, though, should not replace 
the current and future needs for personnel, equipment, space, and trainings. How to 
solidify these funds is a key issue for presidents and crisis managers alike.  
In today’s political climate, Florida’s public universities are moving away from 
being fully state-funded. As state budgets dwindle and as universities’ use of budgets 
become restricted, little funding remains available for long-term investments. Especially 
for universities without emergency management departments (regardless of the breadth) 
and for those institutions that are growing at an exponential rate each year, the state must 
begin to invest direct funding into crisis management programs. Though a concern has 
been expressed by SUS leaders, words should be turned into deeds.  
A comprehensive state-wide strategic plan should be created and implemented 
regarding these issues, which should also include details on funding shared and also 
university-specific areas. Shared communication strategies (like the call center idea 
described by Amir) could be one example of creating more efficient operations while at 
the same time showcasing that campus safety is a priority for our state leaders. Funding 
based on the universities’ current resources and their projected growth could be another 
area described in the plan. Even though investments will never fully protect a university 
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or its constituents from total harm, if properly implemented, dedicated funds will 
significantly reduce universities’ risks for and probabilities of crises from occurring.  
At a more macro level, there could also be federal implications. Incidents like the 
one at Lehigh University can lead to statutory policies and regulations. The Clery Act not 
only affected almost every college and university in the nation, but also affected 
governmental reporting and accountability measures with these institutions. However, 
governmental agencies (state and federal) see crises more in terms of disaster and risk 
management. The conversation on the idiosyncrasies of crises for higher education 
institutions needs to become a national topic. The growing number of mental health cases 
and issues related to fraternities and sororities are only two examples of rampant crisis-
related areas that can greatly change (negatively) the landscape of higher education if a 
system-wide, state-wide, and/or nation-wide approach is not taken soon.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Given the lack of empirical research on crisis leadership in the field of higher 
education, it is important that this study be expanded and that further research be 
conducted. There may be a possibility of conducting a national survey to all public 
university presidents and their crisis managers in order to expand this study’s sample and 
help contribute to the study’s generalizability. The survey would include closed-ended 
and open-ended questions so that a thorough analysis could occur. However, there would 
be two challenges with a study of this nature.  
The first would be time and costs given the sheer number of public university 
presidents there are in the United States. Obtaining a list of all public universities would 
not be very difficult. Even getting mailing addresses for those presidents would be more 
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of a mundane process than overwhelming. The difficult part would be trying to locate the 
crisis managers at those institutions. Given the inconsistencies in titles and organizational 
structures, it would be unmanageable to aggregate all that information without having 
someone from each university assisting the researcher in locating the appropriate persons. 
Adding to that, the funding necessary to print the surveys and create mailers would be a 
big challenge for most researchers. Of course there is the option to create an online 
survey, but costs associated with dissemination and data analysis software could still 
exist. 
The second issue would be that presidents don’t always personally fill out these 
national surveys. Though most surveys nowadays include a section in the survey on who 
actually filled it out, it would be impossible to know if the responses were that of the 
president or the person filling it out. The reliability of the study could then come into 
question. This would be especially true if the survey was heavy on closed-ended 
questions, which can lower validity rates.  
Another possibility would be to conduct another case study, but expand the types 
of institutions and/or number of participants. Though this case study intentionally left out 
private universities in Florida because of their less strict requirements on crisis 
management systems and policies, there would still be value in interviewing them. It 
would be interesting to learn if and how the less stringent processes for private 
universities hinders, supports or has no effect on the relationship between crisis leaders 
and crisis managers. Similarly, how, if at all, roles between crisis leaders and crisis 
managers change depending on the type/size of the university, or if it is still dependent on 
the leader’s own values, as found in this study.  
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In analyzing the transcripts of the 10 crisis managers, I assessed that other 
executive-level leaders should have been included in the study. The one Vice President 
who participated in the studied offered a very unique perspective on how he perceived the 
president’s role in crisis leadership. Because the other crisis managers interviewed were 
three or more notches below the president (only two having frequent, direct contact with 
their president), I felt there were more negative undertones regarding their opinions of top 
management and their president than there was from the VPSA that was interviewed. 
Including the vice presidents that oversee these crisis management departments (i.e., 
Provost, CFO and/or VPSA), may offer greater insight into the opportunities and 
challenges presidents face in crises that crisis managers may not know, understand and/or 
appreciate.  
Additionally, a study including first responders (e.g., housing staff, psychological 
counselors, police, medical professionals, etc.) may be useful. Similar to the perspective 
of how the intermediary touch point between crisis managers and presidents is an 
executive leader like a Vice President, crisis responders are the connections between the 
victims and the crisis managers. Understanding their ground level perspective, could 
contribute further in understanding – in a more holistic way – the continuum from crisis 
management to crisis leadership.  
This bridging of information could provide further findings in how the 
relationships between presidents and crisis managers could be improved or inhibited. 
This direction, though, was the one taken by Muffet-Willett (2010). Therefore, a merger 
of the two studies, or a meta-analysis of all available literature of crisis leadership in 
higher education, may also be an area for further research.  
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Summary 
As noted in the Introduction, crises have simply become imbedded into our 
society (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001). They are unavoidable and are things that all leaders 
must now prepare for. When the study of crisis management emerged in the 1960s, 
Hermann (1972) created three limitations to the field. His first two were that, up to that 
point, crises had only been analyzed on an incident-by-incident basis because of the 
unique idiosyncrasies each case posed. To an extent, that is what the higher education 
literature of crisis management and crisis leadership still entails; it lacks empirical 
research. Hermann’s third limitation was that the term crisis had too many meanings (as 
supported by my literature review). This study aimed at addressing those boundaries 
Therefore, this dissertation was unique and was intended to be an empirical study on 
crisis leadership as well as crisis management in the field of higher education.  
At the onset of this study, it was posited that Zdziarski’s (2006) definition of 
crisis could be a widely accepted description for university presidents and crisis managers 
because of its foundations in student affairs. While it was a relatively agreed-upon 
synthesis, it was found that the meaning and classification of crisis was very 
idiosyncratic. University presidents each interpreted them based on their leadership styles 
(a function of personal beliefs and professional experiences), and crisis managers saw 
them solely within the context of their specific departments. This, therefore, also affected 
how the study participants defined crisis management and crisis leadership. 
Prior to conducting interviews, there was also a stance that crisis management and 
crisis leadership were vastly different and that the findings would support this belief. 
Many participants did take Drucker’s philosophy as well as the perspectives of Mitroff 
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and Anagnos’s (2001) and Daniels and Daniels’s (2007) that the roles for each were 
unique. Though there was a noted distinction between manager and leader by all 
participants, the level of division between the two was less clear. For some participants, 
there could be crises where the lines between roles would be blurred, and rightfully so. 
This, in part, was based on how managers and leaders defined a crisis. A crisis to an EHS 
director, may not be one to a president, and hence would affect if a president would be 
involved. Similarly, a president could see something as a crisis that an EM director 
believes is his responsibility and does not need the president to be making decisions.  
These perceived roles, in turn, affected a university’s culture towards and 
maintenance of safety and preparedness. A strong crisis management system, as noted by 
Fink (1986), should help to reduce “risk and uncertainty” that can allow an organization 
to be better prepared. They should help guide the university to define terms and roles. A 
leader, though, must consider a university’s specific culture (i.e., size, location, values, 
etc.) to ensure that those systems are implemented around the university’s needs – not 
just national best practices that may not be a good fit for that university. The conscious 
decision for presidents to place crisis management as a university priority, though not 
true for all participants, in and of itself, defines crisis leadership. This also supported 
Dressel’s (1982) belief that enforcement is key to success. Given these differentiations, I 
stand behind my initial position that there is a strong difference between a crisis manager 
and crisis leader.  
That being said, what is to be supposed about the collective role that university 
presidents and crisis managers play in higher education towards the study of crisis 
leadership? In Cowan’s (2014) book, he brought up the two distinct kinds of leadership: 
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direct and indirect. Those in positions of authority (i.e., presidents) use direct leadership. 
Crisis managers, on the other hand, use indirect leadership by “assum[ing] a take charge 
role and change things”. While the latter is in line with how a crisis manager was defined 
in this study (Daniels and Daniels, 2007), despite the difference in approach, both can 
still be considered leaders – albeit, on different scales. 
In analyzing the findings, I must support Muffet-Willett’s position that crisis 
leadership is fundamentally connected to the relationship between presidents and crisis 
managers. Both must offer support, tangibly and intangibly, to one another so that others 
across the university see the importance being placed on crisis management (i.e., 
resources, decisions, etc.). To do so, they must also work collaboratively if they are to 
create an institutional culture that not only has resources to keep constituents safe, but 
also sustain a deeply imbedded culture of safety and preparedness that transcends all 
current and future institutional processes.  
Overall, engaged crisis managers and crisis leaders are needed to provide optimal 
success. However, the more important of the two is an engaged president. When they 
place emphasis on campus safety and set crisis management as an institutional priority, 
this vale trickles down to other executives and crisis managers. It will help ensure that the 
university creates and sustain an overarching culture of preparedness and responsiveness. 
In sum, yes, the assumptions made by student affairs authors that presidents are 
critical to crisis management are fully supported by the findings of this study. However, it 
was also found that crisis managers are just as important to crisis leadership as university 
presidents. The relationship between both groups should be a symbiotic one, where 
cooperation benefits both groups and their respective constituents.  
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Appendix A: Interview protocol (pre-pilot study) 
Joint Questions 
1) How do you define “crisis”? 
2) How do you define “crisis management”? 
3) How do you define “crisis leadership”? 
4) What differences, if any, do you see between crisis managers and crisis leaders? 
5) Do you believe top management plays a distinctive role prior to, during and after 
a crisis? Why or why not? 
6) What role do you believe crisis leaders play in creating the direction towards and 
support of crisis management systems on their campuses? 
 
Presidents Only 
• Per the previous definitions (i.e., joint questions 1-4), how do you see crisis 
managers playing a role in crisis leadership, if any? (or vice versa, depending on 
their definitions) 
 
Crisis Managers Only 
• Per those definitions (i.e., joint questions 1-4), how do you see presidents playing 
a role in crisis management, if any? (or vice versa, depending on their definitions) 
 
 
 
 
* Formulation of all questions are pending the proposed pilot study. 
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Appendix B: Interview protocol (post-pilot study) 
Joint Questions 
1) How do you define “crisis”? – OR – What types of crises do you deal with? 
a. Human / Environmental / Facility  
b. Unintentional / Intentional  
c. Critical Incident / Campus Emergency / Disaster 
2) How do you define “crisis management”? 
3) How do you define “crisis leadership”? 
4) What differences, if any, do you see between crisis managers and crisis leaders?  
a. At what point does crisis management elevate to crisis leadership, if ever?  
5) Depending on response to above …  
a. Do you believe presidents play a unique role prior to, during, and after a 
crisis? Why or why not?  
b. What role do you believe crisis leaders play in creating a culture of 
preparedness towards and support of crisis management systems on their 
campuses?  
6) Do you see a distinction between safety and preparedness? 
7) What are your biggest challenges? 
8) In a perfect world without budget/political constraints, what would be on your 
wish list for your crisis management program 
9) ** Refer to group-specific questions ** 
10) ** To close interview, show Crisis Matrix ** 
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Crisis Managers Only 
1) Describe your duties. 
2) Describe your reporting structure. 
a. How does your EM / EOC operate?  
b. Are you familiar with ICS? 
c. What trainings / certifications have you had for CM? 
3) How does your definition / types differ from that of other campus crisis managers 
(ie. a Dean of Students)? 
4) Per the previous definitions, how do you see presidents playing a role in crisis 
management, if any? 
a. Is there a difference between Emergency managers vs. Crisis managers? 
(human vs. facility vs. environmental issues) 
 
Presidents Only 
1) Who do you perceive as your crisis manager on campus?   
a. Who has overall responsibility for safety preparedness? Response? 
2) Per the previous definitions, how do you see crisis managers playing a role in 
crisis leadership, if any? 
3) More and more, presidents are being held responsible for campus safety. How do 
you feel that plays out for our university, the SUS, and/or your colleagues? (ex. 
Penn State) 
4) ** Prior to showing Crisis Matrix, discuss 5 crisis leadership points (next page) 
**  
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http://www.leadershipchallenge.com/resource/leadership-in-crisis.aspx  
“As a brief demonstration of the application of the Five Practices of Exemplary 
Leadership to crisis leadership, I offer the following: 
• Model the Way: In my experience as a leader in business and the military, the 
quickest way to lose your leadership credentials is to not demonstrate balance in a 
crisis. Instead of calmly addressing a crisis at hand, the inept crisis leader will lose 
control of his/her actions, temper, emotions, or awareness. In the Navy we call it 
"losing the bubble"; not being aware of the tactical situation at sea can cost lives. 
Demonstrate balanced leadership. 
• Inspire a Shared Vision: It is critical in a crisis that we all share the same goal. We 
may have different reasons for the goal but we have the goal in common. For 
example, the obvious goal is to return to normalcy. To employees this means 
ensuring that their job survives, while an executive worries about stopping the 
revenue loss. Return to normalcy. 
• Challenge the Process: The organizational processes are stressed in any crisis and 
may become dysfunctional. A leader in crisis must have the flexibility to adapt to 
the situation, regardless of the inherent processes of the organization. Flexibility 
to adapt. 
• Enable Others to Act: In a crisis, much more than in normal operations, effective 
partnerships are critical to the success. Simply put, partnerships save lives. 
• Encourage the Heart: Taking care of the response staff is not much different in a 
crisis as in normal operating situations. What is different is the stress the team is 
under and how fast this can change. A leader in crisis needs to be more aware of 
  
177 
the physical, psychological, and mental condition of the team. … The leader must 
be aware and respond.” 
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Appendix C: Participant consent form 
 
 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Crisis Leadership: The Role University Presidents and Crisis Managers Play in Higher 
Education – A Case Study of the State University System of Florida 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study as part of a doctoral dissertation.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the phenomenon of crisis leadership in 
higher education. Specifically, I have chosen to conduct a case study of the State 
University System (SUS) of Florida, interviewing all available university presidents and 
crisis managers. Through the study, I hope to find commonalities and analyze key 
differences amongst the presidents and crisis managers related to their definitions of and 
roles in crisis leadership that can contribute to the higher education literature. 
 
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of roughly 24 people in this research 
study. 
 
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require a one-time, 2-hour (max) interview session. Post 
interview, you may be contacted and asked to clarify responses via email or phone.  
 
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
1. Schedule and participate in a 2-hour interview. In-person interviews will be 
requested, but phone or Skype interviews will be offered to the university presidents 
if scheduling conflicts become an obstacle.   
2. Allow for the interview to be voice recorded.  This will assist in minimizing any 
follow up meetings or clarification calls post-interview.   
 
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
There are no known physical, psychological, societal or economical risks associated with 
your participation in this study. Though the interview questions will not deal with any 
specific on-campus incidents (e.g., crises that have been in the news and/or tied to legal 
matters), if the flow of conversation leads us down that path, it is important that you 
make me aware of any discomfort so that the interview can stop or be redirected. 
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BENEFITS 
There are no direct benefits associated with your participation in this study. However, 
your interview responses will offer a great deal of insight into crisis leadership and 
therefore could help change the landscape of crisis management at universities across the 
nation.  
 
ALTERNATIVES 
There are no known alternatives available to you other than not taking part in this study.  
However, any significant new findings developed during the course of the research which 
may relate to your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you. 
 
ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent 
provided by law. In any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify a subject.  Research records will be 
stored securely and only the researcher team will have access to the records.  However, 
your records may be reviewed for audit purposes by authorized University or other agents 
who will be bound by the same provisions of confidentiality. 
   
Because this dissertation is a case study with university presidents, who are all considered 
public figures, it is impossible to guarantee confidentiality or anonymity. As such, you 
and your institution will be identified by name with regard to your responses. If, 
however, you wish to remain anonymous, please let me know and a pseudonym will be 
provided for you in the analysis and results sections.  
 
Crisis managers, however, may or may not be considered public officials. Though the 
public often has little knowledge of who you are or what roles you play, but given that all 
SUS institutions are subject to Florida’s Sunshine Law, this information can be found 
with enough research. Because crisis managers may be asked about presidential 
leadership, they may feel more comfortable with a pseudonym, so one will be provided 
for them. 
 
Each crisis manager (and president, upon request) will be still assigned a letter and 
number, respectively. The assignment will be given based on the order of interviews. For 
example, the first crisis manager will be referred to as Crisis Manager 1, or CM-1, the 
second as Crisis Manager 2 or Amir, etc. This will not only reduce the probability (to the 
extent possible) that the reader will not automatically connect responses to a specific 
manager but also offer the reader an easier way of distinguishing among respondents. The 
presidents who request anonymity will be similarly given such letters and numbers 
depending on the order in which they are interviewed. Others will be identified by name. 
 
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
You will receive no payment or reimbursement for your participation. You will not be 
responsible for any costs to participate in this study.   
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RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or 
withdraw your consent at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of 
participation will not affect any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  The 
investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they 
feel it is in the best interest. 
 
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to 
this research study you may contact Breny DaParre Garcia at FIU – 11200 SW 8 St., 
Miami FL 33199.   
 
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this 
research study or about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU 
Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or by email at ori@fiu.edu. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I 
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been 
answered for me.  I understand that I will be given copy of this form for my records. 
 
 
 
 
________________________________           __________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Printed Name of Participant 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________    __________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent    Date 
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Appendix D: Participant codes 
(assigned in chronological order of each interview) 
 
Date    Code   Pseudonym 
(Pilot)    CM-1   Carlos 
(Pilot)    CM-2   Amir 
Oct. 27, 2014   CM-3   David 
Oct. 27, 2014   CM-4   Toby 
Oct. 27, 2014   P-1   Jose 
Nov. 6, 2014   P-2   Ralph 
Nov. 21, 2014   CM-5   Mitch 
Nov. 21, 2014   CM-6   Rhashad 
Nov. 21, 2014   P-3   William 
Dec. 17, 2014   CM-7   Bradley 
Dec. 17, 2014   CM-8   Pearce 
Dec. 17, 2014   P-4   Julian 
Jan. 26, 2014   P-5   Martin 
Feb. 6, 2015   CM-9   Andrew 
Feb. 6, 2015   P-6   Josiah 
Feb. 6, 2015   CM-10   Jeremy 
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VITA 
BRENEZZA DAPARRE GARCIA 
 
 
2013   Protocol Officer Training School  
Protocol School of Washington 
 
2012   Incident Command System for Higher Education Training 
National Incident Management System Training 
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
  
Record Management Training 
State of Florida 
 
2011   Maximizing Your Leadership Potential  
Center for Creative Leadership 
    
   Active Shooter Training 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
2010-present  Deputy Chief of Staff 
   Office of the President, Florida International University 
   
2010   Notary Public  
 State of Florida 
 
2007-2010  Executive Assistant 
Office of the President, Florida International University 
    
2007-2008  Assistant Director of Operations 
   Office of the President, Florida International University 
 
2006-2007  M.S., Higher Education Administration 
   Florida International University 
 
   Budget Coordinator 
   Office of the President, Florida International University 
 
2005-2006  Program Assistant 
   Office of the President, Florida International University 
 
2001-2005  B.A., Political Science (and Honors College) 
Florida International University 
 
